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Abstract
Authenticating humans to computers remains problematic despite decades of effort.
Password-based authentication remains extremely common, in spite of its widely known
shortcomings, and this seems likely to continue. Hence improving the security of pass-
word use is a topic of huge practical importance — this observation provides the mo-
tivation for the work described in this thesis. We focus in particular on two topics,
namely password generators and password recovery.
Password generators provide site-specific passwords on demand, facilitating the use
of site-specific and complex passwords; they are an alternative to password managers
that avoid storing passwords long-term. We proposed a general model for such sys-
tems, and critically examine options for instantiating this model, including all those
previously proposed. The model has also been used to help design a new scheme, Au-
toPass, intended to incorporate the best features of the prior art whilst also addressing
many of the most serious shortcomings of existing systems through use of novel tech-
niques. AutoPass is specified in detail, and a prototype implementation is described.
The prototype has been user-trialled to test its usability and security.
Because passwords are very widely used for user authentication, most websites us-
ing passwords also implement password recovery to allow users to re-establish a shared
secret if the existing value is forgotten; however, use of such a fall-back creates addi-
tional vulnerabilities. We present a model for such systems, and use this to analyse
existing approaches. This leads naturally to a set of recommendations for system im-
plementation. Many password recovery systems involve sending a special email to the
user, e.g. containing a secret link, in which case security will depend on the email being
acted upon correctly; unfortunately, such emails are not always well-designed and can
introduce vulnerabilities. To understand better this serious practical issue, we surveyed
password recovery emails for 50 of the top English language websites and investigated
their design, structure and content. We found that many well-known web services,
including Facebook, Dropbox, and Microsoft, suffer from recovery email design, struc-
ture and content issues. This study enabled us to formulate recommendations for the
design of such emails.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Passwords
Today users communicate and interact with many types of Internet service, e.g. com-
mercial websites, news websites, social networking websites and blogs. Many such
services require users to create an account, which may have a huge amount of per-
sonal data associated with it, such as: pictures, documents, files, and histories of
shopping/transactions. To protect these sensitive data from unauthorised access and
restrict access to paid-for services, online accounts are typically protected by passwords
[22]. Password-based authentication has many advantages for both users and service
providers. Users can use passwords across multiple platforms, devices, and applica-
tions, and service providers can implement password-based authentication with little
effort and minimal cost per user, as discussed by many authors — see, for example,
[42, 74].
Despite their widely-discussed shortcomings, passwords are widely used to authen-
ticate users to online services [23]. Many attempts have been made to replace simple
password authentication, e.g. using biometrics, tokens and multi-factor authentication
[42]. However, single-factor password-based authentication remains very widely used.
Moreover, in recent years the number of widely-used password-protected services has
grown significantly, in turn increasing the number of passwords users are expected to
remember. There are a huge range of issues associated with the use of text passwords,
including the need to manage passwords for large numbers of accounts, as discussed by
Floreˆncio et al. [27], Bonneau et al. [11], Adams et al. [7], and Robert et al. [69]. In
general, these issues can be categorised as either user-related or online service-related.
User-related issues include:
• users are likely to be overwhelmed by the large number of passwords needed
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for Internet services, which can lead to use of the same password for multiple
accounts (referred to as password fatigue by Sanchez et al. [79]);
• users will often choose guessable passwords, e.g. date of birth, name of pet, or
anniversary date;
• users will often make minimal modifications to an existing password, e.g. by
including a serial number, when forced to make a change.
Online service-related issues, which can make it almost impossible for users to
remember all their passwords, include:
• many sites enforce a complex password policy, e.g. requiring passwords to contain
a minimum number of characters, or include or exclude specific characters;
• some services force users to change their password regularly, e.g. every 90 days.
These issues are all well-known and have been widely discussed (see, for example,
[28, 43]), as have the many possible alternative means of user authentication. However,
for convenience and cost reasons passwords remain very widely used, and in practice
the issues identified above ensure that in practice password authentication is often very
insecure. For example, users often select easily guessed passwords and/or re-use the
same password with many sites. The goal of thus thesis is to help make it possible
in practice for users to use passwords in a more secure way, and in particular to use
strong (i.e. not easily guessed) passwords that vary from site to site.
1.2 Managing Passwords
As noted above, despite its well-known shortcomings, password-based user authenti-
cation remains in very widespread use. This is despite the many possible alternative
authentication technologies, including biometric-based authentication, the use of secure
tokens, and identity management systems such as FIDO1 and FIDO22. Rather than
look at yet more alternatives, or try to find better ways to deploy these technologies,
this thesis is based on the premise that passwords will continue to be widely used, and
that it is therefore vitally important to find ways of making their use more secure.
That is, this thesis is concerned with the general topic of password management.
One approach to improving the security of password-based authentication is to pro-
vide means for users to manage their passwords. So called password managers (see,
1https://fidoalliance.org/
2https://fidoalliance.org/fido2/
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for example, [68, 81]) seek to achieve this by storing passwords for users and supplying
them on demand. Commercial password management services are widely available —
such as LastPass3, Dashlane4, and RoboForm5 — and password management function-
ality is also included as part of most commonly used browsers. However, the fact that
password managers need to retain copies of user passwords give rise to both security
and usability issues. If the passwords are stored locally, then they will no longer be
available when the user switches to a different platform. Alternatively, if they are stored
in the cloud (as is the case, for example, for Safe In Cloud6) then there is the danger
of compromise as a result of a web-based attack, examples of which have been widely
discussed by Silver et al. [81] and the Independent Security Evaluators (ISE)7 group.
These observations have led the development of what we call password generators, i.e.
systems which can generate a site-specific password on demand, but which avoid the
need to store a database of user passwords. Such systems can help address the usabil-
ity and security issues that arise for password managers. Password generators are the
main focus of Part II of this thesis.
Major problems can arise when a user forgets their password. Because this is such
a common event, almost all websites supporting user authentication also offer a means
for password recovery, to enable the user to re-establish a password for authentication.
However, there are clear security threats arising from such a process, notably that an
unauthorised party might trigger or somehow subvert the process to gain access to a
user account. It is therefore vital that such systems are well-designed. This is the issue
we address in Part III of this thesis.
1.3 Contributions
In this thesis we address the general problem of improving the security and usability of
password-based user authentication to web services. This is an area of huge practical
importance, given the current ubiquity of password-based authentication. As noted
above, the research described in this thesis makes contributions in two specific areas
within this field: password generators and password recovery systems.
Password generators provide site-specific passwords on demand, facilitating the use
of site-specific and complex passwords; they are an alternative to password managers
that avoid storing passwords long-term. We propose a general model for such sys-
3https://www.lastpass.com
4https://www.dashlane.com
5https://www.roboform.com
6https://safe-in-cloud.com/en/
7https://www.securityevaluators.com/casestudies/password-manager-hacking/
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tems, and critically examine options for instantiating this model, including all those
previously proposed. This analysis reveals a number of practical issues with existing
password generator schemes, for which we propose possible solutions. The model has
also been used to help design a new scheme, AutoPass, intended to incorporate the best
features of the prior art whilst also addressing many of the most serious shortcomings
of existing systems through use of the novel features we identified as a result of our
analysis. AutoPass is specified in detail, and a prototype implementation is described.
The prototype has been user-trialled to test its usability and security.
Because passwords are very widely used for user authentication, most websites us-
ing passwords also implement password recovery to allow users to re-establish a shared
secret if the existing value is forgotten; however, use of such a fall-back creates addi-
tional vulnerabilities. We present a model for such systems, and use this to analyse
existing approaches. This leads naturally to a set of recommendations for system im-
plementation. Many password recovery systems involve sending a special email to the
user, e.g. containing a secret link, in which case security will depend on the email being
acted upon correctly; unfortunately, such emails are not always well-designed, and can
introduce vulnerabilities. To understand better this serious practical issue, we surveyed
password recovery emails for 50 of the top English language websites and investigated
their design, structure and content. We found that many well-known web services,
including Facebook, Dropbox, and Microsoft, suffer from recovery email design, struc-
ture and content issues. This study enabled us to formulate recommendations for the
design of such emails.
1.4 Joint Work
I have performed all the research described in this thesis, under the supervision of
Professor Chris Mitchell, with the following single exception. Coding for the prototype
implementation of AutoPass described in Chapter 7 was performed by Dr Wanpeng Li,
although decisions about functionality remained under my control.
1.5 List of Publications
The following published papers describe much of the work addressed in this thesis.
• F. Al Maqbali and C. J. Mitchell. Password generators: Old ideas and new. In
S. Foresti and J. Lopez, editors, Information Security Theory and Practice —
10th IFIP WG 11.2 International Conference, WISTP 2016, Heraklion, Crete,
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Greece, September 26-27, 2016, Proceedings, volume 9895 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 245–253. Springer, 2016.
• F. Al Maqbali and C. J. Mitchell. Autopass: An automatic password genera-
tor. In International Carnahan Conference on Security Technology, ICCST 2017,
Madrid, Spain, October 23-26, 2017, pages 1–6. IEEE, 2017.
• F. Al Maqbali and C. J. Mitchell. Web password recovery: A necessary evil? In
K. Arai, R. Bhatia, and S. Kapoor, editors, Proceedings of the Future Technologies
Conference, FTC, Vancouver, Canada, November 15-16, 2018, pages 324–341.
Springer, 2018.
• F. Al Maqbali and C. J. Mitchell. Email-based password recovery — risking or
rescuing users? In 2018 International Carnahan Conference on Security Technol-
ogy, ICCST 2018, Montreal, QC, Canada, October 22-25, 2018, pages 1–5. IEEE,
2018.
A further paper (based on Chapter 7 of this thesis) is about to be submitted.
• F. Al Maqbali, W. Li and C. J. Mitchell, AutoPass: Implementation and testing.
1.6 Structure of Thesis
The reminder of this thesis is divided into four parts, as follows.
1. Part I provides background material. It contains the following three chapters.
• Chapter 2 introduces user authentication, and covers the following topics:
an overview of user authentication, the user authentication lifecycle, pass-
word use and vulnerabilities, password managers, password generators and
password recovery.
• Chapter 3 provides a description of password generators, a review of the prior
art and a discussion of the shortcomings of existing password generators.
• Chapter 4 introduces password recovery and identifies a range of issues as-
sociated with it.
2. Part II is concerned with password generators.
• Chapter 5 introduces a general model for the operation of password gen-
erators. It considers existing password generator mechanisms within the
context of this model, and also considers certain novel mechanisms designed
to address identified shortcomings in existing schemes.
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• Chapter 6 provides a detailed specification and analysis of AutoPass, a pass-
word generator scheme designed using concepts introduced in Chapter 5.
• Chapter 7 describes in detail the design of the AutoPass password genera-
tor prototype, and also gives the results of a preliminary user trial of this
prototype.
3. Part III addresses the password recovery and in particular email-based password
recovery. It contains two chapters, as follows.
• Chapter 8 introduces a general model for the password recovery process,
and uses this to give a structured analysis of usability and security issues for
such systems. It also provides a set of recommendations designed to help
develop secure and usable password recovery mechanisms.
• Chapter 9 describes and analyses the results of a real-world study of the
operation of email-based password recovery for 50 major English language
websites.
4. Part IV concludes the thesis by summarising the main contributions as well as
highlighting possible areas for future work. This part of the thesis consists of a
single chapter, Chapter 10.
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Chapter 2
User Authentication
2.1 Introduction
This first main part of the thesis, consisting of three chapters, provides the background
material and review of previous work necessary for the remainder of the thesis. This
chapter is concerned with introducing user authentication, covering what it is and how
it works. It also introduces password-based user authentication, and reviews some of
the major threats to its security. Finally, the topics of password managers, password
generators and password recovery are briefly introduced. Previous work on password
generators is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. This is followed, in Chapter 4,
by a review of the state of the art in password recovery.
2.1.1 Identification and Authentication
For the purposes of this thesis we define user identification as a claim by a user (or
subject1) of possession of a user identifier to a requesting party (the verifier or authen-
ticating party). That is, user identification enables the verifier to learn who the user
might be, but does not provide assurance that this knowledge is correct. Typically, user
identification will involve learning who the user is from amongst a pre-defined group
of users, e.g. those who have registered for the service concerned. User authentication
is then the provision of assurance to the verifier that the user is the legitimate owner
of that identifier. That is, user authentication provides assurance in the correctness of
the identifier that is learnt from user identification.
The nature of the identifier will, of course, depend on the context, but could in-
clude an email address or a value assigned to an employee by an organisation. User
identification and user authentication are fundamentally important technologies for en-
1 The terms user and subject are used interchangeably throughout the thesis.
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forcing information security policies; in particular, without reliable identification and
authentication of users, it is impossible to enforce access control or accountability.
User identification is an age-old concept, with humans apparently pre-programmed
to recognise people from their faces and voices. The need for user authentication has
grown as societies have become larger and more complex, giving rise to the need for one
human to authenticate another when they were not previously known to each other.
With communications technology enabling remote interactions, e.g. by phone or com-
puter, and where the identifying party is a machine not a human, user authentication
now needs to be performed very frequently.
Of course, there are more general notions of user authentication, not requiring iden-
tification as a precursor. For example, ISO/IEC 27000 [50] defines authentication as
“provision of assurance that a claimed characteristic of an entity is correct”, where this
characteristic (or attribute) could be an identifier but could also be any other informa-
tion associated with the user, e.g. that the user is over 21, is an employee of a specific
company, or is female. Use of a non-identifying attribute allows access to a service to
be authorised in a privacy-friendly way, although this more general type of user authen-
tication is outside the scope of this thesis. Note also that the terms authentication and
entity authentication are commonly used to cover technologies designed to enable one
machine to prove its identity to another machine (see, for example, Boyd and Mathuria
[13]). Typically, such mechanisms involve exchanges of cryptographically-protected val-
ues. However, such techniques are outside the scope of this thesis, since we are only
concerned with the case where the party being authenticated is a human being. For
convenience, in the remainder of this thesis we sometimes drop the word user and just
refer to authentication when we implicitly mean user authentication.
There are many ways of achieving authentication, i.e. ways of providing assurance
in the correctness of the identifier to the authenticating party. In this thesis we focus
on the case where the verifier is a computer, the subject is a human, and the means of
providing assurance is a password. We look at these issues in greater detail immediately
below.
2.1.2 User Authentication to Computers
As noted above, in this thesis we are concerned with the case where the verifier is a
computer. In this context, the main goal of user authentication is typically to support
authorisation, i.e. verification of the subject’s right to access a particular service. In
such a case the computer typically has an authentication database containing informa-
tion associated with each authorised subject, that is used as part of the user authen-
tication process. The subject is typically equipped with credentials of some kind, and
9
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these credentials are then employed by the subject to provide the necessary assurance
to the verifier. This is illustrated in Figure 2.1, which shows the main elements of an
authentication system.
Figure 2.1: The elements of an authentication system [82]
As discussed by many authors (see, for example, O’Gorman [70], Smith [82] and
Stallings et al. [83]), the techniques used for user authentication in this man-machine
context can be divided into three main categories, depending on the nature of the user
credentials:
• what you know : knowledge-based authentication, where the user credential is
information held by the user;
• what you have: token-based authentication [20], where the user credential is a
physical token; and
• what you are: ID-based or biometric authentication, where the user credential is
some physical or behavioural characteristic of the user [40].
This classification is shown diagrammatically in Figure 2.2. Of course, for greater
assurance it is possible to use more than one type of credential, giving rise to the
notion of dual- or multi-factor authentication (as, for example, discussed by Smith
[82]).
In this thesis we are concerned with knowledge-based authentication, and in par-
ticular where the user has a password which he/she is typically requested to remember
and supply on demand for authentication purposes. The verifier database will either
10
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Figure 2.2: User authentication categories [70]
contain a copy of the password or, more commonly, information which can be used to
verify whether or not an offered password is correct (e.g. the hash of a password).
2.1.3 User Authentication Model
The user authentication step, involving use of credentials to verify a claimed identity,
is typically only part of a larger authentication system. To illustrate this larger context
we briefly introduce the model of the user authentication process provided by NIST
SP 800-63-3 [37]. The main entities in this model that directly relate to authentication
are as follows.
• The subject (or user in our terminology) is the human user who wishes to access
a service provided by the verifier.
• The claimant is the party to be authenticated (for the purposes of this thesis,
the subject and claimant are the same entity).
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• The verifier is the party that verifies the claimant’s identity.
The NIST model also introduces two further entities, the subscriber and the ap-
plicant, that relate to a process known as identity proofing. Identity proofing, where
the subject’s claim to an identity is verified, is a step that occurs prior to routine user
authentication, when a new subject is to be added to a system (part of registration,
discussed in greater detail in 2.2.2 below). We observe that in a typical web application
in which a password is used for user authentication (i.e. the scenario that forms the
main focus of this thesis), the identity proofing step may be omitted since there are no
pre-existing resources (or relationship) to which access is being controlled.
Figure 2.3 (taken from SP 800-63-3 [36]) shows the various entities and interactions
in the NIST model. The figure shows two other entities that may be involved in some
authentication scenarios, although they are beyond the scope of the systems we consider
in this thesis:
• Credential Service Providers (CSPs) are involved in generating credentials and
other functions relating to registration;
• Relying Parties (RPs) depend on the results of authentication, e.g. in the provi-
sion of services.
Figure 2.3: Digital Identity Model [37]
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2.2 The User Authentication Lifecycle
2.2.1 The Main Steps
The various parties in an authentication system, as introduced above, are involved in
a range of activities during the lifetime of a subject’s relationship with a verifier. We
summarise these as part of the activities that we refer to as the user authentication
lifecycle. This involves the following four main stages, described in greater detail below.
• registration, i.e. the establishment of a relationship between the subject and the
verifier, which includes identity proofing, credential establishment, and adding
the subject to the verifier’s authentication database;
• performing authentication, i.e. the everyday use of credentials to enable the iden-
tity of a user to be authenticated by a verifier;
• account maintenance, including credential change and account recovery, where
the verifier re-establishes its relationship with a subject if the subject forgets or
loses his or her identifier and/or credentials; and
• account closure, i.e. where the subject terminates his or her relationship with the
verifier.
2.2.2 Registration
Registration (also sometimes referred to as enrolment) involves the user and verifier
setting up their relationship, including establishing the user credentials and adding ap-
propriate information to the verifier’s authentication database. In general, registration
includes identity proofing but, in the context of interest here, i.e. interactions between
a user and a website, this step is typically omitted. As part of registration, a website
will also typically require the user to choose a unique user name (or give an email
address to function as a user name). Examples of the types of personal information
that may be gathered during registration include first name, last name, gender, and
date of birth.
2.2.3 Performing Authentication
Once registration is complete, a user can employ the established credentials to au-
thenticate him/herself to the verifier. In the case of interest in this thesis, this means
providing the password when requested. Figure 2.4 (due to Horsch [44]) shows the
authentication process.
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Figure 2.4: Activity diagram of password-based authentication [44]
2.2.4 Account Maintenance
During the lifetime of the relationship between a user and a verifier it may be necessary
to update the credentials or recover a lost identifier or lost credentials. Credential
update is clearly an important step, although we do not consider this in detail here.
However, addressing the situation where the user and verifier relationship needs repair
is a topic addressed in detail later in this thesis. We use the term account recovery to
cover any steps taken to re-enable identification and authentication.
One case of account recovery of particular interest here is what we term credential
recovery, relevant if the user no longer has access to the credentials necessary to com-
plete authentication. How this situation might arise, along with the possible methods
for recovery, very much depend on the nature of the credentials. This thesis is primarily
concerned with the case where the credentials are passwords, in which case we refer to
password recovery. We discuss password recovery in greater detail in Section 2.6.
2.2.5 Account Closure
Account closure is performed when a user wishes to terminate his or her relationship
with the verifier. As a result of this step the user credentials will be invalidated, and the
user will no longer be able to access the services provided by the verifier that require
users to log on. What happens to any personal information of the user after account
closure is an important issue. European data privacy law, notably the General Data
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Privacy Regulation (GDPR) [18], requires personal data to be deleted when it is no
longer required for the purpose for which it was gathered. This notion is consistent
with principles in international data privacy standards, notably ISO/IEC 29100 [49],
which, as part of the data minimization principle, requires that ICT systems ‘delete and
dispose of PII whenever the purpose for PII processing has expired, there are no legal
requirements to keep the PII or whenever it is practical to do so’. Erasing redundant
personal information is also consistent with the GDPR notion of the Right to erasure
(also known as the right to be forgotten), which is covered in detail in Article 17 of the
GDPR regulation [18]. In particular this article specifies the conditions under which a
user has the right to insist on the erasure of personal data. However, whilst clearly of
key importance, such privacy issues are not addressed in detail in this thesis.
2.3 Passwords: Use and Vulnerabilities
2.3.1 Setting up a Password
If passwords are being used for authentication, a user will be required to choose a
password as part of registration. Some websites may enforce a password policy, i.e. a
set of rules which selected passwords must satisfy, typically intended to try to make the
password more difficult for someone to guess. Once a password has been selected, and
after passing any policy checks, the verifier will store information necessary to verify
it, e.g. the result of applying a cryptographic hash function to the password, in its
authentication database.
2.3.2 Using Passwords
As has been discussed by many authors (e.g. [9, 69, 78, 92]), text-based passwords have
been employed for user authentication for over 50 years, and password remains the most
commonly used authentication method for online services [9]. This is likely because
of its ease of implementation by both services and users, as described in [1, 11, 88],
avoiding the need for costly and inconvenient token or biometrics-based solutions.
We focus primarily here on the case where the password is used as the sole means
of authentication (the single-factor case). Personal Identification Numbers (PINs), i.e.
short, fixed-length, numeric-only passwords, are typically used in conjunction with a
token of some kind, i.e. in a dual-factor scheme; by contrast we are primarily concerned
with the case where the password is of variable length and can include a wide range of
characters.
In practice, the following security issues arise. Many of these problems derive from
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the fact that users are expected to remember a large number of complex passwords,
which in practice is impossible for most people. Recent National Cyber Security Centre
(NCSC) statistics2 reveal that UK citizens have on average 22 online passwords.
• Users are typically encouraged to use a different password with each service with
which they interact. The reasons for this are clear — if a password is used with
multiple sites and one of these is compromised, then there is the risk that the
user can be impersonated to all the sites with which the user employs the same
password. Since compromises of password databases are commonplace (see, for
example, the Have I Been Pwned site3), password re-use represents a major risk
to the security of authentication. Unfortunately, it is also well-established (see,
for example, [21, 63]) that users widely re-use passwords. The same NCSC survey
referred to above suggests that UK users employ the same password for an average
of four sites4.
• Experimental evidence [44] suggests that, in order to resist brute force attacks
on compromised hashed password databases, passwords should contain at least
12 characters; however, in practice users often choose much shorter passwords.
This exposes them to brute force attacks if a password database is exposed (see
Section 2.3.4).
• In an attempt to make password security more robust, websites impose a variety
of password policies, i.e. sets of rules which user-chosen passwords must satisfy.
Typical constraints cover the sets of characters which the password must contain,
and minimum (and maximum) password lengths. However, there is no agreement
on what the best policy is, meaning that there is a very wide variety of such
policies — as Florencio and Herley [29] have observed, this actually has the
perverse effect of making password management more difficult and potentially
less secure for end users. Also, some websites enforce regular password changes,
a practice which has recently been discouraged by a number of influential security
advisory bodies5.
In practice most users find it very difficult to remember a large number of different
complex passwords, i.e. passwords not easily guessed. This causes many users to re-
use passwords with multiple sites and/or to store copies of passwords. However, there
2https://cyforsecure.co.uk/blog/password-security-infographic-ncsc/, Accessed:
29/04/12/2019
3https://haveibeenpwned.com/
4https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/password-guidance-simplifying-your-approach
5https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/articles/problems-forcing-regular-password-expiry
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are technical solutions which help users manage multiple passwords, namely password
managers (see Section 2.4) and password generators (see Section 2.5).
2.3.3 Password Vulnerabilities
There are many ways in which unauthorised parties could seek to learn passwords for
other users’ accounts. Key examples include the following.
• Online guessing attacks. The attacker could try random combinations of user
names/passwords (perhaps using likely values for the user name and/or password)
at a site in the hope of guessing a correct pair [89, 35]. Alternatively, if some user
names are known (e.g. as might be the case if the site uses email addresses as
user names), then multiple guessed passwords could be entered for each valid user
name, in the hope of guessing the correct one. This might be made even simpler
for the attacker if a valid password for this user name is known for a different
site, and this could be used as a guess in the knowledge that password re-use is
common. This approach is made less effective for the attacker if a website restricts
the number of attempted logins to an account, e.g. by imposing increasing delays
after the first three or four failed attempts.
• Offline guessing attacks. It is common for entire authentication databases to be
compromised (see, for example, the Have I Been Pwned website6). As discussed
in Section 2.3.4, these databases typically contain the results of applying a hash
function to a password, often in combination with a random ‘salt’ value. This
allows the attacker to test large numbers of guesses for the password for each
account, e.g. using tables of ‘likely’ passwords. Indeed, hardware specifically
designed for such large scale searches is available (see, for example, Horsch [44]).
• Eavesdropping attacks. If a password is sent across an insecure link (e.g. using
HTTP rather than HTTPS across a wifi network operated by an attacker) then
it might be intercepted.
2.3.4 Verifying Passwords
As we have discussed, we suppose that the verifier maintains an authentication database,
containing the information necessary to verify a supplied password. This could actu-
ally involve storing the passwords themselves; however, this is generally considered
bad practice since, if the database is compromised e.g. as a result of an attack on the
server, then so are all the passwords. Instead, it is common practice to store the result
6https://haveibeenpwned.com/
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of applying a cryptographic (one way) hash function to each password; this notion is
very well-established, having been in use for the Unix account database since the 1970s
(see, for example, the 1979 paper by Morris and Thompson [69]).
When an offered password needs to be verified, it is submitted to the same hash
function and the result is compared to the value in the database. Of course, this
still allows ‘brute force’ offline searches for a password if the authentication database
is compromised. Moreover, if the same hash function is used for every password, this
allows for simultaneous searching for all passwords in the database by hashing a guessed
password and comparing it with all the hashes in the database. Such an attack can
be made even more effective by precomputing hashes of widely used passwords; such a
table can be used to quickly search all compromised authentication databases that use
the same hash function.
A simple countermeasure, also discussed by Morris and Thompson [69], is to gen-
erate a random salt (a short bit string) for each account, and to combine this with
the password (e.g. by concatenating them) before it is hashed. The salt is stored in
the database along with the hashed password. This effectively means every password
is hashed in a different way, meaning each hashed password has to be ‘brute forced’
individually. Also, as long as the salt is long enough (i.e. so that there are sufficiently
many different salt values), this makes the calculation of precomputed tables of hashed
passwords infeasible, since one would need to be created for each possible salt.
2.4 Password Managers
Many technologies have been devised to improve on the level of security provided by
passwords. This includes: providing alternative means of user authentication, using an
identity management system (such as OAuth [41] or FIDO [26]), or simply by making
the use of strong, i.e. not readily guessable, passwords easier. In line with the previous
remarks about the continuing ubiquity of passwords, we focus on the third of the above
categories.
In particular, the fact that users are expected to memorise large numbers of different
strong passwords simply to go about their daily business on the Internet, clearly forces
users to compromise their own security; around 10 years ago, Floreˆncio and Herley,
[28], reported that in a large scale study each user had about 25 accounts that required
passwords, and typed an average of 8 passwords per day — these numbers have probably
risen significantly since their study. The hope is that, in the short-to-medium term at
least, systems can be devised to make the user workload manageable whilst still enabling
the use of strong and diverse passwords.
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One important category of schemes making strong passwords easier to use is made
up of the password managers (what McCarney [68] calls retrieval password managers).
A password manager is an online or offline application, possibly implemented as a
browser extension, that captures and stores user passwords for online accounts. Along
with the password, password managers typically also store the website URL and the
user name. Depending on where it is stored, the password database can be protected
in a variety of ways; if stored locally, it is typically encrypted using a key derived from
a user-supplied master password.
Password managers come in many types, differing in the way they encrypt pass-
words, where they store passwords (locally or in the cloud), and in the additional
features offered. One possible additional feature is automatic form-filling to minimise
manual errors and protect against keyloggers. Table 2.1 summarises the features of-
fered by nine widely discussed password managers. Table 2.1 indicates the presence or
absence of 14 different possible features for a password manager for each of the nine
chosen schemes. These 14 features are summarised below.
• Offline Mode indicates that the password manager can operate in the absence of
an Internet connection.
• Two-Factor Authentication indicates that the scheme supports an additional au-
thentication mechanism.
• Browser Integration indicates that the scheme supports integration with one or
more web browsers.
• AutoFill Forms indicates that the scheme also enables auto-completion of forms,
e.g. storing and filling in personal details.
• Password Generation indicates the scheme provides a facility to generate random
passwords.
• Security Alert indicates that the scheme will provide a user with an alert whenever
it has been used to provide a password for a website.
• Portable Application indicates that the scheme can be used without installing
any special-purpose software.
• Mobile Application indicates that it has been implemented as a smart phone app.
• Security Audits indicates the ability of the scheme to verify the security of saved
password, e.g. to highlight weak or duplicate passwords.
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• Import Password indicates the ability of the scheme to import saved passwords
from another password management scheme.
• Export Password indicates the ability of the scheme to export saved passwords
to another password management scheme.
• Single Sign-On indicates the ability of the password manager to act as a central
point of authentication for a range of web services.
• Password Sharing indicates that the scheme supports password sharing with nom-
inated third parties.
• Cloud-Based indicates that the scheme stores user passwords in the cloud.
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Password Manger 
Features 
Offline Mode 
Two-Factor 
Authentication 
Browser 
Integration Autofill Forms 
Password 
Generation Security Alert 
Portable 
Application 
Mobile 
Application 
LastPass ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
KeePass ● ● ●   ●   ● ● 
1Password ● ● ● ● ● ●   ● 
Dashlane ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Passwordstate ● ● ● ● ●   ● ● 
Keeper ● ● ● ● ●   ● ● 
Sticky Password ● ● ● ● ●   ● ● 
Devolutions Password 
Server ● ● ● ● ● ●     
RoboForm ● ● ● ● ●   ● ● 
         
Password Manger 
Features   
Security Audits 
Import 
Password 
Export 
Password Single Sign-On 
Password 
Sharing Cloud-Based   
LastPass ● ● ● ● ● ●   
KeePass   ● ●   ●     
1Password ● ● ●   ● ●   
Dashlane ● ● ●   ● ●   
Passwordstate ● ● ●   ●     
Keeper ● ● ● ● ● ●   
Sticky Password   ● ●   ● ●   
Devolutions Password 
Server ● ● ● ● ●     
RoboForm ● ● ● ● ● ●   
 
Table 2.1: Password managers compared
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However, the shortcomings of password managers have also been widely documented
(see, for example, McCarney [68]). Passwords stored only on the user’s platform restrict
user mobility, since they will not be available when a user switches, for example, from
use of a laptop to a tablet or phone. However, if passwords are stored remotely ‘in the
cloud’, then there is a danger of compromise through poorly configured and managed
servers. Sadly there are real-world examples of compromises of such password managers
[17, 55, 72, 75, 61].
These issues have led some authors to consider another, related, category of tech-
niques designed to help improve the security of password-based authentication, namely
password generators. These schemes, introduced immediately below, avoid the need to
store individual passwords long-term.
2.5 Password Generators
A password generator is a client-side scheme which generates (and regenerates) site-
specific strong passwords, with the minimum of user input. These schemes operate by
generating site-specific passwords on demand from a combination of inputs, including
those supplied by the user and those based on the nature of the site itself. A number
of individual schemes of this type have been proposed but, apart from a brief summary
by McCarney [68], they have not been studied in a more general setting. Password
generators are one of the main focuses of this thesis, and we provide a more detailed
introduction to the prior art in Chapter 3.
2.6 Password Recovery
Web password recovery, enabling a user who forgets their password to re-establish a
shared secret with a website, is very widely implemented. Most websites requiring users
to create an account support password recovery, enabling legitimate users who forget
their password to continue to use the website. In order to support password recovery,
a website will typically gather a range of information about the user, which can be
divided into two main categories:
• personal information, i.e. information about the individual that may be used for
a range of purposes apart from password recovery;
• recovery information, i.e. information used only for password recovery.
The types of information established purely for password recovery purposes vary
widely, depending on the detailed operation of the recovery process. We can identify
22
2.7. Conclusions 2. User Authentication
the following general categories.
• Recovery authentication information, i.e. information that can be used to
authenticate the user, e.g. answers to security questions.
• Recovery contact details, i.e. special contact details, such as an email address
or phone number, used exclusively for password recovery. Example of such details
include an email address.
Password recovery forms the second main focus of this thesis, and we provide a
more detailed introduction to the prior art in Chapter 4.
2.7 Conclusions
In this chapter we provided an overview of user authentication, including the definition
and lifecycle of user authentication; we also discussed the use and vulnerabilities of
passwords. Finally we introduced the notions of password managers, password gener-
ators and password recovery.
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Chapter 3
Password Generators
3.1 Introduction
This chapter is concerned with password generators, i.e. schemes designed to simplify
password management for end users by generating site-specific passwords on demand
from a small set of inputs, at least one of which is secret. Note that the term has
also been used to describe schemes for generating random or pseudorandom passwords
which the user is then expected to remember; however, we use the term to describe a
system intended to be used whenever a user logs in and that can generate the necessary
passwords on demand and in a repeatable way.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 lists the main com-
ponents of a password generator, and Section 3.3 then gives an overview of previously
proposed password generator schemes. Finally, in Section 3.5, we discuss the short-
comings of existing schemes; this provides the motivation for the research described in
Part II of this thesis.
3.2 A Definition
A password generator is a client-side scheme which generates (and regenerates) site-
specific strong passwords on demand, with the minimum of user input. These schemes
operate by generating site-specific passwords from a combination of inputs, including
those supplied by the user and those based on the nature of the site itself. A number of
individual schemes of this type have been proposed but, apart from a brief summary by
McCarney [68], they have not been studied in a more general setting. One well-known
example of a password generator is PwdHash1.
1https://pwdhash.github.io/website/
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A password generator is typically implemented as functionality on an end-user
platform to support password-based user authentication to a remote server (assumed to
be a website, although most of the discussion applies more generally). This functionality
generates, on demand, a site-unique password for use in authentication.
The password is generated as a combination of a number of values, where the exact
choice of values, the method used to combine these values, and the method used to
format the output varies widely between schemes (as is made clear in Section 3.3).
However, in each case at least one of the inputs must be secret to ensure the generated
password is secret, and at least one of the inputs must be site-specific, to ensure the
password is unique to that site. A general model for password generators is presented
in Chapter 5.
Perhaps the most significant difference between a password generator and a pass-
word manager is that, while password managers store user passwords, password genera-
tors generate them on demand. This potentially eases cross-platform portability whilst
avoiding the risks associated with a locally or cloud-located repository of passwords.
A more detailed comparison of their relative merits has been provided by Bonneau et
al. [11] and McCarney [68].
3.3 Previous Work
We next review previous work on the design and properties of password generation
schemes. The work is presented in chronological order of publication.
• The Site-Specific Passwords (SSP) scheme proposed by Karp [54] in 2002/03
is one of the earliest proposed schemes of this general type. SSP is a stand-
alone application that generates a site-specific password by combining a long-
term user master password (referred to by Karp as a user password) and an
easy-to-remember name for the website, as chosen by the user. These two inputs
are concatenated and hashed using the MD5 algorithm to produce a 16-byte
string, which is then converted to ASCII by Base64 encoding and truncated to
12 characters. The generated password can be then typed manually into the
password field of the web site. A screenshot of the SSP window is shown in
Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: Site-Specific Passwords (SSP),[54]
SSP suffers from some obvious shortcomings, as discussed by the author, who
also proposes possible remedies [54]. The main shortcomings of SSP are listed
below.
– The site name can be easily guessed, and if the user-chosen password is weak
then an attacker may be able to generate the site password.
– The user needs to remember the chosen name for each site.
– The generated password may not match the password policy requirements
of the website, which could make the system unusable for many sites.
– The need to enter the password manually means that the system offers no
protection against phishing attacks. The need for manual password entry
arises from the fact that SSP is implemented as a stand-alone application,
preventing automatic password entry.
• PwdHash, due to Ross et al. [77], is a browser extension (for Firefox, Chrome and
Opera) that generates a site-specific password by combining a long-term user
master password, data associated with the web site (the site domain name), and
(optionally) a second global password stored on the platform. The site-specific
password is then generated by hashing the concatenation of the inputs. The hash
is implemented using a Pseudo Random Function keyed by the password.
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PwdHash incorporates functionality to block JavaScript-based attacks, e.g. key-
board monitoring, domain rewriting and password reflection attacks. This pro-
tection can be enabled either by prefixing an entered password with @@ or by
pressing the F2 key. Since PwdHash is a browser extension, it automatically has
access to the site domain name, and uses this as part of the input to generate the
password. This protects against phishing attacks. Figure 3.2 shows the PwdHash
window.
Figure 3.2: PwdHash, [77]
PwdHash (along with ObPwd) is one of the few active password generator schemes
which is maintained by its developers. A web version is available at https:
//pwdhash.github.io/website/. The web version is intended to address the
portability issue; however, use of the web version potentially gives access to the
user passwords to the operators of the pwdhash site, giving rise to a possible trust
issue.
Other possible limitations are discussed by Ross et al. [77], including possible
DNS Attacks. Chiasson et al. [14] conducted a usability study of two password
managers, one of which was PwdHash. This study revealed that users had an in-
correct and incomplete mental picture of PwdHash. This was due to the interface
design which can lead to security issues; for example, users are required to prefix
the first password with @@, and they (falsely) assumed that subsequent further
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passwords will be protected too. Another issue is the lack of feedback from the
PwdHash interface, leaving users unsure whether the task completed successfully
and their password is protected.
• The 2005 Password Multiplier scheme of Halderman, Waters and Felten, [39], is
an extension to the Mozilla Firefox web browser which computes a site-specific
password as a function of a long-term user master password, the web site name,
and the user name for the web site concerned. This scheme use two levels of
iterated hash computations. The first level is executed when the user first uses
platform (i.e. it is performed once per user per system). This computation takes
around 100 seconds and the result is cached for future password computations.
The second level computation yields the site-specific password by combining the
input from the first stage of computation with the account name for which the
user wants to generate a password.
After the site-specific password has been generated, it is automatically copied to
the targeted website. Figure 3.3 shows the use of Password Multiplier to generate
a password for Amazon.
Figure 3.3: Password Multiplier, [39]
Two key shortcomings of Password Multiplier are handling password changes and
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platform mobility. To handle the password change issue, Halderman et al. [39]
proposed use of an index value alongside the account name. Password change
could be achieved by incrementing this password index. The index value could
be stored with the name of the account, and if the user wishes to switch to a
different platform he/she will only need to input the index value.
A further possible issue is that the passwords created by the system are of a fixed
format, i.e. eight alphanumeric characters; this could breach the password policy
of some websites.
• Wolf and Schneider’s 2006 PasswordSitter [93] generates a site-specific password
as a function of a long-term user master password, the user identity, the appli-
cation/service name, and some configurable parameters, as shown in Figure 3.4.
After generation of a password, PasswordSitter automatically copies the gener-
ated password to the clipboard; the user then has to copy it to the website.
Figure 3.4: Password generation by PasswordSitter, [93]
PasswordSitter combines the inputs using AES encryption, with a key derived
from the master password. The application/service password is generated from
the encryption result by applying the user-specified password rules. After the
password has been generated it transferred to the application or service for au-
thentication.
PasswordSitter incorporates a server to store user data (the user profile), includ-
ing the user identity, the application or service name, the version specification,
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and the password generation rules. The user profile is available to download on
demand to enable the generation of passwords on multiple devices. The user pro-
file is encrypted using AES employing a key derived from the master password,
ensuring the profile is only accessible to the legitimate user. The master password
is stored on and never leaves the user platform, and hence the server does not
need to be trusted; however, this means that compromise of a user platform puts
the security of all the passwords at risk.
• Passpet, due to Yee and Sitaker [94] and also published in 2006, takes a very
similar approach to SSP, i.e. the site-specific password is a function of a long-
term user master password and a user-chosen name for the web site known as a
petname. Each petname has an associated icon, which is automatically displayed
to the user and intended to reduce the risk of phishing attacks.
Passpet uses a combination of techniques: password hashing, petnames, password
strengthening, and UI customisation. User-assigned site labels (petnames) help
users securely identify sites to mitigate phishing attacks. Password-strengthening
measures defend against dictionary attacks. Customising the user interface de-
fends against user-interface spoofing attacks. Figure 3.5 shows the Passpet user
interface.
Figure 3.5: PassPet operation, [94]
• ObPwd, due to Mannan et al. [8, 65, 66, 67], first surfaced in 2008. It takes a
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somewhat different approach by generating a site-specific password as a function
of a user-selected (site-specific) object (e.g. a file), together with a number of
optional parameters, including a long-term user password (referred to as a salt),
and the web site URL. The goal of ObPwd is to use content meaningful to the user
to generate a high-entropy password, where the user simply needs to remember
which object is associated with a particular site. To generate a password, the user
selects a memorable object which must exceed a minimum size (e.g. 160 bytes)
to ensure a high-entropy password. The ObPwd tool then hashes the chosen
object (truncated if necessary, to avoid excess computations), concatenated with
the optional long-term user password. The output is then converted to a text
string of user-selectable length. The password needs to be manually copied to
the desired webpage, since ObPwd is a stand-alone application.
Figure 3.6 represent the steps for password generation in ObPwd, along with an
example.
Figure 3.6: ObPwd operation, [66]
A small scale user trail found that ObPwd has good usability, with excellent
memorability, acceptable login times, and very positive user perception. However,
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as the authors note [67], ObPwd has a number of potential usability and security
issues.
– ObPwd does not protect against long-term compromise of the user platform
(of course, this is true of all schemes in which passwords are entered via the
user device).
– If a digital object used to generate a password is changed, then the password
will no longer be the same. This means that the user must be careful to
choose objects that are unlikely to be modified. Related problems arise if
the object is not available on the platform currently in use.
– There is a danger that an attacker might guess which object is being used,
e.g. if a user chooses images as digital objects. Of course, deployment of the
(optional) long-term user password as a second input to password generation
would help mitigate such an attack.
• PasswordLess Password Synchronization (PALPAS ), described in Horsch’s 2015
paper, [45], generates passwords complying with site-specific requirements using
server-provided password policy data, a stored secret master password (the seed),
and a user-specific secret value (the salt) that is synchronised across all the user
devices using the server. Figure 3.7 summarises password generation in PALPAS.
The password is computed in two stages. First, a cryptographically secure deter-
ministic Pseudorandom Bit Generator (PGR) generates a pseudorandom value
using a seed and a salt value. The pseudorandom value and the password policy
are input to the password generator to produce a site-specific password. The
salt used in the first step serves two purpose: use of a different salt for each site
ensures that each password is distinct, and password change is enabled simply by
changing the salt.
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Figure 3.7: PALPAS password generation, [45]
Apart from the above published work, a number of password generator applications
exist, some of which are implemented as browser extensions and others as phone apps.
The following schemes are available as browser extensions.
• RndPhrase2 is a Firefox add-on and web-based password generator. It generates
site-specific passwords as a function of a predefined salt (unique per user), the
host name, and a user-entered password. The user only needs to remember the
password.
• PwdHash port3 is an Opera add-on based on PwdHash.
Of course, there are many apps and browser extensions which simply generate ran-
dom or pseudorandom passwords, such as the Android phone apps Advanced Password
Generator4 and Password Generator5. Although they are commonly referred to as
password generators, they are not password generators in the sense used in this thesis
since the user is responsible for remembering or storing the passwords after they have
been generated.
3.4 A Taxonomy
In 2013 McCarney [68] provided a taxonomy and a comparative evaluation of password
management systems (including both password managers and password generators)
2https://rndphrase.appspot.com/
3https://addons.opera.com/en-gb/extensions/details/pwdhash-port/
4https://goo.gl/MF0z1D
5https://goo.gl/SNVtJY
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using the Usability-Deployability-Security (UDS) framework of Bonneau et al. [11].
Figure 3.8: Password management systems: a taxonomy (McCarney [68])
3.5 Shortcomings of Existing Techniques
We conclude this chapter by observing certain fundamental problems that affect all (or
almost all) previously proposed password generators. These issues motivate the design
of a novel scheme that we propose later in this thesis, which incorporates novel features
designed to overcome these problems.
Setting and updating passwords If a user is already using the password generator
when newly registering with a website, there is clearly no problem — the user
can simply register whatever value the system generates. However, if the user
has selected and registered passwords with a range of websites before starting use
of the password generator, then all these passwords will need to be changed to
whatever the password generator outputs. This could be highly inconvenient if a
user has established relationships with many sites, and could present a formidable
barrier to adoption of the system. Somewhat analogous problems arise if a user
decides to change a website password, e.g. because the site enforces periodic
password changes. The only possibility for the user will be to change one of the
inputs used to generate the password, e.g. the object (if a digital object is used
as an input) or a user site name. Password change could even be impossible if
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the user does not choose any of the inputs used to generate a password.
Using multiple platforms If a user employs multiple platforms, e.g. a desktop and
a smart phone, then problems will arise if any locally-stored configuration data
is used.
Password policy issues A further general problem relates to the need to automat-
ically generates passwords in a site-specific form, a problem not satisfactorily
addressed by any of the previously proposed schemes except PALPAS. Some
existing schemes have the option for the user to customise a generated password,
but the user has to identify the requirements for the website manually and con-
figure the options accordingly. Automatically generating a password tailored to
meet a website’s specific requirements has been explored extensively by Horsch
and his co-authors [44, 45, 46].
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we provided an overview of password generators including a definition,
examples of existing schemes and a description of the main components of a password
generator. Finally we discussed key shortcomings of previously proposed password
generator schemes.
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Password Recovery
4.1 Introduction
Despite their widely-documented limitations, passwords remain very widely used for
user authentication. However, although passwords are meant to be memorised, humans
often forget or mislay them. In some contexts this is easily managed; for example, in
an office environment, a user who forgets their password for access to a multi-user
system can simply see a system administrator, who authenticates them and issues a
new password. However, for web authentication, the main focus of this thesis, it is
clearly not so simple.
To address this problem, most websites that require users to create an account
support password recovery, enabling legitimate users who forget their password to re-
establish a shared secret, thereby enabling them to continue to use the website. This
can be achieved in many ways, including use of a pre-registered email address or mobile
phone number, and/or involving other pre-set fall-back means of authentication. How-
ever, many of these techniques introduce vulnerabilities which may enable an impostor
to falsely change a password, either causing a denial of service or, in the worst case,
enabling the impostor to authenticate as the user.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 4.2 we review
existing work examining the security issues arising from a range of possible approaches
to password recovery. We also briefly look, in Section 4.3, at certain issues which have
not been previously examined, motivating the research described in Part III of this
thesis. Finally, the chapter concludes in Section 4.4.
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4.2 Previous Work
Many authors have looked at web password recovery, mostly focussing on particular
classes of recovery system or the shortcomings of widely used approaches.
• Several authors have looked at ways to securely store backup copies of passwords
on a client device; this is outside the scope of password recovery as we define
it, since the web service itself is not involved. We briefly mention two papers of
this type. Ellison et al. [25] describe how a locally stored copy of a password can
be held in encrypted form, protected using answers to personal questions; the
encryption key is derived from these questions in such a way that correct answers
to k of n questions enables it to be reconstructed, allowing the user to forget
some of the answers. Somewhat analogously, Frykholm and Juels [31] propose a
provably secure technique for fault-tolerant password recovery; a secret password
is stored protected by a collection of low entropy secrets, such that recovery
is possible with only a subset of these secrets. This again enables the user to
maintain secured backup copies of passwords, and hence, like the Ellison et al.
scheme, is outside the scope of this thesis.
• Chmielewski et al. [15] focus on what they call client-server password recovery.
They propose a series of protocols that allow a user to automatically recover a
password from a server using partial knowledge of the password, and prove their
security in a formal model. This can be regarded as a contribution to theoretical
cryptography, rather than as a practical solution to the everyday problem of web
password recovery.
• Mannan et al. [64] propose a scheme for password recovery rather different from
many commonly used approaches. They propose that websites maintain copies of
user passwords encrypted under a public key for which the user holds the private
key on a personal mobile device (PMD). When the user invokes the recovery
service, the website sends the encrypted copy to the user, who uses his/her her
PMD to decrypt it.
• Kharudin et al. [57] describe a graphical user authentication method and propose
its use for password recovery. However, the main focus is on the authentication
technique rather than on the password recovery process.
All the prior art we have so far described, whilst relating to password recovery, falls
outside our scope here, since the proposals are either independent of the web server
or require major changes in how clients and servers interact. However, as we describe
next, some authors have addressed the problem we consider here.
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• A 2016 study by Stavova et al. [84] examines the usability of two password re-
covery techniques, namely backup codes and the use of trusted associates (social
authentication). They examined a particular scheme where the backup value is
stored as a QR code to address the issue of backup codes being forgotten and/or
written in clear text. They also considered a case where the account holder and
a trusted associate can each retrieve a password share from a call centre, where
the shares must be combined to obtain the password to get access to the service.
The two approaches to password recovery that were studied can be summarised
as follows.
– QR-code-based recovery. This approach simplifies password recovery for the
use by storing a one-time password in the form of QR code. Each user is
equipped with a printed copy of a QR code containing a one-time password
generated by the website. If a user forgets his/her password, the user scans
the QR code and submits it with the username to the website to initiate
password recovery.
– Trusted party based password recovery. This approach relies on social au-
thentication, where the user nominates a trusted person to help the user
regain access to his/her account in the event of password loss. When a
user registers for the service, he/she is asked for a trustee phone number
for password recovery. If a user forgets his/her password, he/she calls the
client centre and if the registered phone number for the user matches the
registered number, the user is given part of a password recovery code. The
user must then ask his/her chosen trustee to call the client centre to get
the other half of the code. The trustee then calls the client centre to obtain
the other half of the recovery code, with the registered phone number being
used to authenticate him/her. If successful, the trustee will get the other
half of the code and can send it to the user. After getting the code from the
trustee, the user now supplies the two halves of the recovery code along with
his/her username to complete password recovery. The process is illustrated
in Figure 4.1.
Stavova et al. conducted a study of 186 student participants to compare the
usability of the two techniques. The study revealed that users preferred QR
password recovery and it takes less time to perform.
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Figure 4.1: Trusted party based recovery, [84]
• A number of authors have examined the security of challenge questions, a sec-
ondary means of user authentication widely used in real-world password recovery.
In 2008, Rabkin [74] examined leaks of answers to these questions via social me-
dia. In the following year, Just et al. [52] performed extensive surveys of user
behaviour to analyse the relative security offered by various questions. In parallel
work, also published in 2009, Schechter et al. [80] looked at the security properties
of security questions as a secondary means of user authentication in the context
of password recovery. Finally, in 2015, Bonneau et al. [10] reported on a study
using a real-world data set to examine the security and memorability of security
questions.
• Guri et al. [38] point out how details revealed during widely-used password re-
covery procedures for several major Internet services, including Gmail, Facebook,
and Twitter, can be used to learn potentially sensitive personal user informa-
tion. This information includes the full (or partial) email address, phone number,
friends list, and street address, as shown in Table 4.1. They examined a range
of scenarios and demonstrated how the details revealed in the password recovery
process could be used to deduce more focused information about users.
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SERVICE INFORMATION
Facebook
Last two digits of phone number
Parts of associated email address
Subsets of users friends (randomly generated)
Gmail Last two to three digits of phone number
PayPal
Last three digits of phone number
Parts of associated email address
Twitter
Parts of email address
The first two letters of email username
The first letter of the email domain name
Yahoo! Last two digits of phone number
Microsoft Last two digits of phone number
Table 4.1: Password recovery privacy violations (Guri et al. [38])
• A recent study by Gelernter et al. [33] describes a possible man-in the-middle
(MitM) attack on password recovery by using the registration process for a ma-
licious MitM website to gather the information needed (e.g. answers to personal
questions) to conduct recovery for a different website. The operation of the attack
is summarised in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2: MITM attack on password recovery (Gelernter et al. [33])
• A recent study by Li et al. [60] investigated account recovery at popular websites
by examining their recovery protocols. Through extensive analysis of the security
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features of those websites, they observed that 92.5% of these websites rely on
emails to reset user passwords and 81.1% of user accounts at the websites reviewed
can easily be compromised by mounting an email recovery attack. In addition,
many websites have not taken serious actions to protect recovery emails, leading
to a single point of failure. To mitigate the issues they identified, they proposed
a mechanism to provide protection for account recovery emails. That is, whilst
related to the work we describe later in this thesis, it goes beyond the scope
of the work described here by proposing additional mechanisms that need to be
implemented by end users.
4.3 Issues with Password Recovery
As can be seen from the previous section, there is relatively little prior art examining the
security of real-world password recovery. However, there are very well-known examples
of real-world attacks exploiting password recovery to gain unauthorised access to the
accounts of well-known individuals. One example of such an attack1 involved Sarah
Palin (the US vice-presidential candidate in 2008). Her personal Yahoo! email was
hacked using a password recovery feature in Yahoo!. The email hack occurred in
September 2008, during the US presidential election campaign. The hacker, David
Kernell, gained access to Palin’s account by looking up personal details, such as her
high school and birth date, and using Yahoo!’s account recovery for forgotten passwords.
Leaked data, including emails and pictures, was posted on WikiLeaks2.
The (in)security properties of challenge questions is probably the only topic that
has been examined reasonably thoroughly. The penultimate piece of work discussed
in Section 4.2 is significant, and reveals major security issues arising with SMS-based
password recovery; in particular, the authors performed an analysis of real-world use
of SMS-based password recovery and discovered a number of serious issues.
However, email-based password recovery is also very common, and very few authors
appear to have examined this previously. Whilst many of the issues are the same as
for SMS-based recovery, some are not, and this observation has motivated much of the
work in Chapter 9, where the results of a detailed examination of real-world email-
based password recovery are reported. This analysis has been used to help develop a
set of recommendations for the design of password recovery emails.
It is also interesting to observe that none of the previous research has taken a high-
level look at what password recovery involves, and the various options for the steps in
1https://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/09/17/anonymous_hacks_sarah_palin/
2https://wikileaks.org/wiki/Sarah_Palin_Yahoo_account_2008
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this process. This gap has been addressed by the development of a general model for
password recovery, which is presented in Chapter 8. This general model helps identify
where security issues may lie, and also what options are available to the designers of a
password recovery system.
4.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we reviewed existing work examining the security issues arising from a
range of possible approaches to password recovery. In Section 4.3 we examined certain
issues which have not been previously examined, motivating the research described in
Part III of this thesis.
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Chapter 5
Password Generators: Old Ideas
and New
5.1 Introduction
In this part of the thesis we consider ways in which password generators can be devel-
oped which avoid the shortcomings of previously proposed schemes that were identified
in Chapter 3. We do this by:
• providing a general model within which a range of password generation schemes
can be analysed;
• using this general model to propose new techniques for enhancing the operation
of password generation schemes;
• giving a detailed specification of a new password generation system, AutoPass,
incorporating the novel techniques and the best features of existing schemes (see
Chapter 6);
• reporting on the results of practical trials using a proof of concept implementation
of AutoPass (see Chapter 7).
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 introduces a general
model for password generators. This is followed in Section 5.3 by a review of the op-
tions for the chief components of the model, referring to existing example schemes.
Section 5.4 then addresses the advantages and disadvantages of these options. In Sec-
tion 5.5 we consider novel enhancements to the operation of the system which mitigate
some of the identified disadvantages. The lessons from our assessments, together with
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these novel enhancements, are incorporated into a design for a novel scheme, AutoPass,
described in detail in Chapter 6.
5.2 The Model
A variety of password generator schemes have been proposed in recent years — this
chapter focusses on the general properties of such schemes, and the various options for
their operation. We start by presenting a general model for such schemes, which we
then use as a framework for analysing possible scheme components.
5.2.1 Operation
As observed in Chapter 3, a password generator is functionality implemented on an
end-user platform to support password-based user authentication to a remote server
(assumed to be a website, although most of the discussion applies more generally). This
functionality generates, on demand, a site-unique password for use in authentication.
Clearly this password also needs to be available to the website authenticating the user
— the nature of the registration step, in which the password is set up, is discussed
further in Section 5.2.2 below.
A password generator has the following components.
• A set of input values is used to determine the password for a particular site.
Some values must be site-specific so that the generated password is site-specific.
The values could be stored (locally or online), based on characteristics of the
authenticating site, or user-entered when required. Systems can, and often do,
combine these types of input.
• A password generation function combines the input values to generate an ap-
propriate password. This function could operate in a range of ways depending
on the requirements of the website doing the authentication. For example, one
website might forbid the inclusion of non-alphanumeric characters in a password,
whereas another might insist that a password contains at least one such charac-
ter. To be broadly applicable, a password generation function must therefore be
customisable.
• A password output method enables the generated password to be transferred to
the authenticating site. This could, for example, involve displaying the gener-
ated password to the user, who must then type (or copy and paste) it into the
appropriate place.
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All this functionality needs to be implemented on the user platform. There are
various possibilities for such an implementation, including as a stand-alone application
or as a browser extension or plug-in. Each of these aspects of the operation of a
password generator are discussed in greater detail in Section 5.3 below.
5.2.2 Registration and Configuration
In this thesis we only consider schemes whose operation is completely transparent to the
website which is authenticating the user. As a result, the ‘normal’ website registration
procedure, in which the user selects a password and sends it to the site, is assumed
to be used. This, in turn, typically means that the password generation process needs
to be in place before the registration procedure, or at least that introduction of the
password generator requires the user to modify their account password. This potential
disadvantage of password generators, together with possible ways of avoiding the need
to change passwords, is examined in Sections 5.4.5 and 5.5.1 below.
There is a potential need for a password generator to store configuration data. Such
data can be divided into two main types:
• global configuration data, i.e. values unique to the user and which are used to help
generate all passwords for that user, and
• site-specific configuration data, i.e. values used to help generate a password for a
single website, which are typically the same for all users.
Not all schemes use configuration data, although producing a workable system without
at least some global configuration data seems challenging. However, the use of con-
figuration data is clearly a major barrier to portability. That is, for a user employing
multiple platforms, the configuration data must be kept synchronised across all these
platforms, a non-trivial task — exactly the issue addressed by Horsch, Hu¨lsing and
Buchmann [45].
5.3 Components of the Model
We next consider in greater detail options for the components of the model.
5.3.1 Inputs to Password Generation
We first consider the input values to the password generation process. The following
data input types have been employed in existing schemes.
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• A master password is a user-specific long-term secret value. This could either
be a user-entered password, i.e. entered by the user whenever a password is
to be generated, or a stored password, i.e. a user-specific secret value stored
as global configuration data. Note that this could be augmented by use of a
(not necessarily secret) user constant, i.e. a further global configuration value
entered by the user which ensures that the passwords generated by this instance
of the scheme are different to those generated by another instance, even if the
same master password is used.
• A site name is a name for the site that is using the password for user authen-
tication. This could take a variety of forms, including a user site name, i.e., a
name for a site chosen by a user, all or part of the site’s URL, or a site-specific
secret, e.g. a random value associated with the site URL.
• A digital object is anything available on the user platform which could be used
as input to the password generation process, e.g. a file or a selected block of text
on the target website. Typically the user would be expected to use a different
object (or set of objects) for each website.
• A password policy is information governing the nature of the generated pass-
word, e.g. the set of acceptable symbols and/or the minimum length.
• A server secret is a secret value held by a supporting server and used as input
to all password generation computations.
• A user name is a user-specific value held by a supporting server which could be
the user account name or a more opaque value (or some combination of the two).
Table 5.1 summarises the sets of data inputs used by existing password generator
schemes. Items given in square brackets ([thus]) are optional inputs.
A further possibility would be to provide a local front end for a graphical password
system (see, for example, [24, 85]), and to use this to generate a bit-string to be input
to password generation. This possibility is not explored further here.
5.3.2 Generating the Password
A number of approaches can be used to combine the various inputs in order to generate
a password. They all involve a two-stage process, i.e. first combining the inputs to
generate a bit-string, and then formatting and processing the bit-string to obtain a
password in the desired format. Typically the target format is a string of symbols
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Table 5.1: Inputs to password generation process
Scheme Input data
ObPwd, [66] digital object, [URL]
PassPet, [94]
user constant, user-entered pass-
word, user site name
Password Multiplier, [39] user-entered password, user site name
PasswordSitter, [93] user-entered password, user site name
PwdHash, [77] user-entered password, URL
Site-Specific Passwords, [54] user-entered password, user site name
PALPAS, [45]
stored password, site-specific secret,
password policy
of a certain length, where each symbol is, for example, numerals only, alphanumeric
characters, or alphanumerics together with punctuation.
Possibilities for the first stage include the following.
• One-level-hash, i.e. concatenating the various inputs and applying a crypto-
graphic hash-function. An alternative of this one-level type would be to use part
of the input as a key, and to then generate an encryption or MAC on the re-
mainder of the input. Examples of schemes using this general approach include
PwdHash [77], ObPwd [66] and SSP [54]. PasswordSitter, [93], uses AES encryp-
tion as an alternative to a hash-function, where the AES key is derived from the
master password.
• A widely discussed alternative is the two-level-hash. In this case, one or more
of the inputs are concatenated and input to a cryptographic hash-function which
is then iterated some significant number of times. The output of this multiple
iteration is then concatenated with the other inputs and hashed to give the out-
put. This two-level multiple iteration process is designed to slow down brute
force attacks. Examples of systems adopting such an approach include PassPet
[94] and Password Multiplier [39].
The main approach to the second stage employs some form of encoding, in which
the output from the first stage is formatted to obtain the desired password from a
site-specific character set, perhaps also satisfying certain rules (e.g. mandating the in-
clusion of certain classes of character). Some existing schemes, such as ObPwd [66],
allow this to be parameterised in order to meet specific website requirements. Horsch
et al. [46] go one step further and propose an XML syntax, the Password Requirements
Markup Language (PRML), designed specifically to enable such requirements on pass-
words to be formally specified. Such password policy statements constitute site-specific
configuration data.
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5.3.3 Password Output and Use
There are a number of ways in which a generated password could be transferred to the
password field of a website login page.
• The simplest is manual copy and paste, where the password generation soft-
ware displays the generated password to the user, who manually copies it into
the login page. This approach is used by SSP [54].
• A slightly more automated approach is copy to clipboard, in which the gener-
ated password is copied into the clipboard for future use. For security reasons the
password can be made to only reside in the clipboard for a limited period, e.g. in
PasswordSitter the generated password is saved to the clipboard for 60 seconds
before being deleted [93].
• The simplest approach for the user is probably automatic copying to the tar-
get password field. This can be done automatically with no user intervention,
as is the case for PwdHash in the web page implementation [77] and the ObPwd
Firefox browser extension [66]. Alternatively it can require the user to perform
an action such as clicking a specific key combination before copying; for example,
PassPet requires the user to click on a screen button, [94], and Password Multi-
plier, [39], requires the user to double click the password field or press ctrl+P to
trigger password copying.
5.3.4 Approaches to Implementation
Password generation software can be implemented in a range of ways.
• There are a number of advantages to be derived from implementing the password
generator as a browser add-on, e.g. as a browser plug-in, browser exten-
sion or signed browser applet. Many existing password generator schemes
adopt this approach, at least as one option, including Password Multiplier [39],
PwdHash [77], PasswordSitter [93], and PassPet [94].
• An alternative is to implement the scheme as a stand-alone application, e.g. to
run on a phone, tablet or desktop. The user would need to install the application.
Such an approach is adopted by SSP and Amnesia; ObPwd, [66], is also available
as both a browser extension and a mobile app.
• A somewhat different approach is to implement the scheme as a web-based
application, either running on a remote server or executing on the user plat-
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form in the form of dynamically downloaded JavaScript. PwdHash [77] has been
implemented as a web application1.
5.4 Assessing the Options
For each of the main components we assess the main advantages and disadvantages of
the possibilities described in Section 5.3.
5.4.1 Inputs
Three main options for the inputs to the password generation process were described
in Section 5.3.1. We consider them in turn.
• The use of a master password of some kind seems highly advantageous; the
main issue is how it is made available when required, i.e. whether to store it long-
term in the software as global configuration data or to employ a user-entered
value. Both possibilities have advantages and disadvantages. Long-term storage
maximises user convenience, but the master password is now at greater risk of
exposure and the system is now inherently less portable, not least because the user
may well forget the value if it does not need to be entered regularly. Conversely,
user entry reduces convenience but possibly improves security, although the entry
process itself is now prone to eavesdropping, either visually or using some kind
of key-logger. Perhaps the best possibility might be to combine the two, i.e.
to use two secrets — one stored long-term on every device employed by the
user and the other entered by the user whenever the system is activated. Such
an approach is implemented in the PALPAS system, [45], where a user-entered
password is employed to generate a key for encrypting and decrypting the locally
stored master secret (or seed).
The addition of some kind of user constant, i.e. a not necessarily secret user-
specific value, also seems reasonable. The obvious location for this is as global
configuration data, although this again may have an impact on portability.
• The inclusion of a site name was the second option considered in Section 5.3.1.
The use of such an input is highly desirable since it will make generated passwords
site-specific. The site name could be a user site name, i.e. a name for the
site selected by the user, the site’s URL, or a value indexed by the URL. One
disadvantage of a user site name is that it must be remembered (and entered) by
1https://pwdhash.github.io/website/
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the user. Use of the URL avoids the latter problem by potentially being available
automatically to the password generator. It also prevents phishing attacks in
which a fake site attempts to capture user credentials for the site it is imitating,
since the URL of the phishing site, and hence the generated password, will be
different to that of the genuine site, [77]. However, use of the site URL also
has issues, [54], since the URL of a site can change without notice, meaning the
generated password would also change and the system would fail. This latter
issue can be at least partially addressed by using only the first part of the URL.
• The third possibility is use of a digital object. Perhaps its main advantage is
that it potentially introduces a major source of entropy into password genera-
tion [66, 67]. Such an input also offers a way of making passwords site-specific,
although it requires users to choose a different object for every site (and it is
not clear that all users will do so). However, there are two major disadvantages
with such an approach. Firstly, the object used must always be accessible, sig-
nificantly restricting user choice especially on platforms with a constrained user
interface, such as phones. Secondly, the user must remember which object is used
with which site, a task which users may find as hard as remembering site-unique
passwords (depending on the psychology of the individuals involved).
5.4.2 Generating the Password
As discussed in Section 5.3.2, password generation is typically a two-stage process: first
combine the inputs to generate a bit-string, and second use the bit-string to generate
a password. The first stage involves either a single level or a two-level hash. The
two-level approach has the advantage of offering a limited degree of protection against
brute-forcing of a master secret, [14, 39, 94]. The only disadvantage is a slight delay in
the password generation process itself, but this can be made small enough to be barely
noticeable.
The second encoding step is more problematic. Websites have widely differing
password requirements and rules. The encoding scheme must generate passwords tai-
lored to site-specific requirements (the password policy). This in turn typically requires
the password generator to store site-specific password policies as site-specific configu-
ration data, potentially reducing the portability of the password generator since each
instance must be locally configured.
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5.4.3 User Interface Operation
Section 5.3.3 describes a range of possible approaches for transferring a generated pass-
word to the password field in the website login page.
• The manual copy and paste approach is clearly the simplest to implement.
However, apart from being the least user-friendly, it has security deficiencies.
Most seriously, a user could be tricked by a fake page to reveal their password for
a genuine site. There is also a serious possibility of eavesdropping (or ‘shoulder-
surfing’).
• The copy to clipboard technique is much more convenient for the user, but
is still prone to fake website attacks. Also, an attacker might be able to launch
an attack to learn the clipboard contents. It would appear to be good practice
to restrict the period of time during which the generated password is in the
clipboard, as implemented in PasswordSitter [93].
• The most convenient approach for the user is undoubtedly automatic copying
to the target password field. If the password generator is aware of the URL
of the web page (which is likely if it can access the page to autofill the password)
then this can mitigate fake website attacks. The major disadvantage relates to
implementability — practicality depends very much on how the password gener-
ator is implemented (as discussed in Section 5.4.4 below). Such a solution might
require the user to perform a specific action to trigger automatic copying of the
password; this would have the advantage of giving the user some control over the
process.
5.4.4 Implementation
We conclude this assessment of the various password generator options by considering
the ways in which it might be implemented.
• The browser add-on approach has been widely advocated in the literature, and
has a number of advantages. When implemented in this way, a password generator
can readily automate key tasks, including detecting the password field, discovering
the site URL, and filling in the password field automatically. However, the use of
multiple browsers across multiple platforms may cause incompatibility problems,
and require the development and use of multiple instances of the scheme. Also,
the lack of an easily accessible user interface may also make configuration difficult
for non-expert users.
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• A stand-alone application is the obvious alternative to a browser add-on. One
advantage of such an approach compared to a browser add-on relates to the user
interface; a stand-alone application is likely to have a richer user interface, easing
its use and configuration. However, such an application may be unable to auto-
matically perform some of the tasks which can readily be performed by a browser
add-on, such as automated password field detection and password input. Stand-
alone applications will also have portability issues, with a different application
needed for each platform type.
• The third possibility is a web-based application. Such an approach has the
great advantage of seamless portability — it would be instantly usable on any
platform at any time. Just like a browser add-on, it could also enable automation
of key tasks such as URL detection and automatic password completion, [39].
However, there are also serious disadvantages. A usability study conducted by
Chiasson et al., [14], revealed that users had difficulty in locating the PwdHash
website. Most seriously, the web implementation will potentially have access
to all the user’s passwords, as well as the values used to generate them. Of
course, an application could be implemented, e.g. using JavaScript, to perform
all the necessary calculations on the user machine, and not on a remote server —
however, the capability would remain for the website to transparently eavesdrop
on the process whenever it wished.
5.4.5 Other Issues
Before proceeding we mention certain other usability and security issues which can arise,
potentially regardless of the options chosen. These issues were discussed in Chapter
3, but we repeat them here given their importance in motivating the work described
below.
• Setting and updating passwords, i.e. none of the schemes allow a user to choose
their password for a site, and in most cases it is problematic to arrange for a
password to eb changed.
• Using multiple platforms is a problem with many existing schemes, since client-
stored secrets need to be migrated between platforms.
• Password policy issues exist with many schemes, i.e. ensuring that generated
passwords meet site-specific requirements on character set and length.
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5.5 Improving System Operation
We next consider a range of ways of addressing some of the problems we have identified.
Some of these techniques have already been proposed, although not precisely as we
describe them here. In Chapter 6 we consider how these measures might be integrated
into a novel system.
5.5.1 Novel Types of Configuration Data
We have already mentioned a range of types of configuration data, including classes of
global configuration data, such as master secrets, and categories of site-specific config-
uration data, such as password policy values (possibly specified in PRML [46]). We
now introduce three new configuration data types, whose use can address some of the
issues identified in Section 5.4 .
• A password offset, a type of site-specific configuration data, can address a range
of issues relating to cases where the user wishes to employ a password different
to that computed by the password generator. For example, a user may already
have a set of well-established passwords which he/she does not wish to change,
or a specific password value may be imposed by the website. Additionally, users
may wish, or be required, to change their passwords from time to time. As we
have already observed, addressing such requirements with a password generation
scheme is problematic.
A password offset acts as an input to the second stage of password generation. The
first stage generates a bit-string, and the second stage converts this to a password
with specific properties, as specified by the password policy. The password offset
induces the second stage to generate a specific password value. For example,
suppose that a password policy dictates that a password must be a string of lower
and upper case letters and numerals, and suppose each such character is internally
represented as a numeric value in the range 0–61. After converting the bit-string
to a string of alphanumeric characters of the desired length, and given a ‘desired
password’ consisting of an alphanumeric string of the same length, the password
offset could simply be the character-wise modulo 62 difference between the two
strings2. Changing a password can now be readily implemented by changing the
offset, either to a random value (thereby randomising the password choice), or to
a chosen value (if the new password value is to be fixed by the user).
2Such an idea ia widely implemented to enable credit/debit card holders to select their own PIN
value — see, for example, https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/en/SSLTBW_2.1.0/com.
ibm.zos.v2r1.csfb300/pinkeys.htmPINvalue.
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If implemented appropriately, this offset is not a hugely sensitive piece of data,
since it need not reveal anything about the actual password value. Of course, if
an ‘old’ password is compromised, and the old and new offsets are also revealed,
then this could compromise the new password value.
• It is also possible to envisage a scheme where a password for one site is generated
using a different set of input types to those used to generate a password for
another site. For example, a password for a particularly mission-critical site
(e.g. a bank account) might be generated using a large set of input values, e.g.
including a digital object, whereas a password for a less sensitive site could be
generated using a master secret and site name only. Such a possibility could
readily be captured using site-specific configuration data which we refer to as
password input parameters.
• A system might also store password reminders as site-specific configuration data.
For example, when choosing a digital object to generate a password, the user
could be invited to specify a word or phrase to act as a reminder of the chosen
value (without specifying it precisely). This could then be revealed on demand
via the password generator user interface.
5.5.2 Use of A Server
We have already observed that storing configuration data on a user platform creates
a major barrier to portability. It also poses a certain security risk through possible
platform compromise, although, apart from the master secret, much of the configuration
data we have discussed is not necessarily confidential.
The ‘obvious’ solution to this problem is to employ a server to store configuration
data, or at least the less sensitive types of configuration information, much as many
password managers keep user passwords in the cloud. That is, while it would seem
prudent to at least keep a master secret on the user platform, all the site-specific
configuration data could be held in the cloud. This type of solution is advocated by
Horsch and his co-authors [45, 46].
If the scope of the site-specific configuration data can be kept to non-confidential
values, then there is no need for a highly trusted server, a great advantage by compar-
ison with some of the server-based password managers. Also, use of a server need not
significantly impact on password availability, since a password generator application
could cache a copy of the configuration data downloaded from the server, addressing
short term loss of server availability. Loss of network availability would not be an issue,
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since in such a case remote logins would in any event not be possible, i.e. passwords
would not be needed.
5.6 Conclusions
This chapter has provided a general model for the operation of a password generator,
providing the basis for a systematic review of how the components of the model might
operate. The various options for implementing the model components were assessed.
Novel approaches to addressing issues with current approaches to implementing the
model were then described and discussed.
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Chapter 6
AutoPass: An Automatic
Password Generator
6.1 Introduction
This chapter provides a detailed specification and analysis of AutoPass, a password
generator scheme that incorporates concepts introduced in Chapter 5. AutoPass has
been designed to address issues identified in previously proposed password generators,
and incorporates novel techniques to address these issues. Unlike almost all previously
proposed schemes, AutoPass enables the generation of passwords that meet impor-
tant real-world requirements, including forced password changes, use of pre-specified
passwords, and generation of passwords meeting site-specific requirements.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. First, in Section 6.2, we
provide a high-level overview of AutoPass. Then, in Section 6.3, we give a detailed
specification of AutoPass in the context of the model introduced in the previous chap-
ter; this involves providing detailed descriptions of the system components, the stored
data, and the method of password generation. This is followed in Section 6.4 by a
detailed specification of its operation. Section 6.5 provides an analysis of the proper-
ties of AutoPass, and in particular highlights how it addresses known shortcomings of
previously proposed password generators. Then, in Section 6.6, we discuss the security
properties and the threat model of the scheme. Section 6.7 describes how the design of
AutoPass addresses the issues identified in previously proposed schemes. Finally, the
chapter concludes in Section 6.8.
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6.2 AutoPass: High-level Specification
AutoPass (from ‘automatic password generator’) is designed to combine the best fea-
tures of the prior art together with the novel ideas introduced in Chapter 5, particularly
those devised to address some of the shortcomings of previously proposed schemes. Au-
toPass uses most of the types of input given in section 5.3.1 to generate a password,
since they all contribute to security in different ways. Following the approach of PAL-
PAS, [45], we also make use of a server to store non-sensitive configuration data, such
as website password policies.
Following Section 5.2, to describe AutoPass we must define: (a) the input types,
(b) how the password is generated, and (c) how the password is output, together with
the implementation strategy. We briefly cover these points in turn; we give a full
specification of each of these features in Section 6.3. Since we also propose the use of
a cloud service to support AutoPass operation, we also briefly sketch its operation.
• For inputs, we propose the use of a master password, stored by the system
(as global configuration data), and a user password (or PIN) to be entered by
the user. We also propose use of the first part of the URL of the site, where,
depending on the implementation, this should also be stored as part of the site-
specific configuration and used to retrieve the other site-specific data. The master
password can be held encrypted by a key derived from the user password. We
also propose the optional use of a digital object, where use of this option is
indicated in the site-specific configuration data.
• The first stage of password generation adopts a two-level hash approach, giving
some protection against brute force attacks. The second stage, i.e. encoding,
uses the AutoPass cloud service to retrieve the password policy for the website
being visited (cf. PALPAS [45]); this policy could be encoded using PRML, [46].
It also uses other cloud-stored configuration data, notably the password offset,
password input parameters, and password reminders introduced in Section 5.2.2.
• The precise option for password output and use depends on the implementa-
tion. Where possible, auto-filling the password is desirable; where this is impos-
sible, the copy to clipboard/paste buffer approach is followed.
• Implementation as a browser add-on is probably the best option, not least in
giving simple access to the web page of the target site, although a range of options
may need to be pursued depending on the platform type.
We next consider the AutoPass Cloud Service, whch will be required to store two
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main types of data. User-independent data will be accessed by AutoPass users, and
will include non-sensitive site-specific data, e.g. password policies. Even if corrupted
by a malicious party, it would at worst cause a denial of service. User-specific data will
only be accessed by a single user, and includes a range of password configuration data.
Although this data is not highly confidential, access to it will need to be restricted
to the user to whom it belongs, e.g. via a one-off login process in the local AutoPass
application (with access permissions encoded in a cookie stored in the user platform).
Any cloud service has associated risks arising from non-availability; however, this
can be addressed through caching. The local AutoPass app should maintain a copy of
the data downloaded from the cloud service; since this data is not likely to change very
quickly, the cached data should normally be sufficient. To avoid risks arising from fake
AutoPass services, e.g. using DNS spoofing, the cloud service could sign all provided
data, and the AutoPass app could verify signatures using a built-in copy of the cloud
service public key.
6.3 AutoPass: Detailed Specification
We next provide a detailed specification of AutoPass, building on the high-level speci-
fication provided in Section 6.2.
6.3.1 Structure
AutoPass has two main parts: the AutoPass server and the AutoPass client. The
AutoPass server stores less sensitive user data, e.g. user names and website-specific
password policies (specifying the types of password a particular site will accept). The
AutoPass client software provides a user interface, and automatically generates site-
specific user passwords by combining the specified set of inputs. Some inputs are
stored locally and some are stored in the AutoPass server, with which the client soft-
ware interacts as necessary. Where possible, the generated password is automatically
inserted into login forms. Figure 6.1 depicts the AutoPass architecture, showing the
main components of the scheme.
6.3.2 Operation
We next describe the detailed operation of AutoPass, based on the high level specifi-
cation provided in the previous section. We first describe the three main components
of the scheme, i.e. the input values, the password generation function, and the output
method, together with an initial approach to implementation.
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Figure 6.1: AutoPass System Architecture
Input values
AutoPass makes use of a range of types of input, as listed below, incorporating those
used in previous schemes.
• A master password is a long-term strong password selected by the user or gen-
erated by the system. It is stored in encrypted form on the AutoPass server as
part of the user-specific configuration data. Since it does not need to be remem-
bered by the user, it could, for example, be a 128-bit random value; the precise
choice is implementation-dependent. The user should make a written record of
this value when it is initially chosen, and store it securely for backup/recovery
purposes.
• The site name is the URL of the site for which AutoPass is generating a pass-
word. To overcome the issue of changes to URL sub-domains, AutoPass only uses
the first part of the URL (i.e. up to the first / character).
• A password policy specifies the site-specific requirements for a password (e.g.
length constraints and/or minimum numbers of certain classes of character).
Many websites enforce highly specific policies, reflecting somewhat ad hoc de-
cisions made by system designers. The policy is specified using the Password
Requirements Markup Language (PRML) [46].
• A digital object is a text fragment, picture, or audio sample, typically in the
form of a digital file. This is an optional input that potentially adds significant
entropy to the password generation process, e.g. for use when generating pass-
words protecting high-value resources. Such objects need to be available on all
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user platforms — this means that objects should be selected with care to avoid
causing cross-platform mobility issues.
Password generation
The process of combining input values to produce the site-specific password occurs in
two stages, as follows.
• The first stage involves combining the input values, including the master pass-
word and the URL, to produce a bit string. Following Kelsey et al. [56], this
computation involves a two-level hash computation, as follows.
1. The master password is submitted to a cryptographic hash-function, e.g.
SHA-256, [47], that is iterated n times, where n is chosen to be as large
as possible without making the client software too unresponsive. The value
n can be user-dependent, although in such a case it needs to be held in
the server to enable it to be synchronised across all user platforms. The
output, e.g. a 256-bit string, is then cached by the client. Since this value is
independent of the website, it can be computed once when the client software
is started up and cached locally while the client is active.
2. The 256-bit string is concatenated with the website-specific inputs (the site
name and the optional digital object) and hashed once more to yield a site-
specific bit string.
The two-level process gives protection against brute force attacks by slowing
them down. Suppose an opponent knows a site-specific password and wishes
to use this to brute-force the user’s master password. Of course, if the master
password is a randomly chosen 128-bit string then there is no danger of such
a search succeeding, but some users may not select their master passwords to
possess high entropy. In such a case, a brute-force search might be practical.
Use of a multiply-iterated hash means that any brute force search will involve
significantly more computational effort than it otherwise would; however, since
the iterated part is only computed once per session, the additional load on the
genuine client will be manageable.
• The second stage (encoding) involves constructing a password of the desired form
from the bit-string output from the first stage, using the PRML policy specifi-
cation to ensure the password meets the website-specific requirements. Other
possible inputs include the password offset. How encoding operates is discussed
in detail in 6.3.4 below.
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Figure 6.2 summarises password generation in AutoPass.
Figure 6.2: Password generation in AutoPass
Password entropy
As discussed above, the inputs to password generation include the master password, the
site name, and (optionally) a digital object. If the master password is a 128-bit random
string (as recommended), then there will be at least 128 bits of entropy in the input to
password generation. As specified in Section 6.3.4 below, the default (minimum) length
of passwords is 16 characters. If we assume that the password character set is of size
62 (upper- and lower-case letters and numerals), and the minimum password length
is chosen, then there are a 6216 ≈ 4.8 × 1028 ≈ 295.3 possible passwords. Assuming
the outputs of the hash function used to combined the inputs are distributed in a
random-looking fashion, and given that there are at least 2128 possible inputs, then
each possible password will be approximately equally likely to occur, i.e. password
entropy will exceed 95 bits.
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Password output and use
This is achieved by automatically copying the generated password to the targeted
password field. AutoPass uses secure filling techniques to prevent sweeping attacks
[81].
Implementation
We propose to implement AutoPass (at least initially) as a browser add-on. This
enables automation of key tasks, including fetching the website URL and inserting
passwords into login forms. In the future, for use with platforms not permitting add-
ons, we plan to examine stand-alone applications and web-based functionality.
6.3.3 Stored Data
AutoPass needs access to a variety of configuration data, and this data clearly needs
to be stored somewhere. There are two possible locations for storage, namely the
AutoPass server and the AutoPass client, and AutoPass uses both. The configuration
data stored at the server is held long-term, i.e. for the lifetime of the user account;
data held on the client may be held either short-term, e.g. for the life of a session, or
long-term, i.e. while the software remains installed.
Server-stored Data
The following user-specific configuration data is held at the AutoPass server:
• the user account name;
• an email address for the user;
• the (encrypted) master password;
• the result of applying a cryptographic hash-function to the concatenation of the
master password and a fixed string (e.g. a single ‘0’ bit), where the addition of
the fixed string ensures that the hash-value held by the server cannot be used to
generate user passwords;
• a (salted) hash of the login password (see 6.4.1);
• for each website for which a password has been generated for this user:
– the (first part) of the URL of the website;
– the types of input used to generate the password for this site;
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– the password offset for this site (see 6.3.5).
The following site-specific configuration data is held at the AutoPass server: (a) the
(first part) of the URL of the website; and (b) the password policy of the site, encoded
in PRML (see 6.3.4)).
Note that the site-specific data could be maintained by a server separate from
that used to store the user-specific data. Indeed, since this data is completely non-
confidential, it could be provided by a service independent of AutoPass, e.g. the Pass-
word Requirements Description Distribution Service (PRDDS) [46], which provides an
online interface to meet requests for PRML-based Password Requirements Descriptors
(PRDs) for websites identified by their URL.
Client-stored Data
The following data is held short-term on the client, i.e. for the life of a browser session:
(a) the login password (see 6.4.1); and (b) a multiply-iterated hash of the master
password (see 6.3.1). The AutoPass client also caches recently downloaded password
policies.
6.3.4 Use of PRML
The Password Requirements Markup Language (PRML) [46] is an XML-based syntax
for use in specifying password requirements, including minimum and maximum lengths,
the permissible character set, and minimum required number(s) of specific sub-classes
of characters. It has been designed to address the diversity of password requirements
arising in practice, and enable password generators to automatically generate site-
specific passwords matching password requirements.
A website’s PRML specification is one of the two inputs for the second stage of
password generation described in 6.3.2, the other being the bit string output from the
first stage. The second stage of password generation operates as follows.
1. The size C of the password character set is derived from the PRML specification;
we suppose that a mapping is chosen from the set of integers {0, 1, . . . , C − 1} to
the characters in the password character set.
2. The length L of the password is chosen to be the minimum of 16 and the minimum
length prescribed by the PRML policy.
3. The input bit string is converted to a positive integer (by regarding the string
as the binary representation of a number), and this number is converted to its
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C-ary representation dtdt−1 . . . d0, for some t, where 0 ≤ di ≤ C − 1 for every i
(0 ≤ i ≤ t).
4. The final L digits of the above sequence of numbers, i.e. dL−1dL−2 . . . d0, are then
converted to characters using the mapping established in step 1.
5. The password is tested to verify that it satisfies the other constraints in the
PRML specification. If not, then the input bit string is rehashed and the process
is recommenced; otherwise the process is complete.
The above procedure assumes that the length of the input bit-string is significantly
greater than dL log2Ce. Since the likely value of L is 16, and a typical value for C
is at most 64, this means that dL log2Ce is likely to be less than 100, i.e. much less
than the length of the output of a modern hash function such as SHA-256 (which gives
a 256-bit output). It also assumes that a random password with characters from the
specified password set has a reasonable chance of satisfying the PRML requirements.
If this is not true, then a more elaborate second stage algorithm could be devised.
6.3.5 Password Offsets
As noted in 5.5.1, a major issue with existing password generators is that they do not
allow a user to choose a password (e.g. to allow continuing use of a password established
prior to use of the system), or to change a password without changing the set of inputs.
We propose the use of password offsets to support these requirements. A password
offset works in the following way.
1. A password dL−1dL−2 . . . d0 is first generated in the normal two-stage way (as de-
scribed in 6.3.4), and suppose D is the positive integer which has dL−1dL−2 . . . d0
as its C-ary representation.
2. Let the user-chosen password (of length M , say) be encoded as an M -digit se-
quence eM−1eM−2 . . . e0, where 0 ≤ ei ≤ C − 1 for every i (0 ≤ i ≤ M − 1), and
suppose E is the positive integer having eM−1eM−2 . . . e0 as its C-ary represen-
tation.
3. The password offset is simply E −D.
When generating a password, if a password offset exists then the password is gen-
erated in the normal way and the offset is added; the result will be the C-ary encoding
of the desired password. A similar approach can be used for password changes, where
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a new password can be generated at random (in accordance with the PRML specifi-
cation) and the password offset is set to the difference between the new password and
the value generated using the standard procedure.
Note that the use of a password offset is to some extent like a cloud-based pass-
word manager, in that password-related information is stored by a server. Indeed, it
can be regarded as a way of combining the best features of both approaches. What
distinguishes an offset-based password generator from a password manager is that use
of an offset is optional, and users are only expected to employ it if they wish to either
continue to use an existing or externally chosen password or make frequent password
changes. Also, the AutoPass server only stores non-sensitive information, unlike the
case for a cloud-based password manager.
6.4 Details of Operation
To simplify the description of AutoPass operation, we assume AutoPass is implemented
as a browser add-on running on a Windows platform. Alternative implementation
scenarios, e.g. as a stand-alone application on a phone or tablet, are likely to be very
similar, but may vary in some minor details.
6.4.1 Application Installation
We divide the discussion into two cases, i.e. where a user installs AutoPass for the first
time (and creates an account on the AutoPass server), and where a user installs the
software and already has an AutoPass account.
First Installation and Account Creation
Suppose a user decides to start using AutoPass, and so installs the client software. Once
the AutoPass add-on is installed, the set-up procedure involves the following steps.
1. When the AutoPass add-on is activated for the first time, e.g. by clicking a
toolbar button, it first asks the user whether he/she has an existing account. In
this case the user indicates that a new account is to be created. This involves the
client contacting the AutoPass server, and various registration details need to be
completed, as described below.
(a) Login password : This is chosen and entered by the user, who must memo-
rise it. It serves two main purposes: user authentication to the server and
derivation of a key used to encrypt a copy of the master password stored at
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the server. After entry of the login password, the client computes a salted
hash of the value, which is sent to the AutoPass server as a means of au-
thenticating the user.
(b) User name: The user must select a unique name. The AutoPass server
checks that the name is not already in use, and if necessary requests the
user to choose a different value. The user name is stored by the AutoPass
server, and serves as an identifier for the user.
(c) Master password : This value functions as a cryptographic key, and can be
generated by the user or the AutoPass client software (perhaps at the choice
of the user). We assume here that it is a 128-bit value, represented as a
string of 32 hexadecimal characters. If the client software generates it, it
is displayed to the user and the user is advised to keep a copy somewhere
secure so that system recovery is possible (see below). The login password is
used to generate a cryptographic key, e.g. by hashing a concatenation of the
login password and a fixed value. This key is then used to encrypt the master
password using an appropriate technique, e.g. AES [48] in an authenticated
encryption mode, prior to uploading it to the server. The server retains this
encrypted master password for downloading to a client whenever a user logs
in. The AutoPass client also generates the result of applying a cryptographic
hash-function to the concatenation of the master password and a fixed string
(e.g. a single ‘0’ bit), which is sent to the AutoPass server and stored with
the encrypted copy; this hash value is used for recovery purposes (see below).
(d) Other information: To allow recovery if a user forgets his/her user name
or login password, an email address (or addresses) should also be collected.
Other contact details could also be given, e.g. a mobile number. The server
holds this information as part of the user account information.
2. After successful user account creation, the user is requested to log in using his or
her newly established user name and login password (see 6.4.2).
Installing AutoPass on a Newly Acquired PC
Once an AutoPass account has been established (as described immediately above), the
following step is performed to set up AutoPass on a new machine. We suppose that
the client software has already been installed.
As previously, when the AutoPass add-on is activated for the first time, it first
asks the user whether he/she has an existing account. In this case the user indicates
that he/she already has an account. The AutoPass client then asks the user for his or
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her user name and login password, and the process continues exactly as in a normal
operational session (see 6.4.2).
Recovery
The system needs to provide a recovery mechanism for the case where a user forgets
their user name and/or password. We suppose that the client software has a recovery
function, which a user can invoke in the event of a forgotten user name or password.
We consider the operation of this recovery function for the two cases separately.
• If a user forgets their user name, he/she can request a copy from the server by
entering their registered email address. The server checks the email address is
registered, and emails the user name for this address to the user.
• If a user forgets their login password, then it cannot be recovered since neither
the server nor the client retain a copy. However, if the user has kept a copy of
the master password, then system recovery is possible. The user is prompted
to enter his or her user name, the master password and a new login password.
The new login password is used to generate a key which is used to encrypt the
master password, exactly as described above. A salted hash of the newly selected
login password, the user name, the encrypted master password, and the result
of applying a cryptographic hash-function to the concatenation of the master
password and a fixed string (e.g. a single ‘ 0’ bit) are all sent to the AutoPass
server. The server authenticates the user by comparing the master password hash
with its stored value, and, if successful, replaces the current encrypted master
password, the master password hash and login password hash with the new values.
Finally, the server communicates the success of the recovery operation to the
AutoPass client, which informs the user.
6.4.2 Operational Sessions
We next consider what occurs when the AutoPass software is activated, e.g. after the
host platform has been rebooted. We suppose that the set-up process described in 6.4.1
has already been performed.
1. The user is prompted for his or her user name and login password.
2. The user name is sent to the AutoPass server, which responds with the salt value
for its stored copy of the hashed login password for the identified user.
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3. The AutoPass client software uses the salt value to hash the login password
entered by the user, and the resulting hash-value is sent to the server.
4. The AutoPass server checks that the login password hash is the same as its stored
value, and by doing so authenticates the user.
5. The AutoPass server sends back to the client the encrypted master password.
The AutoPass server also sends the following information for each site for which
the user has created a password using AutoPass:
• the first part of the URL of the site (this is used as the site identifier);
• the password policy for the site (in PRML);
• the set of input types used to generate the password for this site (e.g. whether
a digital object is used);
• the password offset for this site, if it exists;
• any other parameters used to control password generation for this site.
6. The AutoPass client decrypts the master password using a key derived from the
login password, and multiply hashes the master password; the result is cached
and the master password can then be deleted. Note that the multiple hashing
process takes as input just the master password (i.e. not concatenated with any
value) and hence the hash value held by the server cannot be used to compute
this value.
7. Once activated, the AutoPass add-on will run continuously in the background,
examining each web page to see if it is a login page. It does this by using various
heuristics, including looking for the string input type=“password”.
8. The add-on will then work as required, generating passwords automatically, un-
til the session ends, e.g. when the browser is terminated, at which point the
short-term stored configuration stored data, including the multiply-hashed mas-
ter password, is securely deleted.
Figure 6.3 summaries the AutoPass client and server interactions and information flow.
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Figure 6.3: AutoPass operational sessions
6.4.3 Use with a Website
When AutoPass is used with a new website, the following procedure is executed. We
suppose that the AutoPass software is already executing, i.e. the procedure in 6.4.2 has
been followed.
1. If the AutoPass add-on detects a login page, it cross-checks the first part of the
site URL with the data from the AutoPass server to determine whether it is a
known site. In this case, we suppose that AutoPass has not previously been used
to generate a password for this site.
2. The AutoPass add-on then communicates with the user (e.g. via a pop-up) to
indicate that it has detected a login page for a website for which a password has
not previously been generated, and asks the user whether it would like AutoPass
to manage generation of a new password for this site.
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3. If the user declines, then the AutoPass add-on goes back to looking for login
pages. If the user accepts, AutoPass next asks what types of input the user
would like to use to generate the password from amongst those listed in 6.3.1.
4. The user selects the input types; if use of digital objects is selected, the user is also
asked to select an object. The AutoPass client assembles the inputs, including
the first part of the website URL and the multiply-hashed master password, to be
used to generate the site password. The client also offers the user the option to
select the password — if the user requests this option then the user is prompted
for the pre-chosen value.
5. The AutoPass client retrieves the PRML password policy for this site from the
AutoPass server.
6. The password is generated using the procedure specified in 6.3.1 and 6.3.5 and
automatically copied to the password field. If the user chose to select the pass-
word value, then the appropriate password offset is computed during password
generation.
7. The user preferences and the password offset (if appropriate) are sent to the
AutoPass server for storage.
The following steps are executed when AutoPass is in everyday use, i.e. after a
website has already been set-up. As previously, we suppose that the client AutoPass
software is already active.
1. If the AutoPass add-on detects a login page, it uses the first part of the site URL
to check whether a password has previously been generated for this site — in this
case we suppose it has.
2. The AutoPass add-on now communicates with the AutoPass server to request the
site-specific configuration data for this site, including the list of data input types
to be used to generate the password, the password policy encoded in PRML, and
the password offset (if it exists).
3. The AutoPass add-on then assembles the set of inputs to be used to generate the
password; if the user preferences for this site indicate that a digital object is to
be used, the add-on prompts the user for the object.
4. The AutoPass add-on generates the password, using the password offset if avail-
able, and automatically copies the value to the password field.
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6.5 Other Aspects
Client-Server Communications
Whilst the data exchanged between AutoPass client and server is not necessarily highly
confidential, some is privacy-sensitive and the integrity of all the data is crucial for cor-
rect operation. We therefore propose that all data exchanged between client and server
is protected using a server-authenticated TLS channel established at the beginning of
a client session. To make the authentication of server to client robust, the client is
assumed to use certificate pinning for the AutoPass server.
Client Caching
The set of website data downloaded by the AutoPass server to the AutoPass client at
the beginning of every session (see step 5 of Section 6.4.2) is not likely to change very
rapidly. It therefore makes sense for the client to cache the most recently downloaded
copy of this data, potentially improving system availability even if the AutoPass server
is unavailable for a period.
Of course, if this data is cached long term, then it is at risk of compromise if the
host device is compromised. To understand the nature of this risk we need to consider
the data that would be cached. This information is enumerated in step 5 of Section
6.4.2, namely, for each website for which the user has chosen to use AutoPass to help
manage the password:
• the first part of the URL of the site (this is used as the site identifier);
• the password policy for the site (in PRML);
• the set of input types used to generate the password for this site (e.g. whether a
digital object is used);
• the password offset for this site, if it exists;
• any other parameters used to control password generation for this site.
Apart from the privacy issue of revealing with which sites the user interacts, the first
and second pieces of information are completely non-sensitive, public information. The
third and fifth items are also minimally sensitive. That is, the only piece of information
of significance from a security perspective is the password offset (if it exists). As
discussed in Section 6.6.3, if a password and the corresponding password offset are
compromised then any future password for that particular site can be determined if
the corresponding offset is known. That is, compromise of a single password offset is
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not damaging, even if the corresponding password is discovered by some means. Only
if the password is changed and the new offset is also compromised does this cause a
threat. This suggests that caching does not add significantly to the risks. Of course,
if users are likely to be concerned then an option to disable caching could easily be
implemented, e.g. as a user option.
6.6 Security Evaluation
We next consider the security properties of the scheme.
6.6.1 Trust Relationships
Clearly, the AutoPass server must be trusted to some extent by the user, since if it
sends incorrect data then passwords cannot be generated correctly. It also learns which
websites the user interacts with, and hence it must be trusted to respect user privacy.
On the other hand, it does not have the means to learn user passwords, since it only
has access to an encrypted copy of the master password, which is used to generate all
passwords, and thus it can be regarded as being partially trusted.
6.6.2 Threat Model
The security and correct operation of AutoPass depend on a number of key assumptions,
which we enumerate.
• The client device is assumed to be uncompromised, since passwords are generated
in and used by this device. If, for example, the browser is compromised then
clearly the generated passwords may be compromised.
• The AutoPass client is assumed to be correct and without exploitable vulnerabil-
ities. As for the previous assumption, if a corrupted version of the client software
is present on the client device, then user passwords may be compromised.
• The AutoPass server provides correct information (see also Section 6.6.1 above).
Given the above assumptions, AutoPass is designed to resist the following types of
attack:
1. active attacks on the communications link between the AutoPass client and server,
including masquerading as the server to the client or vice versa, e.g. as made
possible by an untrustworthy wireless access point or by DNS poisoning;
2. attacks on password secrecy conducted by the AutoPass server;
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3. attacks on password secrecy conducted by a valid site against user passwords for
other sites;
4. attacks on password secrecy conducted by any party with temporary access to
the AutoPass server database.
6.6.3 Security Properties
We conclude this discussion by considering whether the desired properties are realised
by the AutoPass design. We consider the four attacks in the previous section in turn.
1. Attacks of the first type are prevented by the assumption that all communications
between the client and server are TLS-protected. The server will be authenti-
cated by a pinned certificate. The client end of the link will not be explicitly
authenticated to the server, but the presence of the correct user is verified by
checking that the correct hash of the login password is sent over the link.
2. The server only has access to password metadata, a hash of the master password,
and an encrypted copy of the master password. If the master password is au-
tomatically generated by a process using sufficient randomness, use of a 128-bit
value will prevent direct brute forcing guessing attacks. However, the encryption
of the master password is based on a key derived from the user-selected login
password. If the login password is poorly chosen, then it can be brute-forced,
meaning that the server could gain access to the master password. Thus it is vi-
tal for the user to choose a login password with high entropy. This is a reasonable
assumption since this is the only secret the user is required to memorise. It is also
worth noting that the use of password offsets means that if a password (and its
offset) are compromised then any future password for that particular site can be
determined if the corresponding offset is known. That is, whilst offsets will not be
divulged to any party, a dishonest AutoPass server that (by some means) learns
a user’s password for a website will be able to determine all future passwords for
that site.
3. The AutoPass system is completely transparent to authenticating websites, and
passwords for distinct sites are computed separately as a function of the master
password. If a website guesses that AutoPass is in use, it could use the password
to try to perform a brute force search for the master password. However, if the
master password is chosen at random then such a search is infeasible.
4. If an unauthorised party has access to the AutoPass server database, then it will
not have immediate access to any user passwords. However, as discussed under 2
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above, if the unauthorised party obtains the encrypted master password and the
login password used to encrypt the master password is poorly chosen, then the
attacker might be able to brute-force the login password and learn the master
password. This argues in favour of the AutoPass server providing additional
encryption of the database, giving protection against compromise of stored user
data.
6.6.4 Security from An Attacker Perspective
To complement the above security discussion, we give an analysis of the security of the
system from an attacker perspective. We divide this discussion into a number of cases
depending on the nature of the attacker and the resources they might have.
• Passive eavesdropper. Such an attacker could eavesdrop on communications
between the client and the server. However, we require all such communications
to be TLS-protected (see Section 6.5). That is, no useful information, except for
the fact that the client machine is talking to the AutoPass server, will be available
to the eavesdropper.
• Server compromise. As noted in Section 6.6.3, the server only has access to
password metadata for each website for which passwords are generated, the user
account name and email address, a (salted) hash of the login password, a hash of
the master password concatenated with a fixed string, and a copy of the master
password encrypted using a key derived from the login password. We consider
the possible threat posed by compromise of each of these values in turn.
– Password metadata for each website. As discussed in Section 6.5 below,
the only data of security significance is the password offset. The use of
password offsets means that if a password (and its offset) are compromised
then any future password for that particular site can be determined if the
corresponding offset is known. That is, whilst offsets will not be divulged to
any party, a dishonest AutoPass server that (by some means) learns a user’s
password for a website will be able to determine all future passwords for
that site. However, this means that two distinct server compromises would
be required for this to have an impact on password security.
– User account name and email address. These are not of major security
significance.
– (Salted) hash of the login password. If the login password is poorly chosen,
then a brute-force search for the login password could be successfully per-
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formed using the salted hash, meaning that the server could gain access to
the master password. Nonetheless, the use of a salt should make this more
difficult by ruling out the use of precomputed tables of hashes of ‘likely’
passwords. Thus it is vital for the user to choose a login password with high
entropy; this is a reasonable assumption since this is the only secret the user
is required to memorise.
– Hash of the master password concatenated with a fixed string. If the master
password is automatically generated by a process using sufficient random-
ness, use of a 128-bit value will prevent direct brute forcing guessing attacks
based on this hash value. Concatenation with a fixed string prior to hashing
prevents use of this hash value to help compute passwords.
– Master password encrypted using a key derived from the login password. The
encryption of the master password is based on a key derived from the user-
selected login password. As above, if the login password is poorly chosen,
then it could be brute-forced using the salted hash of this password, meaning
that the server could gain access to the master password.
• User device compromise. There are a number of ways a user device might be
compromised.
– In the worst case, the hardware or operating system could be compromised
to allow monitoring of user behaviour (e.g. keystrokes) by a third party. This
might enable complete compromise of the system. However, it would also
be potentially disastrous even if AutoPass was not in use, and addressing
such a threat is way beyond the scope of a password generator or password
manager.
– Data stored on the device during a live session might be compromised. In
this case, the multiply-hashed master password might be revealed. This
would then potentially enable user passwords to be generated. As a result, it
is important that, while stored during a session, the multiply-hashed master
password is protected by the system as much as possible. Of course, more
generally, compromise of a session while the user is logged on could be highly
damaging in other aspects, and the user would be expected to take normal
precautions for personal device protection such as using password-protected
screen lock.
– The least bad case is where data stored on a device long-term is compro-
mised. As specified in step 8 of Section 6.4.2, at the end of an AutoPass ses-
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sion all short-term stored configuration stored data, including the multiply-
hashed master password, is securely deleted. That is, the only AutoPass-
specific data that might be compromised in this case is cached data down-
loaded from the AutoPass server. As discussed in Section 6.5, the security
impact of the compromise of cached data is limited.
• Server impersonation. Impersonation of the AutoPass server to a client device
is prevented by the use of a TLS session with certificate pinning.
• User impersonation. Impersonation of a user to the AutoPass server is pre-
vented by use of the login password for user authentication. Compromise of this
password is prevented by the establishment of a TLS session before transmitting
the salted hash of the login password to the server.
6.7 Addressing Shortcomings
In Section 3.5 we identified three major problems with existing password generators.
These issues are all addressed by the AutoPass scheme, with the aid of a partially
trusted server that does not have the means to recover individual user passwords. We
examine the three issues in turn.
• Setting and updating passwords. As we have observed, all existing password gener-
ation schemes cause major difficulties for users with a large body of existing pass-
words, since they are obliged to change them all; AutoPass avoids this through
the use of password offsets, allowing continued use of existing passwords.
• Using multiple platforms. The use of the AutoPass server allows seamless cross-
platform working. At the same time, this server is only partly trusted, and does
not have the means to recover individual user passwords, as discussed in Section
6.6.3.
• Password policy issues. The use of server-provided PRML statements allows
passwords to be automatically generated to meet website-specific requirements.
Of course, whilst AutoPass works in theory, it is important to verify that the system
also works in practice. A prototype implementation has been developed and used to
conduct user trials. The prototype and the results of the trials are discussed in the
next chapter.
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6.8 Conclusions
In this chapter we described in detail the design of the AutoPass password generator.
First we provided a high level description of AutoPass. We then provided a detailed
specification of AutoPass, covering the types of inputs used to generate a password, the
method of password generation, and the types and storage locations of configuration
data. This was followed by a security evaluation, and a discussion of how the scheme
addresses shortcomings identified in previous schemes.
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Chapter 7
Testing AutoPass
7.1 Introduction
In Chapter 6 we described in detail the design of the AutoPass password generator. Its
use of a server, in particular to store password offsets, PRML specifications and user
preferences, is designed to remove the shortcomings present in all previously proposed
password generators. Of course, whilst the system works in theory, it is important to
also test that the system works in practice. To verify that the system is viable we
first developed a prototype implementation and then used this prototype to conduct a
small-scale informal user trial, with the goal of verifying that the prototype software
is usable. In this chapter we first describe the prototype implementation, and then
summarise the results from the user trial.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 7.2 we introduce
the design and implementation of the AutoPass prototype; this involves providing
detailed descriptions of the AutoPass server, AutoPass browser extension and how the
browser extension is used. This is followed in Section 7.3 by a description of the user
trial, including: the methodology used, a description of the user demographics, and
a summary and analysis of the data obtained from the trial. Finally, the chapter
concludes in Section 7.4.
7.2 Prototype Design and Implementation
In this section we describe the AutoPass prototype; this involves providing detailed
descriptions of the AutoPass server, the AutoPass browser extension and how the
browser extension is used.
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7.2.1 Overall Structure
AutoPass has two main parts: the AutoPass server and the AutoPass client. The Au-
toPass server stores less sensitive user data, and the AutoPass client software provides
a user interface and automatically generates site-specific user passwords by combining
the specified set of inputs.
7.2.2 AutoPass Server
The AutoPass server was developed using Python on the Django1 platform; Django
was chosen since it is easy to use, scalable, and appears to be reasonably secure. The
AutoPass server is hosted on the Amazon Web Services (AWS) Elastic Beanstalk2 cloud
service. This cloud service was chosen for its ease of use and low cost. The service
automates the process of setting up applications on the AWS infrastructure; as a result,
setting up and executing the application was made very simple and took only a few
minutes. It is also free for the first year of use. The AutoPass code is available on
GitHub at https://github.com/wanpengli/AutoPass.
7.2.3 AutoPass Client
Because of the ubiquity of the Chrome browser, and the ease with which Chrome
extensions can be developed and developed, the prototype client was developed as a
Chrome extension written in JavaScript. It is available at https://google-url.com/
068vq. Currently users need to know this link to install it, but the intention is to make
is available via Google Play once it has been finalised. Key extracts from the client
code are given in Appendix A.1.
The current version, which was used in the trial reported in the next section, offers
the following functionality:
• generation and regeneration of a password on demand;
• use of password offsets to enable users to choose their own password, and to
change passwords;
• automatic creation of passwords meeting website password policies;
• autofilling of passwords (this only works if a user has just one account at the
website).
1https://www.djangoproject.com/
2https://aws.amazon.com/elasticbeanstalk/
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Two other features of AutoPass as specified in the previous chapter have not yet
been implemented, namely:
• optional use of user-selected digital objects (e.g. files or images) as an input to
password generation;
• use of a default password policy for websites for which a PRML policy file is not
available at PRDDS3.
Implementation of these features is planned as future work.
7.2.4 Installing and Using the AutoPass Client
The following steps must be followed in order to install and use the AutoPass client.
Note that a description of how to use the AutoPass prototype is also included in the
user manual, a copy of which is given in Appendix A.5.
1. Download and Install from Google Play
The Chrome extension can be installed from the following link: https://chrome.
google.com/webstore/detail/autopass/oapnffdchomlagblkehioepojjkjjcjb/
related. The AutoPass icon is shown in Figure 7.1. After installation, Chrome
will show the new extension next to the search bar.
Figure 7.1: AutoPass extension from Google Play
2. AutoPass Registration
After installation of the extension has been successfully completed, the user must
next register with the AutoPass server to create an account at the server. This
involves the following steps.
3https://api.ppdds.passwordassistance.info/v1/ppds//
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(a) The user must first cause Chrome to visit http://www.autopasspg.co.uk/
login/.
(b) The user should then click on the Sign Up button, which will lead to the
registration page. The user must then complete following information.
i. Account name: the user must choose an account name after checking
its availability using the check account availability option.
ii. First and last names.
iii. Email address: this is used for password recovery.
iv. Password : this is used to log in to the application (i.e. it is the login
password in the terminology used in the previous chapter) and must
contain at least 8 characters.
v. Password confirmation.
vi. Master password : if the user clicks on Generate Master Key, the client
will generate a random master password. This will be displayed to
the user and the user is recommended to keep a copy (as it cannot be
recovered if the user forgets their login password).
(c) The user is then requested to solve a CAPTCHA4 to try to reduce the risk
of automated account creation by bots.
(d) Registration is completed by pressing the Registration button. Once pressed
the extension will allow the user to create a printed copy of the registration
information.
3. Logging In
Once the user has registered, the user will be required to log in every time Chrome
is started up. This involves the following steps.
(a) To commence the process the user should click on the AutoPass extension
logo in the Chrome browser. This will cause the AutoPass login window to
appear (see Figure 7.2).
4A CAPTCHA (see, for example, [87, 6] and http://www.captcha.net/) is a type of challenge-
response test used to determine whether or not a remote user is human and not a malicious program,
such as a bot.
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Figure 7.2: AutoPass login window
(b) The user should enter his or her account name and password. The user will
then have access to the AutoPass functionality.
4. First Time Use with A Website
We next consider the case where a user navigates to a website login page (or
website registration page) which has not previously been set up with AutoPass.
Of course, AutoPass may fail to detect the login page since it relies on a set of
heuristics to detect such pages — if so then the user will be forced to proceed
without AutoPass support. We therefore suppose that AutoPass has detected a
login page, in which case AutoPass will display a popup of the type shown in
Figure 7.3.
Figure 7.3: AutoPass pop-up for user consent
(a) If the user clicks Cancel then AutoPass will do nothing and will return to
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looking for login pages. If the user clicks OK, then the window shown in
Figure 7.4 will be displayed. The user will be required to enter his or her
User name for this website (as opposed to the user name for AutoPass).
The site URL will be automatically completed by the AutoPass client. A
Log out button is provided enabling the user to log out from AutoPass.
Figure 7.4: AutoPass password generation window
(b) After pressing Confirm, the AutoPass client will generate a password for
the site which (on this occasion only) the user must manually copy into the
appropriate place in the website registration page.
If the user wishes to choose the password for this site then he/she must also click
the Use your own password box and enter the chosen password into the Your
own password field as shown in figure 7.5. The site URL will be automatically
completed by the AutoPass client. A Log out button is provided enabling the
user to log out from AutoPass. After pressing Confirm, the AutoPass client will
regenerate the entered a password for the site and automatically enter it into the
field in the login page.
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Figure 7.5: Use your own password window
5. Subsequent Use With A Website
If AutoPass detects a login page for a website for which it has already been set
up, it will simply fill in the user name and the generated password.
7.3 A User Trial
The prototype described in the previous section was used as the basis of a small-scale
informal user trial to provide a preliminary evaluation of the usability and security of
AutoPass. The methodology for and the results from this trial are now discussed.
7.3.1 Methodology
Before conducting the trial we completed the Royal Holloway ethical review
process. This was necessary since we were conducting a trial with human
participants. Details of the ethical review process are available at: https:
//intranet.royalholloway.ac.uk/staff/research/research-and-enterprise/
research-enterprise/ethics/ethical-approval-process.aspx.
We used a quantitative approach, and obtained statistics about user behaviour and
user attitudes relating to passwords and AutoPass. We were also open to discussions
with the participants for feedback on AutoPass. Since only a relatively short time was
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available to set up and conduct the trial, and in the absence of funding to support a
large study, we decided to recruit volunteers for the trial from fellow students, friends
and acquaintances. As a result of our requests we obtained a total of 17 participants
for the trial (all of whom were Chrome users).
Each participant was asked to (a) read the provided documentation and install Au-
toPass in Chrome, (b) use the AutoPass extension in their everyday web activities for
at least a week, and then (c) complete a short questionnaire about their experiences
using the extension. The goal was to obtain a general overview of AutoPass usability
and security from the user perspective. Once signed up, each participant was provided
with a link to enable them to install the Chrome extension. The extension was up-
loaded to Google Play and made available via the link: https://chrome.google.com/
webstore/detail/autopass/oapnffdchomlagblkehioepojjkjjcjb/related.
Each participant was also provided with the following four documents.
• A Consent form. The form is included in Appendix A.3. Given that the trial
involves working with user passwords, it clearly has privacy implications; it there-
fore seemed appropriate to both inform the users of any issues and also obtain
their informed consent. The form provides very basic information about the na-
ture of the trial and also gives assurances about the handling of any personal data.
Participants were asked to return a signed copy of the form before participating
in the trial.
• A User guide. This is included in Appendix A.4. This provides general informa-
tion on passwords generators and in particular on AutoPass. It focusses on the
nature of the data used and stored by the AutoPass software.
• The AutoPass manual. This is included in Appendix A.5. This general manual
provides detailed instructions on the installation and use of AutoPass. It is hoped
that this will of value to any future users of AutoPass, and not just for participants
in the trial.
• A Questionnaire. This is included in Appendix A.6. This was set up in Google
Forms5, and participants were asked to provide their responses via Google after
use of the extension for at least a week. Use of Google Forms made it simple to
recover statistical information from the responses, and also to generate graphical
representations of the response data.
The questionnaire was primarily designed to learn whether the users found AutoPass
easy to use, and whether it met their needs for automated password management.
5https://www.google.com/forms/about/
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Given that the trial was only intended as an informal evaluation, we did not design the
questionnaire using any formal methodology. The results should therefore be seen as an
informal indication of initial reactions to use of the scheme, rather than as a detailed
examination of its strengths and weaknesses. A more formal and detailed study is
planned future work.
7.3.2 User Base
As noted above, the trial involved a total of 17 participants, a relatively small number
compared to previous studies [14, 67, 90]. All the participants were either fellow stu-
dents at Royal Holloway, University of London or colleagues at the College of Applied
Science in Oman. Unfortunately, only 12 of the 17 participants completed the trial by
returning the questionnaire, and hence from here on all information is with respect to
the 12 who completed the trial. Three of the five who didn’t complete the trial were
Linux users who were unable to install the extension for compatibility reasons.
Nine of the 12 completing participants were female, and they were all aged between
25 and 64. All participants had a background in Computer Science and/or Mathe-
matics. The age distribution of the 12 who completed the trial is shown in Figure
7.6.
Figure 7.6: Participant age distribution
7.3.3 Summary of Results
The full results from the 12 completed questionnaires are given in Appendix A.7. Af-
ter two questions about the participants themselves, the next three questions (q3-q5)
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in the questionnaire aimed at exploring user attitudes towards passwords, password
generation and enabling users to identify and to be aware of these issue before using
AutoPass. The questions were derived from the Lyastani et al. analysis [63], shown in
Figure 7.7.
Figure 7.7: password generation strategies
The main conclusions from an analysis of the answers to these questions are as
follows.
• As shown in Table 7.1, more than half the participants have problems with both
managing large numbers of passwords for multiple accounts and with varying
password policies. This result was not unexpected, and is consistent with the
literature (see, for example, Lyastani et al. [63]).
Table 7.1: Issues user face with using password
Difficulties user face with passwords Total
Too many accounts with too many passwords 58.30%
Different websites have different policies on what is
permitted as a password e.g. upper case, lower case
58.30%
Some websites require frequent password changes 50%
• Table 7.2 shows that the most common password generation technique is to em-
ploy familiar phrases or data, closely followed by use of ‘random’ passwords;
it is not clear whether either of these approaches result in genuinely ‘strong’
passwords. Also, a large proportion of the participants admitted to re-using
passwords, a clear security risk.
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Table 7.2: User password generation techniques
User password generation techniques Total
Password generator 8.3%
Password generator which is built into a password manager or browser 0%
I use the same password for all accounts with minimal modification 41.7%
I use familiar phrases or dates 50%
I generate a random password from whatever comes to mind 41.7%
• Half of the participants had previously used computer software to generate pass-
words.
The second main part of the questionnaire (q6-q11) focussed on the usability of
AutoPass. 75% of the participants found it easy or very easy to use, which was en-
couraging. Also, more than half the participants preferred AutoPass to their existing
password management method. All but two of the participants valued the ability to
continue to use existing passwords.
7.3.4 Analysis
The results described in Section 7.3.3 confirm that users are struggling with the poten-
tially large numbers of passwords they are currently required to manage. The results
suggest that many users cope with this problem by risking security through use of weak
passwords and/or by re-using passwords. The users are fully a ware of such bad prac-
tice and the risk associated with it and still accepting the risk. This is quite alarming
since most of our participants are from computer science background who are always in
contact with the updates in the technology and has better understanding of the tech-
nology. Also the age of the participant identify that none of the participants belong
to elderly category who could be unfamiliar with the technology and has difficulty to
adapt. These issues could be amplified with people have limited knowledge in computer
science or if there were in age where adapting with technology become a challenge.
AutoPass was found to be easy to use by the majority of the participants; users
also found it easy to create an account. The fact that AutoPass was available in the
Google store made it simple to download and install. Users were satisfied with the
passwords generated by AutoPass, as shown in Figure 7.8. Users also found it valuable
to be able to continue to use existing passwords, as shown in Figure 7.9. These results
were encouraging, and suggest that AutoPass offers a useful service and incorporates
functionality valued by users.
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Figure 7.8: Level of satisfaction with passwords generated using AutoPass
Figure 7.9: Did you find the ability to use existing passwords useful?
When asked to compare AutoPass with other password management schemes, only
17% of the participants said they found it better. However, whilst apparently disap-
pointing, 50% of the participants had not used password management software before,
and 33% had no preference. Encouragingly, 58% prefer AutoPass to their current
method of password management.
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Figure 7.10: Have you ever used a computer program to generate your passwords?
Figure 7.11: If you ever used a computer program to generate your passwords, how
does AutoPass compare with methods you have used previously?
The last question was an open question, intended to allow the participants to in-
dicate additional features that might improve the functionality of AutoPass. The re-
sponses we received are listed below along with an assessment of the feasibility of
implementing the suggested functionality.
• “Change the random password”. This feedback is unhelpful since the nature of
the suggested change is unclear.
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• “to auto fill the user name as well, not only the URL”. AutoPass autocompletes
the user name and the password automatically from the second visit onwards.
• “linking password creation with human memorization theories So the program
doesn’t generate password only but helps user to remember it”. This is a valid
thought; however the idea of AutoPass is to take the load of memorising away
from the user.
• “There should be specifications regarding creating passwords in AutoPass in order
for the password to be solid”. Unfortunately the author of the comment does not
appear to understand that AutoPass generates strong passwords by default.
• “length of the password should be limited”. The length of the password is governed
by the website requirements. So if a website requires no more than 12 characters
then AutoPass will generate a password of that length.
• “A timer to change your password, to improve security of my password maybe?”.
It would be fairly straightforward for AutoPass to be enhanced to incorporate a
password change reminder, e.g. where a user is reminded to change their password
after, say, a year has elapsed.
It seems that the most important remaining issue is to convince users to use pass-
word generators such as AutoPass, and thereby avoid the need to adopt insecure prac-
tices such as password re-use and selection of weak passwords.
7.4 Conclusions
We believe that the small-scale trial described in this chapter suggests that AutoPass is
indeed a usable solution for user password management. One important next step will
be to enhance AutoPass to add functionality currently missing, including optional use
of digital objects and the provision of a default password policy. Another important
direction for future work will be to create versions for all the most popular browsers,
operating systems and platform types, thereby addressing the compatibility issues iden-
tified by three of the original 17 trial participants. Finally, further and more extensive
user trials will be required to both test the added features, and obtain more detailed
and statistically significant information about user attitudes to password generators
such as AutoPass.
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Password Recovery
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Chapter 8
Modelling the Password
Recovery Process
8.1 Introduction
Passwords are frequently forgotten, and as a result websites typically provide a mecha-
nism to enable a user to re-establish a shared secret. Floreˆncio and Herley’s [28] study
reveals that every month over 1.5% of Yahoo users of a typical website forget their
password and reset it. Password recovery can be achieved in many ways, including
use of a pre-registered email address or mobile phone number, and/or involving other
pre-set fall-back means of authentication. However, many of these techniques intro-
duce vulnerabilities which may enable an impostor to falsely change a password, either
causing a denial of service or, in the worst case, enabling the impostor to authenticate
as the user.
In this chapter, we analyse these issues by first introducing a general model for pass-
word recovery, and then examining various existing password recovery options within
the context of this model. We also use the model to look at ways of improving the
security and/or usability of password recovery. In the next chapter we examine one
aspect of password recovery in greater detail, namely the real-world use of password
recovery emails.
This chapter is structured as follows. In Section 8.2 we provide a general model for
web password recovery, intended to capture the commonly used approaches. Section
8.3 then reviews the various ways in which password recovery is performed in practice,
within the context of the model. This then enables us in Section 8.4 to provide a
systematic assessment of the security strengths and weaknesses of existing approaches,
along with potential usability issues. In Section 8.5 we use the results of this assessment
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to provide a series of recommendations on the design of password recovery systems.
Section 8.6 concludes the chapter.
8.2 A General Model
We now present a general model for a password recovery system. It provides a frame-
work within which we can examine the security of various options for the recovery
process. As discussed above, password recovery is a process which enables users to
re-establish a password for a website account. Sometimes referred to as password re-
set1, password recovery is typically performed when a user forgets the password for a
website. There are a variety of ways in which password recovery can be performed,
some more secure than others, and the general model is intended to capture all the
means of password recovery in current use.
8.2.1 Constituent Processes
A password recovery process typically involves three sub-processes, namely:
• registration, in which user-specific information to be used during password re-
covery is captured by the website,
• password setup, in which the user chooses and sends the website a new password
for that site, and
• recovery, where the user interacts with the website with the goal of re-
establishing a shared secret password.
Typically, the first of these will be performed just once, the second will be performed
infrequently, and the third will be performed whenever necessary. These three sub-
processes are next examined in greater detail.
8.2.2 Registration
In establishing an account with the website, a user typically sets up a user name and
password, as well as other information for use in the recovery process. This information
is used to ensure the security of the recovery process, i.e. to help prevent an unautho-
rised party from changing the password to cause a denial of service, or, even worse,
obtaining a valid password for the account. Existing categories of information of this
type are examined in Section 8.3.1.
1We avoid this terminology since it implies changing the existing password, and not all password
recovery schemes involve such a change.
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8.2.3 Password Setup
We assume the website uses a password to authenticate the user, and so both initially
(probably as part of registration) and whenever the user wishes to change it, the user
will need to supply the website with a password. Other information, e.g. a ‘password
hint’, may be collected at the same time. Further examples of information that might
be gathered in this stage are given in Section 8.3.2.
8.2.4 Recovery
Password recovery is typically invoked by a user when he/she forgets the password for
a website. Such a process typically has three stages, as follows.
1. Recovery request. This involves the user signalling to the website to request
password recovery. The website will typically provide a means for this to occur,
e.g. a special button.
2. Request validation. The website checks that the request is valid. A website
may perform user authentication, obviously using a means other than the pass-
word, although by no means all websites do this. In this stage the website may
also attempt to verify that the request originates from a human rather than a
bot, e.g. using a CAPTCHA.
3. Password re-establishment. At the conclusion of this stage, if successful, the
user is equipped with a valid password for the website. There are two main
implementation approaches.
• The password recovery system can help the user remember (recover) his/her
password; this will typically involve the system keeping a copy of every user
password, and password recovery will involve reminding the user what it is
(typically after he/she has been authenticated).
• The password recovery system can help the user set up a new password,
often referred to as password reset. This may involve the system giving the
user a temporary password, which the user must change at first use.
Regardless of the particular implementation approach, the recovery process will
typically involve using a secure communications channel to the user, e.g. based on a
previously registered email address or phone number. Examples of how each of these
steps might be executed are provided in Sections 8.3.3 and 8.3.4.
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8.3 Model Components
We next examine how the model components can be instantiated. The various options
introduced here are critically analysed later in the chapter.
8.3.1 Registration
Registration for password recovery is typically implemented as part of a general reg-
istration process, in which the user establishes a new account (known as registering
or signing up). As well as gathering information, it may also involve security-related
steps, e.g. solving a CAPTCHA to prevent automated user account harvesting. It of-
ten involves collecting a wide range of information, including matters not relevant to
password recovery (e.g. payment information); we focus only on information related to
password recovery. Such information can be divided into two main categories:
• personal information, i.e. information about the individual that may be used for
a range of purposes apart from password recovery;
• recovery information, i.e. information used only for password recovery.
A website will also typically require the user to choose a unique user name (or give
an email address to function as a user name) as well as a password; these two pieces of
information are obviously key to password recovery, although given their special status
we do not include them in this classification. We next look at examples of widely used
information types of both categories.
Personal information
The following are examples of the types of personal information that may be gathered
during registration and subsequently used for password recovery. In each case, examples
of websites are given which use such information in a password recovery process.
• name (first name, last name), e.g. as gathered by Instagram2;
• gender, e.g. as collected by Facebook3;
• birth date (day, month, year), e.g. as gathered by Google Mail4;
• street address (street name, city, country), e.g. as used by Microsoft email5;
2https://goo.gl/sG4wDv,accessed:09/04/2018
3https://goo.gl/wCsLMk,accessed:09/04/2018
4https://goo.gl/b67119,accessed:09/04/2018
5https://goo.gl/9hbHNX,accessed:09/04/2018
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• email address, e.g. as collected by Amazon6;
• phone number (e.g. mobile number), e.g. as gathered by Twitter7.
Recovery information
The types of information established purely for password recovery purposes vary widely,
depending on the detailed operation of the recovery process. We can identify the
following general categories.
• Recovery authentication information, i.e. information that can be used to
authenticate the user. Examples include the following.
– Answers to security questions: the website may give a list of security
questions (also known as personal knowledge or challenge questions), for
a user-selectable subset of which the user must provide answers. These
questions cover topics which the user can easily remember since they relate
to the user’s personal life, e.g. school name, mother’s maiden name, pet
name, memorable street address, birthplace, favorite colour, etc. Examples
of websites that request answers to security questions during registration
include Apple and Google. In addition, some websites, e.g. Alipay.com, allow
users to customise the question, i.e. the user provides both the question and
the answer.
– One-time recovery (backup) codes: a website may set up one or more
one-time backup codes, which the user must securely retain for possible
future use for account recovery. These backup codes are typically not used
for password recovery as we define it here, but for closely related purposes.
In particular, Facebook and Google both support the establishment of such
codes to enable users to recover account access if a second authentication
factor fails or is unavailable, e.g. if a one-time password sent via SMS or email
cannot be accessed by the user. Of course, such backup codes could also be
used for password recovery but, since we are not aware of any websites using
them in this way, we do not discuss them further in this chapter.
• Recovery contact details are special contact details, such as an email address
or phone number, that are used for password recovery. Examples of such details
include the following.
6https://goo.gl/yrv1fA,accessed:09/04/2018
7https://goo.gl/uUYysF,accessed:09/04/2018
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– Contact details for trusted associates (trustees): i.e. email addresses
or phone numbers for one or more individuals trusted by the account holder,
e.g. as used by Facebook. During password recovery, a verification code is
sent to a trustee, who is trusted to relay it to the correct user.
– Recovery email address: i.e. one or more email addresses to which a
one-time password or a link to a special recovery page is sent by the website
during the recovery process.
– Recovery phone number: i.e. a phone number used to send a one-time
password for recovery purposes.
• Recovery preferences can be gathered at this stage if a website offers more
than one option for password recovery. The user preference can be established
during registration, or, as is the case for Google, the user is simply offered various
options if the password recovery process is invoked.
8.3.2 Password Setup
As part of the process of entering a password, the website may gather and store the
following types of information.
• Password hints: when a password is entered, some websites also request a hint,
intended to help the user remember the password. Alternatively, some websites,
e.g. Google (see Figure 8.1), record the time when the password was last changed,
and subsequently use this information as a password hint when the user makes a
password recovery request.
• Old passwords: some websites, e.g. Gmail, retain a means to verify old (super-
seded) passwords, to enable their use for authentication during password recovery.
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Figure 8.1: Google password change hint
8.3.3 Recovery Request and Validation
We consider the request and validation steps together since, in practice, these steps are
often combined. A website will typically provide a simple means for a user to invoke the
password recovery process, e.g. by providing a link somewhere close to the password
field in the login page. Once invoked the user will typically be asked to perform one or
more of the following steps in order to prevent the acceptance of fraudulent requests:
• solve a CAPTCHA — some websites, e.g. PayPal, use a CAPTCHA during pass-
word recovery to filter out automated attacks;
• answer one or more of the pre-established security questions, e.g. as performed
by Apple;
• select an option for password recovery (if the user registered multiple methods),
e.g. as is the case for Amazon;
• enter the last password the user can recall, e.g. as requested by Google.
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Following initial acceptance of the request, a user may be required to engage in
further interactions to validate the request, e.g. as follows.
• An email is sent to the user’s registered address, and the user is asked to perform
a task using information contained in the email, e.g. clicking on an embedded
link or entering a code value.
• An SMS (text) message containing a secret code is sent to the user’s registered
mobile number, and the user is requested to enter this code; alternatively the user
may receive an automated call to his/her mobile phone and be asked to engage
in a short dialogue.
8.3.4 Password Re-establishment
We next review some commonly used methods for re-establishing a password.
• Email reset involves a website sending a message containing secret information
to the registered email address of the user requesting recovery. Subsequent use of
this information implicitly authenticates the user, assuming that only the user can
access emails sent to his/her email address. This approach is very widely used;
Bonneau et al. [12] found that 92% of the 138 websites they tested use email-
based password recovery. Various types of secret information are commonly sent,
e.g. as follows.
– Verification codes/temporary passwords are a temporary means of
accessing the user account, purely for the purposes of establishing a new
password, and are used, for example, by Amazon and Wikipedia — see
Figure 8.2. Note that Wikipedia limits users to one temporary password
per 24-hour period, and its temporary passwords expire after a week.
– Links (URLs) are embedded in emails sent to a user-registered address.
Clicking on such a link (which typically contains a secret string) redirects
the user browser to a page enabling the user to set up a new password. Some
websites, e.g. Twitter, limit the validity period of such links.
• SMS reset messages are sent to the user’s registered mobile number, and typi-
cally contain a secret verification code (analogously to email reset).
• Use of an old password is permitted by some websites, e.g. Google, as a means
of authenticating a user for password recovery. Typically, it will form only part
of the process of authenticating the user.
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Figure 8.2: Wikipedia password recovery using a temporary password
• Use of a trustee is supported by some websites (e.g. Facebook), where the
trustee is used as a secure communications channel to the account holder for
sending secret recovery information, such as a temporary (one-time) password.
8.3.5 After Password Re-establishment
After a user has reset his/her password, some websites immediately log out the user
and require a fresh log-in with the new password; others allow the user to continue
without logging-in again. In parallel with this, some websites notify the account holder
via email that password recovery has occurred, with the goal of alerting users if the
recovery was not authorised by the account holder.
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8.4 Security and Usability Issues
We now consider potential security and usability issues for the recovery validation and
password re-establishment techniques given in Sections 8.3.3 and 8.3.4.
8.4.1 Security Questions
As observed in Section 8.3.3, security questions are widely used to help ensure that
a recovery request is valid. As discussed in Section 4.2 in Chapter 4, apart from the
fact that gathering such personal data potentially endangers user privacy, a range of
serious security and usability issues have been identified. Bonneau et al. [10] identify
the following problems.
• Answers to some questions are more readily guessed than others since they have
a small answer space; such questions offer relatively little protection.
• Some users may provide false answers with the goals of limiting what is revealed
about them and making it harder for impostors to guess their responses. However,
users may forget their false answers, making the security questions useless in the
recovery process.
• Although the questions are designed to cover topics which users will always know,
some questions may nevertheless require the user to remember the answer they
gave, e.g. which of many pet names they chose, or which colour they said was
their favourite. Given such questions are likely to be used very infrequently, and
considerable time may elapse between setting them up and using them, a user’s
recollection of the ‘correct’ answers is likely to fade.
• Cultural differences can have an impact on the memorability of some questions,
e.g. Bonneau et al. [10] found that, for a typical set of questions, French users are
most likely to recall their first phone number and are least likely to recall their
father’s middle name.
Also, the answers to some questions could be obtained via social media, as discussed
by Rabkin [74]. Even more seriously, the same questions are used by many sites, making
possible the type of MitM attack described by Gelernter et al. [33] (see Section 8.4.5),
where a malicious site persuades a user to register with answers to security questions
which are then used to impersonate the user to another site. The real issue here is
that the authentication information (answers to security questions) is not site-specific;
analogous problems arise when users employ the same password with many sites —
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this has caused many well-documented security problems, notably when passwords for
one site are compromised and can then be used to try to impersonate users to other
sites8.
The main lessons from this analysis would appear to be that: (a) security questions
should be carefully chosen to maximise the level of security offered; (b) security ques-
tions only offer a limited level of security and should always be used in combination
with other methods; and (c) ideally authentication information should somehow be
made site-specific.
8.4.2 Trustee-based Recovery
As discussed by Gong and Wang [34], there are a number of security issues with relying
on trusted ‘friends’ of a user to support password recovery.
• The account holder may forget who they chose as trustees, so that an individual
may remain a nominated trustee even if they are no longer trusted. That is, the
state of trust can change with time and a user could forget to remove a trustee
from the list.
• Use of trustees can be prone to ‘forest fire attacks’ [34], where compromise of a
trustee account can compromise many other accounts.
• Users are sometimes obliged to nominate several trustees, e.g. Facebook mandates
three. This may force the user to select less trusted associates.
• A malicious trustee could take over an account by triggering password recovery
and (if necessary) comunicating with other trustees (e.g. using social engineering)
to obtain all the secret information necessary.
8.4.3 Email Reset
A major vulnerability of this approach is its assumption that emails cannot be inter-
cepted. There are various ways this assumption could be invalidated.
• If emails are retrieved via an unencrypted link, e.g. if the user accesses email
via a browser and the website does not use https, or if a mail client employs
IMAP over a link not protected using SSL/TLS, then emails might be intercepted.
8This analysis suggests a very simple attack on passwords, where a malicious entity sets up a site
and persuades users to register and choose an ID and password; the site can then act on the assumption
that some users will employ the same user name/password combinations elsewhere, and can try them
out with other sites to see if they work. Such an attack could be very effective without even requiring
any real-time MitM activity or compromise of existing password databases.
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This threat is particularly significant when using public access networks; a MitM
attacker operating a ‘fake’ public wireless access network could intercept emails
received via SMTP.
• If the reset email is forwarded to a third party, either accidentally or deliberately,
then the contents could be compromised.
• Malware in the client device could be used to obtain the reset email. For example,
Gelernter et al. [33] describe a malicious android application which, if installed,
can covertly read received emails.
The use of email for distributing reset information also has other risks. For example,
consider the case where the website for which password recovery is being performed
is itself a provider of an email service (e.g. Google). In this case, sending a password
reset message by email will not help, as the user will not be able to log in to retrieve it.
In such a case it is common practice for the user to be asked to register an alternative
email address to be used to distribute recovery information. During password recovery,
in some cases the user will be shown a partially obfuscated version of this alternative
email address, and the user will be asked to confirm that this is the correct address for
use in password recovery. Figures 8.3 and 8.4 show this process as used by Gmail. This
is a clear privacy breach, in that it may well be possible for a third party to learn the
entire alternative address, e.g. by a web search or by automated harvesting of email
addresses [38] (see, for example, Polakis et al. [73]).
Apart from the risk of spam, restricting access to email addresses is clearly desirable
given that email addresses are often used as user identifiers. A further possible problem
arising with the use of email relates to the non-permanent nature of email addresses. A
user may register an email address which may later become re-assigned to someone else,
e.g. because they change service providers or employers. In such a case, a password
reset message may be received by a third party, who could use it to take control of
the user account. Another issue could arise in a work environment in which employee
emails are temporarily forwarded to another person, e.g. because the employee is sick
or on leave; this could be especially hazardous if the forwardee is a temporary employee
or a contractor.
8.4.4 Verification Codes and Reset Links
As discussed in Section 8.3.4, there are two main ways emails can be used for password
recovery, namely by sending a verification code or a reset link. As discussed above,
both give rise to a risk if the email is compromised. Apart from the direct compromise
threat, both have other security and usability issues.
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Figure 8.3: Partial leakage of user
contact number
Figure 8.4: Partial leakage of alter-
native email address
• The following issues are associated with verification codes.
– Lack of entropy: since verification codes are typically short numeric values,
they are potentially vulnerable to brute force searching attacks. That is, if
a website does not limit the number of attempts to enter the code, then a
simple brute force attack becomes possible, as demonstrated by a successful
attack on two Facebook sites [86].
– As discussed in greater detail in Section 8.4.5 in the context of codes sent via
SMS, a user could be misled into revealing a verification code to a malicious
site in a type of phishing attack.
• Reset links have a slightly different set of associated issues.
– Some websites do not expire unused reset links, i.e. they remain valid in-
definitely. For example, in an experiment we discovered that a link for
rosegal.com remained valid for at least five months. Since it is hard to
understand why a link needs to be valid for more than a few hours, this
represents an unnecessary risk, since if such a link is ever disclosed it may
enable the associated account to be hijacked.
– Karlof et al. [53] describe a phishing attack on link-based password recovery.
The attacker starts password recovery at a website for a target user, knowing
this will cause the website to send an email containing a link to the that user.
Simultaneously the attacker emails the user asking them to paste the link in
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an email they are about to receive into a page on an attacker-controlled web-
site; a similar attack works against verification codes regardless of whether
they are in emails. This attack is similar to the Gelernter et al. [33] attack
on SMS-based password recovery (see Section 8.4.5).
8.4.5 SMS Reset
There are a variety of issues associated with the use of SMS reset messages, many of
which are analogous to issues associated with email reset.
• Since codes sent to mobile phones typically contain only six numeric digits9, i.e.
there are only 106 possibilities, this means that it may be possible to successfully
guess a code value. It is therefore imperative that websites limit the number of
entry attempts a user is permitted.
• As noted in Section 8.4.1, Gelernter et al. [33] describe an MitM attack on pass-
word recovery: the registration process for a malicious website is used to gather
the answers to personal security questions in order to successfully complete re-
quest validation for a website with which the user already has an account. Of
course, this MitM step does not complete the attack, as the attacked website
will typically, after receiving the correct answers to security questions, send a
verification code (e.g. via SMS) to the genuine user. To complete the attack, the
malicious website (as part of its registration procedure) tells the user to expect
a message containing a verification code which should be entered into the regis-
tration page. If the user enters the verification code received from the attacked
website, the malicious website will now have what it needs to complete the pro-
cess of capturing the user’s account. The only defence against this attack is for
the message containing the verification code to make it clear which website it is
intended for (i.e. the attacked website rather than the malicious website).
This attack will work against verification codes sent via email or SMS, although
it is much harder for the sending website to make clear how the code should be
used in a 160-character SMS message than in an email. Indeed, Gelernter et al.
[33] describe the results of a detailed survey of the use of SMS-based verification
codes, with the goal of understanding both how clear the SMS messages are, and
how likely users are to mistakenly enter a code intended for one website into a
box on a different website. They go on to make a series of recommendations
regarding how SMS messages should be designed to minimise the likelihood that
9Google and Dropbox both use 6–digit verification codes
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a user can be deceived. They also recommend that the verification code should
have a short validity period.
• In some countries, network coverage in rural areas is often poor or non-existent,
meaning it may not be possible for a user to obtain a verification code sent via
SMS. Similarly, if a user is travelling, he/she may not be able to receive the
SMS. Also, SMS messages are occasionally delayed, which may cause the user to
initiate many requests.
• Just as for emails, the security of SMS reset relies on the assumption that an SMS
message is a secure channel to the user. Again, as for email reset, this assumption
can be invalidated in a range of ways, e.g. as follows.
– Guri et al. [33] describe an attack based on an apparently harmless Android
app which can monitor and redirect SMS messages to an attacker server. If
such an app was installed, then a password recovery SMS might be compro-
mised.
– If the phone to which the SMS is sent is stolen then the contents of the SMS
message could be compromised; even if the phone is password-locked, the
message may still be compromised since many phones display the contents
of received SMS messages without requiring the phone to be unlocked.
– SMS messages could be intercepted at the network operator, e.g. by a mali-
cious employee, or when sent over the air interface if the air interface link is
not encrypted (as is the case in some countries). The message could also be
intercepted by an unauthorised base station (an IMSI catcher or ‘Stingray’)
[62] or by exploiting weaknesses in implementations of the SS7 protocol used
by telecomunication companies to communicate with each other [91].
– If the user changes his/her phone number and forgets to notify the website,
then the SMS message will be received by the new owner of that number.
8.4.6 Other Issues
We conclude this discussion of existing password recovery techniques by briefly review-
ing certain other issues which have a bearing on the security and/or usability of the
password recovery process.
• Use of an old password as the only means of user authentication for password
recovery is clearly dangerous, since one reason a user might replace a password
is because it has been, or is suspected of having been, compromised. It also
108
8.5. Towards Secure Password Recovery 8. Modelling the Password Recovery Process
seems relatively unlikely that a user will recollect an old password if they cannot
remember their current password.
• Many web services use an email address as a user ID, e.g. Amazon, Facebook,
Dropbox, Instagram, Twitter and LinkedIn. This has the major advantage of
making it easy for the user to remember their account identifier, and it is also
convenient for web service providers to deliver account-related functions via email
as well as simplifying registration. However, as discussed by Jin et al. [51], there
are significant risks associated with such an approach, not least that an attacker
automatically knows one of the two parts of a user credential set, thereby facili-
tating attacks on the password recovery process.
• Password hints may reveal sensitive information, potentially endangering user
security or privacy. For example, the Google password hint shown in Figure 8.1
indicates when the user last changed his/her password – this reveals that Google
was being used at that time. Whilst this may not seem so significant, for some
sites this could be far more revealing.
8.5 Towards Secure Password Recovery
We next provide recommendations on best practice in implementing a password recov-
ery system. These recommendations are based on the analysis given in the previous
section. We consider the two most security-significant steps in password recovery,
namely request validation and password re-establishment.
8.5.1 Recovery Request Validation
As discussed in Section 8.3.3, two main security-related steps are commonly used during
request validation, namely use of a CAPTCHA and security questions. The CAPTCHA
prevents automated attacks on password recovery, and appears a reasonable step to in-
clude. Security questions are used to prevent malicious triggering of password recovery,
which could otherwise be done on a large scale, e.g. using databases of email addresses
(since user names are often the same as email addresses). However, the use and ef-
fectiveness of security questions is questionable for a variety of reasons. Firstly, as
discussed in Section 8.4.1, the answers can sometimes be readily guessed or obtained
via social media, and, most seriously, the MitM attacks of Gelernter et al. [33] suggest
that they offer relatively little protection. Secondly, there are significant privacy issues,
since use of such questions involves gathering personal data, which could be misused
and could also cause issues with respect to privacy regulations such as GDPR [16].
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Thirdly, there are also usability issues, in that not all answers to questions can always
be readily recalled. It is therefore highly questionable whether using security questions
as a filtering mechanism is worth the trouble, since while it offers limited security it
also has significant negative privacy and usability disadvantages.
8.5.2 Password Re-establishment
Depending on how password re-establishment works, there are a number of important
recommendations which emerge from the analysis in Section 8.4. We look separately
at three main areas: email reset, SMS reset, and the use of trustees.
Email reset
If email is used to re-establish a shared password, then the website must try to minimise
the chance that the email reaches an incorrect recipient. This means, for example, that
the email address to which the message is to be sent should ideally have been used (or
confirmed by the user) recently. This could be achieved by asking the user to enter
the email address to which the email should be sent, and only if this matches with the
address stored by the website should it be used.
If verification codes are sent via email, then the discussion in Section 8.4.3 suggests
that: (a) they should use as large an alphabet as possible (e.g. including letters, digits
and punctuation), and be as long as possible, subject to usability constraints; and (b)
they should expire after a short period of time.
URLs sent in an email should: (a) have a short expiry period (just as for codes); (b)
contain a random (secret) string which should be sufficiently long to make successful
guessing attacks highly improbable; and (c) start with ‘https’, so that the connection
to the server is secure.
SMS reset
If SMS is used to deliver the means to re-establish a password, then very similar
requirements to those for email apply. That is, regardless of what information is sent
in the SMS, the website should try to ensure that the phone number is current, e.g.
by requesting the user to re-enter the number, and only if it matches with the number
stored by the website should it be used. Apart from the requirements applying to
verification codes and links previously mentioned, Gelernter et al. [33] give a list of
recommendations aimed specifically at verification codes sent via SMS. In particular:
(a) the SMS message should be designed so that the code is not displayed on the phone
screen when locked, i.e. forcing the user to unlock the phone to obtain the code; and
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(b) the wording of the SMS should minimise the chance that the user can be deceived
into submitting the code to the wrong website, including indicating the identity of the
sending website, the purpose of the message, and a warning not to divulge the code to
any other person or website.
Trustee-based password recovery
Since significant risks arise from out of date trustee data, as part of the recovery request
process the account holder should be asked to verify contact details for the trustee(s)
to be used. For example, the user could be asked to re-enter trustee email addresses
or phone numbers, with the website only using them if they match already stored
values. Websites could also periodically require users to revalidate trustee data. Clear
instructions should be sent with the password recovery information sent to a trustee, to
minimise the chance that a trustee is misled (e.g. via social engineering) into disclosing
the recovery data to the wrong party.
8.6 Conclusions
We have given a general model for the password recovery process, and we have also
examined the range of ways in which this model is instantiated by today’s websites. We
then provided the first comprehensive review of known security and privacy weaknesses
in existing approaches to password recovery; we also examined usability issues. This
then allowed us to make a series of recommendations regarding how best a password
recovery process should be designed.
There is clearly a need for further research in this important area, as well as new,
more secure, ways of performing recovery. Almost all the techniques in common use
are to some extent flawed, and many also pose privacy risks.
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Chapter 9
Real-world Email-Based
Password Recovery
9.1 Email-Based Password Recovery
As discussed in the previous chapter, most websites using passwords also implement
password recovery to allow users to re-establish a shared secret if the existing value is
forgotten; many such systems involve sending a password recovery email to the user, e.g.
containing a secret link. The security of password recovery, and hence the entire user-
website relationship, depends on the email being acted upon correctly; unfortunately,
as we show, such emails are not always designed to maximise security and can introduce
vulnerabilities into recovery.
To understand better this serious practical security problem, we surveyed password
recovery emails for 50 of the top English language websites. We investigated a range
of security and usability issues for these emails, covering their design, structure and
content (including the nature of the user instructions), the techniques used to recover
the password, and variations in email content from one web service to another. We
found that many well-known web services, including Facebook, Dropbox, and Microsoft,
suffer from recovery email design, structure and content issues.
This is, to our knowledge, the first study of its type reported in the literature. This
study has enabled us to formulate a set of recommendations for the design of such
emails.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 9.2 provides the
motivation for the study. In Section 9.3 we review the use of password recovery emails;
Section 9.4 then reviews the risks associated with email-based password recovery, where
this review forms the basis for our subsequent analysis. Section 9.5 gives the scope and
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methodology for the study, and Section 9.6 provides the main findings. In Section
9.7 we use these findings to provide recommendations on the design of email-based
password recovery. We briefly discuss disclosure of our findings in Section 9.8. Finally,
Section 9.9 concludes the chapter.
9.2 Motivation and Methodology
Websites often offer multiple password recovery options, e.g. based on security ques-
tions, a registered email address, or a mobile number. Email-based password recovery is
widely implemented [12, 32], and is likely to remain in wide use for years to come. In a
typical such system, when a user initiates password recovery a password recovery email
is sent to the user’s registered email address. The recovery email, see e.g. Figure 9.1,
will typically contain instructions on how to recover the password; these instructions
might include clicking on a link or entering a verification code or temporary password.
Since email-based password recovery is widely used, it is important to understand
whether it is secure in practice. Unfortunately, as we show, some recovery emails
are not well-designed and can introduce vulnerabilities into the recovery process. In
this chapter, we analyse password recovery emails by examining their content and
design, and use this analysis to make recommendations regarding their design. To
our knowledge there are no previously published studies on the design of recovery
emails, despite the potential of poor design to give rise to serious vulnerabilities. This
observation has motivated the work described here.
To understand better the size and nature of this serious practical security problem,
we manually surveyed password recovery emails for 50 of the top English language
websites1. The study examined the content of recovery emails and evaluated their
security and usability, including: their ease of use, their overall design, the clarity of
instructions, and the techniques used to recover the password.
9.3 Password Recovery Emails
9.3.1 Use of Recovery Emails
Email-based password recovery (as discussed in the previous chapter) involves an email
being sent to the user by the web service; this email contains a secret which, on the
assumption that the email can only reach the intended user, is used to authorise the
password recovery request. The email may also contain information which helps the
user to reset their password at the website. These emails vary in content and design,
1The list was taken from https://majestic.com/reports/majestic-million.
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although in all cases it is vital that the email is not available to third parties who could
use the secret in the email to hijack the recovery process. Given that correct use of the
email by its recipient is security-critical, the content and design of the email are clearly
of importance in practice, since they will affect how the email is treated by the user.
Figure 9.1 shows a Dropbox password recovery email. Such emails typically include
a user greeting, the email purpose, instructions (possibly including what to do if the user
did not request recovery), and contact details. The instructions will include a (one-time-
secret) mechanism enabling password recovery, e.g. a URL (link) or code/temporary
password. Clicking on such a link redirects the browser to a page enabling the user to set
up a new password. Verification codes/temporary passwords typically give temporary
access to a user account purely to establish a new password, e.g. as used by Amazon
and Wikipedia.
Figure 9.1: Example password recovery email (from dropbox.com)
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9.3.2 Email Structure
In general, emails can be divided into header and body [76]; however, for our purposes
we further divide password recovery emails into four components: the email preheader,
email header, email body and email signature (where the preheader and signature are
parts of the body), as follows.
• Email preheader (Johnson Box2 or Snippet). This corresponds to the first
few words of an email, the exact length being determined by the email client. It is
typically displayed by the email client after the subject header field (see below), to
give the recipient an idea of what the email is about3. Figure 9.2 shows an example
of a Gmail preheader. Despite its variability across clients, we discuss below the
importance of the preheader in ensuring that emails are handled appropriately
by their recipients. Given the small number of email clients in widespread use, it
is relatively easy for email senders to check the appearance of the preheader for
the vast majority of users.
Figure 9.2: Message preheader example
• Email header. The header can only contain printable US-ASCII characters
(except for carriage return, line feed, and colon), [76], and contains message
metadata. It is broken into fields, each starting with a name followed by a colon
(:). Examples of key header fields are briefly described below; many of these fields
are displayed by the email client, along with the body of the message.
– The subject field is chosen by the sender, and is commonly used to give a
summary of the email.
– The to and from fields contain the email addresses of the sender and recip-
ient, as specified by the sender.
– The orig-date indicates when the email was sent.
– The message-ID is a globally unique email identifier, [71, 76].
Email clients will typically display the subject, to, from and orig-date fields in
lists of received emails; other header fields, e.g. the message-ID, are typically
2http://hyperlinkcode.com/blog/html-johnson-box/
3The term ‘preheader’ is perhaps misleading since it is displayed after the subject header field, and
actually occurs in the email after the header.
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optionally viewable. For example, the Gmail show original button will reveal the
entire email header.
• Email body. This constitutes the contents of the email. Email bodies were
originally simply text strings, but MIME [30] allows bodies in a range of formats
and with multiple parts. Today many email bodies contain an HTML-formatted
part, which is by default what is displayed; this is thus the most important part
for our analysis, and we look in detail at the information included in recovery
email bodies below.
• Email signature. This is included at the end of the email body in a format
determined by the sender’s email client and the user. Its purpose is to provide
information about the sender in an accessible form.
9.3.3 Email Client Features
A range of email information can be displayed by an email client, some of which is
computed by the client rather than being contained in the email itself. Examples of
information of this latter type include the following.
• Sender Policy Framework (SPF) [58] is an email-validation system designed
to detect and block email spoofing. It allows receiving email exchangers to check
that an incoming email comes from a host authorised by the administrators of
the originating domain.
• DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) [19] aims to prevent email spoofing
by allowing the receiver to check that an email was authorised by the owner of
the originating domain.
• Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance
(DMARC) [59] is an email-validation system designed to combat certain tech-
niques often used in phishing and email spam, such as emails with forged sender
addresses (in the from field) appearing to originate from legitimate organisations.
9.4 Risks from Recovery Emails
We next review threats that can arise from poorly designed recovery emails. Of course,
the use of email in password recovery has intrinsic risks, as described in the previous
chapter. The list below was compiled by combining the discussion of the design of
password recovery SMSs due to Gelernter et al. [33], with observations derived from
our study.
116
9.5. A Study of Existing Practice 9. Real-world Email-Based Password Recovery
• Poor instructions. It is important that the user is given clear instructions on
how to use the email, and an indication of its sensitivity. Some emails give very
brief instructions, e.g. limited to what the user should do to proceed, whereas
others give almost too much information and are very hard to follow; this can be
challenging, especially for non-technical users. Most seriously, the lack of clear
instructions could lead to disclosure of the secret in the email, e.g. by forwarding
the email to a third party, thus compromising password recovery.
• Poor readability. Some HTML-formatted emails use small fonts and/or small
buttons, which can make reading them hard especially for those with impaired
vision.
• Lack of easily recognised source. Some recovery emails lack clear information
as to their source, e.g. a usable email address; in such cases the user may treat it
as a phishing email or it may be blocked by a spam filter.
• Email header or preheader leaking confidential information. In some
cases the temporary password or validation code is included in the header or
preheader, which means that it might be available to anyone with temporary
access to the phone, even if locked.
• Lack of contact details. Some emails lack contact details for use if the recovery
process fails. Contact details are often necessary as the source email address may
not be monitored for replies.
• Lack of instructions if recovery not requested. Recovery emails may lack
instructions on what to do if password recovery was not requested, e.g. indicating
an attempt to gain unauthorised access to the account.
• Spam filter issues. If the email is not constructed carefully, then there is an
increased danger that it will be blocked by a spam filter [32], hence preventing
the user from performing password recovery.
9.5 A Study of Existing Practice
9.5.1 Scope of Study
We examined 50 widely used English language sites. We looked at only 50 websites
because we needed to manually register at each site, trigger a recovery email, and
then carefully examine it. The average time to perform the first two steps was 20
minutes, and so it took around 17 hours simply to gather the data. The process could
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Table 9.1: The 50 websites tested in the study
Number Website name Number Website name
1 google.com 26 creativecommons.org
2 facebook.com 27 issuu.com
3 twitter.com 28 wix.com
4 microsoft.com 29 oracle.com
5 linkedin.com 30 imdb.com
6 instagram.com 31 slideshare.net
7 adobe.com 32 paypal.com
8 en.wikipedia.org 33 go.com
9 itunes.apple.com 34 myspace.com
10 vimeo.com 35 archive.org
11 pinterest.com 36 www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
12 yahoo.com 37 washingtonpost.com
13 amazon.com 38 cpanel.net
14 tumblr.com 39 bloomberg.com
15 github.com 40 ebay.com
16 mozilla.org 41 telegraph.co.uk
17 sourceforge.net 42 ibm.com
18 nytimes.com 43 hp.com
19 soundcloud.com 44 cnet.com
20 bbc.co.uk 45 dailymail.co.uk
21 reddit.com 46 opera.com
22 weebly.com 47 imgur.com
23 dropbox.com 48 debian.org
24 theguardian.com 49 twitch.tv
25 forbes.com 50 surveymonkey.com
not be automated since user registration and password recovery requests require user
interactions, e.g. solving a CAPTCHA or validating the email address by clicking on a
link or entering a temporary code.
We chose the 50 highest-ranking sites employing email-based password recovery
from the list of most-visited websites provided by majestic.com (chosen because it
offers information free of charge). In a number of cases, we were not able to study a
website on the list; if so we simply moved on to the next site in the list, continuing
until we had the results from 50 sites. Sites were omitted from our study if they did
not offer the ability to create an account, if creating an account required taking out
a paid subscription, or if an organisation (e.g. flickr.com and yahoo.com) operated
multiple sites in which case we skipped second and subsequent related sites. The full
list of websites we tested is given in Table 9.1.
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9.5.2 Methodology
We performed the following three steps with each of the 50 chosen websites. Account
creation/registration involved giving a user name, password, and any other infor-
mation requested. We initiated password recovery by making a password recovery
request and recording the received recovery email. Finally we manually analysed the
password recovery email. In this analysis we first tested each email against the design
risks listed in Section 9.4, and in each case considered whether the email suffered from
that risk. This generated the statistical results given in Section 9.6.5 below. We then
looked at each of the four components of the email and noted any examples of particu-
larly good or bad practice; the results of this examination are summarised in Sections
9.6.2–9.6.4.
9.6 Results
9.6.1 Example Recovery Emails
Figures 9.3 and 9.4 provide examples of recovery emails suffering from issues of the
type highlighted in Section 9.4.
Figure 9.3: Example recovery email: Lacking information
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Figure 9.4: Example recovery email: Readibility issue
9.6.2 Email Header
We examined the email header for all 50 recovery emails. We focussed on the subject
and from fields.
subject
Among the websites we tested, Facebook (see Figs. 9.2 and 9.5) was the only one which
included a verification code in the subject field (as opposed to the message body). An
email client may display the subject fields of received emails even when a phone is
locked, increasing the risk that the code will be seen by a third party.
from
This field includes an email address and, optionally, a ‘name’.
• If the sender name is absent then the receiver might doubt its legitimacy. Six
of the 50 emails did not state the name of the sender in this field, e.g. the
www.ibm.com recovery email had from field ‘ibmacct@us.ibm.com’, i.e. with-
out the name of the service. Similar issues arise in SMS-based password recovery
[33].
• In some cases, the email address did not identify the type of service, i.e. relating
to password recovery, e.g. no-reply@tumblr.com.
• Of the 50 recovery emails we examined, 21 (i.e. 42%) were sent from an email
address to which replies are not permitted (e.g. noreply@bloomberg.com). Other
websites did not use noreply but test emails sent to the address nevertheless
bounced, e.g. washingtonpost.com. If a contact email is not provided then this
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is very unhelpful for users who encounter difficulties; it could also mean that the
recovery email is blocked by an email client spam filter.
• Some emails were not constructed in such a way as to pass the SPF, DKIM and
DMARC anti-spoofing tests, e.g. ibm.com failed DMARC testing.
Figure 9.5: Facebook password recovery email
9.6.3 Message Body
Within the message body, 28 of the emails contained a personalised user greeting
(e.g. a name or email address), whereas the others had a generic greeting or none at
all. A personalised greeting is to be preferred since it helps reassure the user that
the email is genuine. Information as to when the request was initiated was included
in three of the recovery emails we examined; this helps the user verify that the email
corresponds to a legitimate request.
46 of the 50 emails included a URL link for password recovery. We have a number
of observations.
• 41 (82%) of the emails did not specify how long the URL would remain valid. As
discussed in the previous chapter, it is desirable for links to have a short lifetime,
since they represent a security risk. Indeed, some tokens were still valid even
three months after the experiment, e.g. creativecommons.org/ and bloomberg.
com. In other cases the password recovery page was available after token expiry,
allowing the user to generate a new token without user authentication, e.g. www.
mozilla.org.
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• 20 (40%) of the emails did not give a way of disabling the link in the event of
accidental initiation of password recovery, increasing the risk of compromise.
• Many emails require the user to copy and paste the URL into a browser, which
could expose the user to phishing attacks. For example, an attacker could trigger
password recovery for the user, and in parallel instruct the user to copy the URL
in a recovery email into an attacker webpage.
Websites give varying advice for the case that the user did not request recovery.
Some, e.g. www.dropbox.com and www.wix.com, simply suggested ignoring the email;
this may leave the user very concerned as to what is happening. Others suggest con-
tacting the web service, e.g. by filling an online form, contacting a call centre (e.g.
www.nytimes.com), replying to the email (e.g. www.vimeo.com), or clicking on a link
(e.g. Facebook.com). Other sites, e.g. www.forbes.com, did not address the issue at
all.
47 (94%) of the recovery emails failed to advise the user to protect the code or
URL. Giving such a warning could help to reduce the risk of code sharing and phishing
attacks. The same issue arises when using SMS-based password recovery.
9.6.4 Message Signature
As many as 21 of the emails lacked a signature, e.g. www.wikipedia.org/. Others
contained only the URL, e.g. www.microsoft.com and www.dropbox.com.
9.6.5 Summary of Risks
As described above, we conclude by summarising the observed frequency of the seven
risk types given in Section 9.4. The results are given in tabular form in Tables 9.2 and
9.3, in which a black spot is used to indicate a website whose recovery email had an
issue of the relevant type.
• Poor instructions. As many as 22 (44%) of the 50 emails contained no further
instructions on the use of the provided link or code, as was the case for www.
tumblr.com/.
• Poor readability. Three (6%) of the emails used small fonts or condensed blocks
of text, giving potential readability issues, e.g. www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/.
• Lack of easily recognised source. In five (10%) of the cases, the from field
contained an email address with no obvious link to the originating website, making
recognition problematic, e.g. dailymail.co.uk uses password@and.co.uk.
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• Email header or preheader leaking confidential information. Only six
of the 50 emails contained a secret code/temporary password; the others used a
link or a combination of code and link; of these six, two (4%) leaked the code
via the header or preheader field. These two websites are two of the most widely
used sites, i.e. google.com leaked the code via the preheader and facebook.com
included the code in the header.
• Lack of contact details. As many as 35 (70%) of the recovery emails did not
provide any contact details, e.g. for use in the event of problems, although some
of these (e.g. pinterest.com) provided links to websites for further information
(e.g. containing FAQs).
• Lack of instructions if recovery was not requested. 20 (40%) of the emails,
including that from google.com, failed to provide any user guidance for the case
where the recovery email was not requested.
• Spam filter issues. In our experiment, two (4%) of the emails were routed into
a spam folder by the email client, e.g. the email from creativecommons.org.
This suggests that the source of these emails could have done more to prevent
such an undesirable event.
All 50 of the emails suffered from at least two of the above issues. This suggests
that most websites need to improve the design of their recovery emails. Although some
the identified issues seem minor, even if they cause a problem in just 1% of recovery
attempts this could potentially result in a large number of compromised or unusable
accounts.
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1 google.com ●     ● ●   ● 
2 facebook.com       ●     ● 
3 twitter.com             ● 
4 microsoft.com ●       ●   ● 
5 linkedin.com         ●   ● 
6 instagram.com ●           ● 
7 adobe.com         ●   ● 
8 en.wikipedia.org             ● 
9 itunes.apple.com               
10 vimeo.com             ● 
11 pinterest.com             ● 
12 yahoo.com   ●         ● 
13 amazon.com         ●   ● 
14 tumblr.com ●       ●   ● 
15 github.com         ●   ● 
16 mozilla.org ●       ●   ● 
17 sourceforge.net ●       ●     
18 nytimes.com         ●     
19 soundcloud.com             ● 
20 bbc.co.uk             ● 
21 reddit.com             ● 
22 weebly.com ●       ●   ● 
23 dropbox.com ●           ● 
24 theguardian.com ●   ●         
25 forbes.com         ●     
26 creativecommons.org ●   ●   ● ● ● 
27 issuu.com ●           ● 
28 wix.com ●           ● 
29 oracle.com ●             
30 imdb.com ●           ● 
31 slideshare.net             ● 
32 paypal.com ●       ●   ● 
33 go.com               
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34 myspace.com ●       ● ● ● 
35 archive.org ●           ● 
36 www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov   ●           
37 washingtonpost.com ●       ●     
38 cpanel.net ● ●         ● 
39 bloomberg.com ●             
40 ebay.com               
41 telegraph.co.uk         ●     
42 ibm.com ●   ●   ●   ● 
43 hp.com         ●     
44 cnet.com               
45 dailymail.co.uk ●   ●   ●   ● 
46 opera.com     ●       ● 
47 imgur.com             ● 
48 debian.org              ● 
49 twitch.tv             ● 
50 surveymonkey.com               
 
Table 9.3: The 50 websites with issues identified (Part 2)
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9.7 Recommendations
The issues identified in our survey enable us to make the following recommendations for
the design of recovery emails. We divide our recommendations under seven headings
corresponding to the risks identified in Section 9.4.
• Instructions. A personal greeting is desirable to increase user confidence. Where
possible the email should include a clickable URL, and avoid asking the user
to copy/paste the URL. Users should be warned against sharing or forwarding
password recovery emails. More detailed information should be provided via links
to avoid creating congested, unreadable emails. The recovery mechanism should
have a limited validity period.
• Readability. The message should be easily comprehensible, i.e. the font/font
size must be chosen with care.
• Source recognition. The name of the sender and the sender email address
should match.
• Email header and preheader design. The header and preheader must not
include any secret recovery information, e.g. a code or link, since preheaders can
appear on a mobile phone screen even when locked. Users may also be tempted to
perform recovery just by reading the preheader without fully viewing the email,
thereby missing any instructions/warnings in the email. This issue can be more
serious for users who view emails on a mobile phone, where the preheader can
often be a ‘notification’. Similarly, the subject field in an email header should
state clearly the purpose of the email along with the service name.
• Contact details. The email should give a valid email address or a support link
for use if the user is unable to recover a password. Ideally the email signature
should include the name of the web service along with a logo, an email address,
a phone number, a website URL and a physical address.
• Instructions if recovery not requested. Users should be given a means
to disable the password recovery mechanism and to report unsolicited recovery
emails to assure users of their security.
• Spam filter issues. The email should be generated and sent in such a way as
to minimise the risk that it is blocked by a spam filter.
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9.8 Disclosure
We sent a copy of the paper [4] summarising our findings to all 50 of the websites
we tested. So far we have received replies from six of the 50 sites: Vimeo.com,
wikipedia.org, wix.com, cnet.com, dailymail.co.uk and imdb.com. All the replies
stated that the recipient was pleased to be contacted and that they were willing to make
improvements to their email-based password recovery system based on the findings of
the paper. Examples of the responses are included in Appendix B.
9.9 Conclusions
We examined the password recovery emails sent by 50 of the most widely visited web-
sites, and found that they all suffer from at least two types of defect. As a result it
seems likely that some password recovery processes are unnecessarily prone to compro-
mise. Although email-based password recovery allows the service provider to provide
clear and detailed instructions, it would appear that some providers have given rela-
tively little attention to the design of their recovery emails. In some cases the email
structure, wording and content clearly give rise to potential vulnerabilities. Our survey
has allowed us to make a series of recommendations regarding how best a password
recovery email should be designed to maximise security and usability.
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Part IV
Conclusions
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Chapter 10
Concluding Matters
10.1 Summary of Contributions
We introduced a general model for password generators, and considered all the existing
proposals in the context of this model. The model enabled us to analyse the advantages
and disadvantages of a range of approaches to building such systems. It also enabled
us to propose certain new options to enhance such schemes.
We described in detail the design of the AutoPass password generator. Its use of
a server, in particular to store password offsets, PRML specifications and user prefer-
ences, helps to remove the shortcomings present in all previously proposed password
generators. At the same time, this server is only partly trusted, and does not have the
means to recover individual user passwords. A prototype implementation of AutoPass
has been developed and used to conduct user trials, to verify that the desired high level
of usability can be achieved. The main findings of these trials, which established the
usability of the system, were reported.
We also gave a general model for the password recovery process, and we examined
the range of ways in which this model is instantiated by today’s websites. We provided
the first comprehensive review of known security and privacy weaknesses in existing
approaches to password recovery; we also examined usability issues. This allowed us
to make a series of recommendations regarding how best a password recovery process
should be designed.
We examined the password recovery emails sent by 50 of the most widely visited
websites, and found that they all suffer from at least two types of defect. As a result it
seems likely that some password recovery processes are likely to be unnecessarily prone
to compromise. Although email-based password recovery allows the service provider
to provide clear and detailed instructions, it would appear that some providers have
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given relatively little attention to the design of their recovery emails. In some cases the
email structure, wording and content clearly give rise to potential vulnerabilities.
10.2 Directions for Future Work
Whilst AutoPass has been prototyped and a small user trial has been conducted, the
trial was very limited in scope and its goal was merely to prove that the system was
usable. One obvious next step would be to make any adjustments deemed necessary
from a careful analysis of the trial, and to then perform a larger scale trial over a much
longer time period. This would probably necessitate paying participants. Of course, in
parallel we hope to receive unprompted feedback from users, given that the AutoPass
Chrome extension will soon be publicly available for free download from the Google
store. Another important next step will be to enhance AutoPass to add functionality
currently missing, including optional use of digital objects and the provision of a default
password policy. In addition, we plan to create versions for all the most popular
browsers, operating systems and platform types, thereby addressing the compatibility
issues identified by three of the original 17 trial participants. More generally, whilst
password generators have considerable potential, their use is still relatively limited.
Even password managers are not used to the extent that their proponents would like.
As a result, many users are still vulnerable to simple impersonation attacks through
the use of weak passwords, and through use of the same password with many sites.
Further research is urgently required on the best approach to try to understand what
would enable users to switch to more secure ways of managing their authentication
credentials.
There is clearly a need for further research in password recovery, as well as new,
more secure, ways of performing recovery. Almost all the techniques in common use
are to some extent flawed, and many also pose privacy risks. One direction for future
work would be to conduct large scale practical trials to try to understand better how
users can interact with password recovery systems both securely and reliably. Password
recovery is just one aspect of a larger topic we refer to as account recovery. This also
covers the case where a user may forget their user name, and/or other information
necessary to access an account at a website. This is a topic that has been the focus
of very little published research, and a survey of approaches used by major websites
would be an obvious way of starting to gain an understanding of the possible strengths
and weaknesses of various approaches.
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10.3 The Future of Passwords
Passwords have been around for decades, and they are not going to disappear any time
soon. The work described in this thesis aimed to explore ways to strength password-
based authentication until mature, readily usable and cheap alternatives can be de-
ployed to either replace passwords or provide a secondary means of authentication.
One approach to strengthening password-based authentication is the use of an ex-
tra layer of authentication, e.g. involving biometric or activity-based verification. In
biometric verification a user is authenticated based on an individual characteristic, e.g.
his/her fingerprint details, finger vein pattern, or retina/iris characteristics. Such solu-
tions can be implemented on smart phones, so that the phone is used to help perform
authentication (cf. FIDO [26]). In activity-based verification (essentially a different
class of biometric authentication), a user is authenticated by his or her behaviour, such
as user-mouse interactions, keyboard activity, or software interactions (including game
playing).
Another technique that can be used as a secondary authentication method involves
the use of contextual information, e.g. IP address, browser information, cookies cached
on the browser, the time of the login, and the use of trusted devices. More generally,
many modern user authentication methods, including biometric and contextual au-
thentication, involve the use of machine learning techniques, which potentially require
gathering significant amounts of data about the user, including the user’s behaviour
and devices. Whilst access to such data can improve authentication accuracy, it is also
a major threat to user privacy as well as being a target for attack.
From the user perspective, password-based authentication can be made more secure
through the use of password management solutions, such as password managers and
password generators. However, the challenge remains to persuade users to implement
such solutions rather than reusing passwords across multiple accounts or using weak
passwords.
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Appendices
A AutoPass Prototype and User Trial
A.1 AutoPass client – code extracts
Key extracts from the AutoPass client software (i.e. JavaScript from the Chrome ex-
tension), used in the trials described in Chapter 7, are given below.
I
 /* 
 * utils.js contains common functions used by AutoPass 
 * author: Wanpeng Li 
 */ 
 
/** 
 * generate a strong password for user 
 * @param  {[string]} mPasswd    [a long-term strong password selected by user] 
 * @param  {[string]} hostname   [the host name of the target website] 
 * @param  {[type]} pwdPolicy  [a password policy specified by the website] 
 * @param  {[type]} digitalObj [a digital file, e.g. a text fragment, picture, or audio sample] 
 * @return {[string]}            [return a deterministic password for the user] 
 */ 
function generatePassword(mPasswd, hostname, pwdPolicy, userAccountName,digitalObj) { 
    // hash the master password 
    var mPasswdHash = sha256(mPasswd); 
    // hash hash(master password) + hostname 
    var outHash = sha256(mPasswdHash + hostname + userAccountName); 
    // generate 
    var password = mapStringToPRML(pwdPolicy, outHash); 
    return password 
} 
 
 
 
/** 
 * generate a  password offset for user 
 * @param  {[string]} mPasswd    [a long-term strong password selected by user] 
 * @param  {[string]} hostname   [the host name of the target website] 
 * @param  {[type]} pwdPolicy  [a password policy specified by the website] 
II
 * @param  {[type]} digitalObj [a digital file, e.g. a text fragment, picture, or audio sample] 
 * @return {[string]}            [return a deterministic password for the user] 
 */ 
function generatePasswordOffset(mPasswd, hostname, pwdPolicy, 
userAccountName,userPwd,digitalObj){ 
  var mPasswdHash = sha256(mPasswd); 
  // hash hash(master password) + hostname 
  var outHash = sha256(mPasswdHash + hostname + userAccountName); 
  // generate 
  var outNum = bigInt(outHash, 16); 
  var userPwdHex = ascii_to_hexa(userPwd); 
  var userPwdNum = bigInt(userPwdHex, 16); 
  var pwdOffset = userPwdNum.subtract(outNum); 
  return pwdOffset.toString(16); 
} 
 
/** 
 * check the login status 
 * @return {Boolean} true if the user has logged in 
 */ 
function hasLoggedIn() { 
    var data = localStorage.getItem("masterPassword"); 
    if (data){ 
        return true; 
    }else{ 
        return false; 
    } 
} 
 
/** 
 * generate master passwords for the user 
III
 * @return {string} a 128-bit string (16 chars) 
 */ 
function generateMasterkey() { 
    return random(16); 
} 
 
 
/** 
 * change ascii to hexdecimal 
 * @param  {str} str the asicc string 
 * @return {str}     the hex string 
 */ 
function ascii_to_hexa(str) 
  { 
  var arr1 = []; 
  for (var n = 0, l = str.length; n < l; n ++) 
     { 
    var hex = Number(str.charCodeAt(n)).toString(16); 
    arr1.push(hex); 
   } 
  return arr1.join(''); 
 
} 
 
/** 
 * convert hex decimal to ascii 
 * @param  {str} str1 the hex string to convert 
 * @return {str}      the ascii string 
 */ 
function hex_to_ascii(str1) 
 { 
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  var hex  = str1.toString(); 
  var str = ''; 
  for (var n = 0; n < hex.length; n += 2) { 
    str += String.fromCharCode(parseInt(hex.substr(n, 2), 16)); 
  } 
  return str; 
 } 
 
/** 
 * calculate sha256 of a give string 
 * @param  {string} str [the input string] 
 * @return {string}     [the sha256 of the input string] 
 */ 
 
function sha256(ascii) { 
  function rightRotate(value, amount) { 
    return (value>>>amount) | (value<<(32 - amount)); 
  }; 
 
  var mathPow = Math.pow; 
  var maxWord = mathPow(2, 32); 
  var lengthProperty = 'length' 
  var i, j; // Used as a counter across the whole file 
  var result = '' 
 
  var words = []; 
  var asciiBitLength = ascii[lengthProperty]*8; 
 
  //* caching results is optional - remove/add slash from front of this line to toggle 
  // Initial hash value: first 32 bits of the fractional parts of the square roots of the first 8 primes 
  // (we actually calculate the first 64, but extra values are just ignored) 
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  var hash = sha256.h = sha256.h || []; 
  // Round constants: first 32 bits of the fractional parts of the cube roots of the first 64 primes 
  var k = sha256.k = sha256.k || []; 
  var primeCounter = k[lengthProperty]; 
  /*/ 
  var hash = [], k = []; 
  var primeCounter = 0; 
  //*/ 
 
  var isComposite = {}; 
  for (var candidate = 2; primeCounter < 64; candidate++) { 
    if (!isComposite[candidate]) { 
      for (i = 0; i < 313; i += candidate) { 
        isComposite[i] = candidate; 
      } 
      hash[primeCounter] = (mathPow(candidate, .5)*maxWord)|0; 
      k[primeCounter++] = (mathPow(candidate, 1/3)*maxWord)|0; 
    } 
  } 
 
  ascii += '\x80' // Append Ƈ' bit (plus zero padding) 
  while (ascii[lengthProperty]%64 - 56) ascii += '\x00' // More zero padding 
  for (i = 0; i < ascii[lengthProperty]; i++) { 
    j = ascii.charCodeAt(i); 
    if (j>>8) return; // ASCII check: only accept characters in range 0-255 
    words[i>>2] |= j << ((3 - i)%4)*8; 
  } 
  words[words[lengthProperty]] = ((asciiBitLength/maxWord)|0); 
  words[words[lengthProperty]] = (asciiBitLength) 
 
  // process each chunk 
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  for (j = 0; j < words[lengthProperty];) { 
    var w = words.slice(j, j += 16); // The message is expanded into 64 words as part of the iteration 
    var oldHash = hash; 
    // This is now the undefinedworking hash", often labelled as variables a...g 
    // (we have to truncate as well, otherwise extra entries at the end accumulate 
    hash = hash.slice(0, 8); 
 
    for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) { 
      var i2 = i + j; 
      // Expand the message into 64 words 
      // Used below if 
      var w15 = w[i - 15], w2 = w[i - 2]; 
 
      // Iterate 
      var a = hash[0], e = hash[4]; 
      var temp1 = hash[7] 
        + (rightRotate(e, 6) ^ rightRotate(e, 11) ^ rightRotate(e, 25)) // S1 
        + ((e&hash[5])^((~e)&hash[6])) // ch 
        + k[i] 
        // Expand the message schedule if needed 
        + (w[i] = (i < 16) ? w[i] : ( 
            w[i - 16] 
            + (rightRotate(w15, 7) ^ rightRotate(w15, 18) ^ (w15>>>3)) // s0 
            + w[i - 7] 
            + (rightRotate(w2, 17) ^ rightRotate(w2, 19) ^ (w2>>>10)) // s1 
          )|0 
        ); 
      // This is only used once, so *could* be moved below, but it only saves 4 bytes and makes things 
unreadble 
      var temp2 = (rightRotate(a, 2) ^ rightRotate(a, 13) ^ rightRotate(a, 22)) // S0 
        + ((a&hash[1])^(a&hash[2])^(hash[1]&hash[2])); // maj 
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       hash = [(temp1 + temp2)|0].concat(hash); // We don't bother trimming off the extra ones, 
they're harmless as long as we're truncating when we do the slice() 
      hash[4] = (hash[4] + temp1)|0; 
    } 
 
    for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { 
      hash[i] = (hash[i] + oldHash[i])|0; 
    } 
  } 
 
  for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { 
    for (j = 3; j + 1; j--) { 
      var b = (hash[i]>>(j*8))&255; 
      result += ((b < 16) ? 0 : '') + b.toString(16); 
    } 
  } 
  return result; 
}; 
 
 
/** 
 * randomly generate a string 
 * @param  {int} howMany the length of the output string 
 * @param  {string} chars   the chars used to generate the random string 
 * @return {string}         the random string 
 */ 
function random(howMany, chars) { 
    var chars = chars 
        || "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUWXYZ0123456789_=@+"; 
    var numbers = new Uint8Array(howMany); 
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    var rnd = crypto.getRandomValues(numbers); 
    var value = new Array(howMany); 
    var len = chars.length; 
    for (var i = 0; i < howMany; i++) { 
        value[i] = chars[rnd[i] % len] 
    }; 
    return value.join(''); 
} 
 
 
 
// chrome.webRequest.onBeforeSendHeaders.addListener( 
//         function(details) { 
//           for (var i = 0; i < details.requestHeaders.length; ++i) { 
//             if (details.requestHeaders[i].name === '11') { 
//               details.requestHeaders.splice(i, 1); 
//               break; 
//             } 
//           } 
//           console.log(details.requestHeaders); 
//           return {requestHeaders: details.requestHeaders}; 
//         }, 
//         {urls: ["<all_urls>"]}, 
//         ["blocking", "requestHeaders"]); 
 
/** 
 * retrieve PPD of a website 
 * @param  {string} domain the domain name of the target website 
 * @param  {integer} count  the number of search results to be retrieved 
 * @return {xml}        an xml file 
 */ 
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function cashPPD(domain, count) { 
  // search for PPD 
  var xmlhttp = new XMLHttpRequest(); 
  var searchURL = "https://api.ppdds.passwordassistance.info/v1/search" 
  xmlhttp.open("POST", searchURL); 
  xmlhttp.setRequestHeader("Content-Type", "application/json;charset=UTF-8"); 
  xmlhttp.setRequestHeader("Accept", "application/json;charset=UTF-8"); 
 
  xmlhttp.onload = function () { 
    var result = JSON.parse(xmlhttp.responseText); 
    console.log(result); 
    var results = result.result; 
    // retrieve PPD file 
    var foundPPD = false; 
    if (results && results.length > 0) { 
      for (var i = 0; i < results.length; i++) { 
        var rawURL = results[i].url; 
        var url = new URL(rawURL); 
        var domainRetrived = extractDomain(url.host); 
        // console.log(domainRetrived) 
 
        // make sure domain names of retrieved PPD same as the search domain 
        if (domainRetrived === domain){ 
          foundPPD = true; 
          var handler = results[i].ppdHandle; 
          var baseURL = "https://api.ppdds.passwordassistance.info/v1/ppds/"; 
          var xml = new XMLHttpRequest(); 
          xml.open("GET", baseURL + handler); 
          xml.setRequestHeader("Content-Type", "application/json;charset=UTF-8"); 
          xml.setRequestHeader("Accept", "application/json;charset=UTF-8"); 
          // console.log("I am here") 
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          xml.onload =  function(){ 
            var res = JSON.parse(xml.responseText); 
            // console.log(res); 
            storePPD(domain, res); 
            console.log("Store PPD for domain: " + domain); 
          }; 
          xml.send(); 
        } 
      } 
      if (!foundPPD) { 
        console.log("No PPD is found on domain: " + domain); 
      } 
    }else{ 
      console.log("No PPD is found on domain: " + domain); 
    } 
 
  }; 
  xmlhttp.send(JSON.stringify({ query: domain, count: count})); 
} 
 
/** 
 * store ppd to local storage 
 * @param  {strign} domain the domain name of the website 
 * @param  {json} ppd    a pdd json file 
 * @return {none} 
 */ 
function storePPD(domain, ppd) { 
  var pddStore = localStorage.getItem(domain); 
  if (pddStore) { 
    console.log(domain + " pdd has been cashed earlier!"); 
  } else { 
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    localStorage.setItem(domain, JSON.stringify(ppd)); 
  } 
} 
 
/* 
 * Domain name extractor. Turns host names into domain names 
 * Adapted from Chris Zarate's public domain genpass tool: 
 *  http://labs.zarate.org/passwd/ 
 */ 
 
function extractDomain(host) { 
    var s;  // the final result 
    // Begin Chris Zarate's code 
    var host=host.split('.'); 
 
    if(host[2]!=null) { 
        s=host[host.length-2]+'.'+host[host.length-1]; 
        
domains='ab.ca|ac.ac|ac.at|ac.be|ac.cn|ac.il|ac.in|ac.jp|ac.kr|ac.nz|ac.th|ac.uk|ac.za|adm.br|ad
v.br|agro.pl|ah.cn|aid.pl|alt.za|am.br|arq.br|art.br|arts.ro|asn.au|asso.fr|asso.mc|atm.pl|auto.pl
|bbs.tr|bc.ca|bio.br|biz.pl|bj.cn|br.com|cn.com|cng.br|cnt.br|co.ac|co.at|co.il|co.in|co.jp|co.kr|
co.nz|co.th|co.uk|co.za|com.au|com.br|com.cn|com.ec|com.fr|com.hk|com.mm|com.mx|com.p
h|com.pl|com.ro|com.ru|com.sg|com.tr|com.tw|cq.cn|cri.nz|de.com|ecn.br|edu.au|edu.cn|edu.
hk|edu.mm|edu.mx|edu.pl|edu.tr|edu.za|eng.br|ernet.in|esp.br|etc.br|eti.br|eu.com|eu.lv|fin.e
c|firm.ro|fm.br|fot.br|fst.br|g12.br|gb.com|gb.net|gd.cn|gen.nz|gmina.pl|go.jp|go.kr|go.th|gob.
mx|gov.br|gov.cn|gov.ec|gov.il|gov.in|gov.mm|gov.mx|gov.sg|gov.tr|gov.za|govt.nz|gs.cn|gsm.p
l|gv.ac|gv.at|gx.cn|gz.cn|hb.cn|he.cn|hi.cn|hk.cn|hl.cn|hn.cn|hu.com|idv.tw|ind.br|inf.br|info.pl
|info.ro|iwi.nz|jl.cn|jor.br|jpn.com|js.cn|k12.il|k12.tr|lel.br|ln.cn|ltd.uk|mail.pl|maori.nz|mb.ca|
me.uk|med.br|med.ec|media.pl|mi.th|miasta.pl|mil.br|mil.ec|mil.nz|mil.pl|mil.tr|mil.za|mo.cn|
muni.il|nb.ca|ne.jp|ne.kr|net.au|net.br|net.cn|net.ec|net.hk|net.il|net.in|net.mm|net.mx|net.nz
|net.pl|net.ru|net.sg|net.th|net.tr|net.tw|net.za|nf.ca|ngo.za|nm.cn|nm.kr|no.com|nom.br|no
m.pl|nom.ro|nom.za|ns.ca|nt.ca|nt.ro|ntr.br|nx.cn|odo.br|on.ca|or.ac|or.at|or.jp|or.kr|or.th|or
g.au|org.br|org.cn|org.ec|org.hk|org.il|org.mm|org.mx|org.nz|org.pl|org.ro|org.ru|org.sg|org.tr|
org.tw|org.uk|org.za|pc.pl|pe.ca|plc.uk|ppg.br|presse.fr|priv.pl|pro.br|psc.br|psi.br|qc.ca|qc.co
m|qh.cn|re.kr|realestate.pl|rec.br|rec.ro|rel.pl|res.in|ru.com|sa.com|sc.cn|school.nz|school.za|s
e.com|se.net|sh.cn|shop.pl|sk.ca|sklep.pl|slg.br|sn.cn|sos.pl|store.ro|targi.pl|tj.cn|tm.fr|tm.mc|
tm.pl|tm.ro|tm.za|tmp.br|tourism.pl|travel.pl|tur.br|turystyka.pl|tv.br|tw.cn|uk.co|uk.com|uk.n
et|us.com|uy.com|vet.br|web.za|web.com|www.ro|xj.cn|xz.cn|yk.ca|yn.cn|za.com'; 
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        domains=domains.split('|'); 
        for(var i=0;i<domains.length;i++) { 
            if(s==domains[i]) { 
                s=host[host.length-3]+'.'+s; 
                break; 
            } 
        } 
    }else{ 
        s=host.join('.'); 
    } 
    // End Chris Zarate's code 
    return s; 
} 
 
 
/** 
 * generate C-ary representation of a string 
 * @param  {integer} c   the integer use to generate the representation 
 * @param  {string} the hex string e.g. 0-f 
 * @return {string}     a C-ary representation of the string 
 */ 
function generateCaryString(c,str) { 
  var stacks = []; 
  var bigNum = bigInt(str, 16); 
  // console.log(bigNum); 
  while (bigNum.compare(0)){ 
    var rem = bigNum.mod(c); 
    stacks.push(rem); 
    bigNum = bigNum.divide(c); 
  } 
  return stacks.reverse(); 
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} 
 
/** 
 * map string representation to characters in PRML 
 * @param  {JSON} jsonPRML json file of the PRML file of the website 
 * @param  {integer} the hex string, e.g. 0-f 
 * @return {string}      a string that match the PRML 
 */ 
function mapStringToPRML(jsonPRML, str) { 
  console.log(jsonPRML) 
  var characterSet = jsonPRML.ppds[0].characterSets; 
  var characters = ""; 
  // console.log(characterSet) 
  // retrieve all characters from PRML 
  for (var i = 0; i < characterSet.length; i++) { 
    var character = characterSet[i].characters; 
    characters += character; 
  } 
 
  // build a map between C-ary and strings. 
  var dict = {}; 
  for (var i = 0; i < characters.length; i++) { 
    dict[i] = characters[i]; 
  } 
  var c = characters.length; 
  var cary = generateCaryString(c, str); 
  console.log(cary); 
  console.log(dict); 
  // transfer C-ary to strings 
  var str = ""; 
  for (var i = 0; i < cary.length; i++) { 
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    var c = cary[i]; 
    str += dict[c.toString()]; 
  } 
  return str; 
} 
 
/** 
 * verify a password whether it satisfy the PRML requirements 
 * @param  {JSON} jsonPRML the PRML object for a domain 
 * @param  {string} password the generated password 
 * @return {password or false}          return true if the generated password is OK 
 */ 
function verifyPassword(jsonPRML, password) { 
  var valid = false; 
  var tmpPwd = "" 
  // retrieve requirements from PRML 
  var properties = jsonPRML.ppds[0].properties; 
  var maxLength = properties.maxLength; 
  var minLength = properties.minLength; 
  // check the minmum password length 
  if (minLength && password.length < minLength) { 
    console.log("Password: " + password + " is not valid, Reason: not enough length") 
    return false; 
  } 
  // check maximum password length and trim generated password 
  if (maxLength && password.length > maxLength) { 
    console.log("trim Password: " + password + " to meet max length requirement") 
    tmpPwd = password.substring(0, maxLength); 
    console.log(tmpPwd) 
  } 
  // check the consecutive occurrence of a character in password 
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  var maxConsecutive = properties.maxConsecutive; 
  var char = tmpPwd[0]; 
  var counter = 1; 
  for (var i = 1; i < tmpPwd.length; i++) { 
    var tempChar = tmpPwd[i]; 
    if (char === tempChar) { 
      counter++; 
      if (maxConsecutive &&  counter > maxConsecutive) { 
        // console.log(counter); 
        console.log("Password: " + tmpPwd + " is not valid, Reason: max consecutive occurrence") 
        return false; 
      } 
    }else{ 
      counter = 1; 
      char = tempChar; 
    } 
  } 
 
  // check character set 
  var characterSet = jsonPRML.ppds[0].characterSets; 
  for (var i = 0; i < characterSet.length; i++) { 
    var charOccursSet = jsonPRML.ppds[0].properties.characterSettings.characterSetSettings; 
    var minCharOccurs = charOccursSet[i].minOccurs; 
    var maxCharOccurs = charOccursSet[i].maxOccurs; 
    if (minCharOccurs) { 
      // check min occurs of a charset 
      var charSet = new Set(characterSet[i].characters); 
      var interSet = occurance(charSet, tmpPwd); 
      var count = interSet.length; 
      if (count < minCharOccurs) { 
        console.log("Password: " + tmpPwd + " is not valid, Reason: min char occurrence") 
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        return false; 
      } 
    } 
    if (maxCharOccurs) { 
      // check max occurs of a charset 
      var charSet = new Set(characterSet[i].characters); 
      var interSet = occurance(charSet, tmpPwd); 
      var count = interSet.length; 
      if (count > maxCharOccurs) { 
        console.log("Password: " + tmpPwd + " is not valid, Reason: max char occurrence") 
        return false; 
      } 
    } 
  } 
  return tmpPwd || password; 
} 
 
// count occurrence of a set characters appeared in password 
function occurance(setChar, password) { 
    var _intersection = []; 
    for (var elem of password) { 
        if (setChar.has(elem)) { 
            _intersection.push(elem); 
        } 
    } 
    return _intersection; 
} 
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A.2 AutoPass Testing Documents
As stated in Chapter 7, participants in the user trial of AutoPass were provided with
four documents. These are reproduced in A.3-A.6 below.
A.3 Consent Form
All user trial participants were asked to read and sign the consent form before starting
use of AutoPass.
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CONSENT FORM
April 1, 2019
Title of project: Testing AutoPass
Name of researcher: Fatma AL Maqbali
I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the
above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. I understand
that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any
time, without giving any reason. I agree to take part in the above study. I
understand that I can withdraw my consent at any time by contacting the
researcher.
I understand that for the duration of the project my contribution will be
kept safely and securely with access only to those with permission from the
researcher. I give my permission for the information I have given to be used
for research or educational purposes only (including research publications
and reports). At no time will any user password ever be held (short or long
term) externally to a user device. Any information included in publications
or reports will be anonymised, and no information about individual accounts
or passwords will ever be released.
Signature:
Name :
Date:
Thank you for taking part in this study
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A.4 Testing AutoPass: A user guide
This document is intended to give an overview of the AutoPass password generator,
and to provide the user with guidance on its use for testing purposes. It also sketches
how AutoPass operates and indicates precisely what user information is stored and
where.
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Testing AutoPass: A user guide
Fatma Al Maqbali
Information Security Group, Royal Holloway, University of London
fatmaa.soh@cas.edu.om
April 1, 2019
1 Introduction
This document is intended to give an overview of the AutoPass password
generator, and to provide the user with guidance on its use for testing pur-
poses. It also sketches how AutoPass operates and indicates precisely what
user information is stored and where.
1.1 Background
This experiment is concerned with password generators, i.e. schemes de-
signed to simplify password management for end users by generating site-
specific passwords on demand from a small set of readily-memorable inputs.
Note that the term has also been used to describe much simpler schemes for
generating random or pseudorandom passwords which the user is then ex-
pected to remember; however, we use the term to describe a system intended
to be used whenever a user logs in and that can generate the necessary pass-
words on demand and in a repeatable way.
1.2 Password Generators
For the purposes of my research, a password generator has the following
components.
• A set of input values is used to determine the password for a particular
site. Some values must be site-specific so that the generated password
is site-specific. The values could be stored locally or online, based
on the characteristics of the authenticating site, or user-entered when
required. In practice, systems can, and often do, combine these types
of input.
• A password generation function combines the input values to generate
an appropriate password. This function could operate in a range of
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ways depending on the requirements of the web site performing the
authentication. For example, one web site might forbid the inclusion
of non-alphanumeric characters in a password, whereas another might
insist that a password contains at least one such character. To be
broadly applicable, a password generation function must therefore be
customisable.
• A password output method enables the generated password to be trans-
ferred to the authenticating site. This could, for example, involve dis-
playing the generated password to the user, who must then type (or
copy and paste) it into the appropriate place.
All this functionality needs to be implemented on the user platform.
There are various possibilities for such an implementation, including as a
stand-alone application or as a browser plug-in.
1.3 AutoPass
AutoPass is an experimental password generator, developed as part of my
PhD research. It incorporates both features from existing schemes as well
as a number of novel features. The system design is described in detail in a
published paper [1].
Wanpeng Li has kindly developed a prototype implementation of my
design, and the purpose of the experiment in which you are being asked
to participate is to test the usability and deployability of this prototype of
AutoPass as a way of validating my work. The results will form an important
part of my PhD thesis.
AutoPass has two main components: the AutoPass server and the Au-
toPass client software. The AutoPass server is used to store relatively non-
sensitive user data, e.g. the user name and website-specific password policies
(i.e. specifications of the types of password a particular site will accept). The
AutoPass client software is implemented as a browser plug-in; it provides
a user interface, and automatically generates site-specific user passwords as
a combination of the specified set of inputs. Some of the inputs are stored
locally and some are stored in the AutoPass server, with which the client
software interacts as necessary. Where possible, the generated password is
automatically inserted into login forms.
Figure 1 depicts the AutoPass architecture, showing the main compo-
nents of the scheme.
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Figure 1: AutoPass System Architecture
2 Data Collection and Storage
As I have described, AutoPass needs access to a variety of configuration data
to enable it to operate automatically, and this configuration data clearly
needs to be stored somewhere. There are two possible locations for data
storage, namely the AutoPass server and the AutoPass client, and AutoPass
uses both. The configuration data stored at the server is held long-term,
i.e. for the lifetime of the user account at the server; the data held on the
client may be held either short-term, typically for the life of a session, or
long-term, i.e. while the software remains installed on the client platform.
We summarise below the various types of stored data.
2.1 Server-stored data
The following user-specific configuration data is held at the AutoPass server:
• the user account name;
• an email address for the user;
• the (encrypted) master password;
• a hash of the master password;
• a (salted) hash of the session password
• for each website for which a password has been generated for this user:
– the (first part) of the URL of the website;
– the types of input used to generate the password for this site;
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– the password offset for this site (this relatively non-sensitive in-
formation cannot be used to compute the user password without
information that is not held on the server)
The following site-specific configuration data is held at the AutoPass
server:
• the (first part) of the URL of the website;
• the password policy of the site, encoded in PRML (an XML-based
scheme for specifying rules used by a site that contain password choices);
Note that the site-specific configuration data could be maintained by a
server separate from that used to store the user-specific configuration data.
Indeed, since this data is completely non-confidential, it could be provided
by a service independent of AutoPass, e.g. the Password Requirements De-
scription Distribution Service (PRDDS) [2], which provides an online inter-
face to meet requests for PRML-based Password Requirements Descriptors
(PRDs) for websites identified by their URL.
2.2 Client-stored data
The following data is held long-term by the AutoPass client:
• cached copies of password policies for recently visited websites.
The following data is held short-term by the AutoPass client:
• the session password;
• a multiply-iterated hash of the master password.
3 Contact details
For questions about the experiment please contact:
Fatma AL Maqbali
Email: pbva132@live.rhul.ac.uk
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A.5 AutoPass: An Introductory Guide
This document describes how to install and use AutoPass.
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AutoPass: An Introductory Guide
Fatma Al Maqbali
Information Security Group, Royal Holloway, University of London
fatmaa.soh@cas.edu.om
April 1, 2019
1 Introduction
This document describes how to install and use AutoPass.
2 What is AutoPass?
AutoPass is a password generator designed to simplify password manage-
ment for end users by generating website-specific passwords on demand from
a small set of inputs. It incorporates features from existing schemes as well
as a number of novel techniques. Its operation relies on the installation of a
Chrome extension available from the Google webstore.
AutoPass has two main components: the AutoPass server and the Au-
toPass client software. The AutoPass server is used to store relatively non-
sensitive user data, e.g. the user name and website-specific password policies
(i.e. specifications of the types of password a particular site will accept). The
AutoPass client software is implemented as a Chrome extension; it provides
a user interface, and automatically generates site-specific user passwords as
a combination of the specified set of inputs. Some of the inputs are stored
locally and some are stored in the AutoPass server, with which the client
software interacts as necessary.
3 AutoPass Installation
The AutoPass extension icon is shown in Figure 1. The AutoPass extension
can be installed by clicking on the following link: https://chrome.google.com/webstore/
detail/autopass/oapnffdchomlagblkehioepojjkjjcjb/related
1
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Figure 1: The AutoPass extension icon
After installation, when you next open Chrome, the extension will be
displayed next to the search bar.
4 AutoPass Registration
Before using AutoPass to generate passwords, it is necessary to register with
the AutoPass server and create an account. This involves the following steps.
1. Use your browser to visit: http://www.autopasspg.co.uk/login/
2. Click on the Sign Up button. This will lead you to the registration
page, shown in Figure 2. The various items of information required to
complete the registration process are marked with numbers in figure
2, and each item is now explained.
2
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Figure 2: AutoPass registration page
1. Account name: please provide a user name; you can check its avail-
ability by pressing on check account availability. If the account name
you choose is unavailable, i.e. it is already in use, then you will need
to provide another user name.
2. First name: please provide your first name.
3. Last name: please provide your last name.
4. Email : please provide an email address for account recovery purposes.
5. Password : please provide a login password which must be at least eight
characters long — you will need to remember this password, which you
will be required to enter every time you start the extension (when you
start Chrome).
6. Password confirmation: please re-enter the login password you pro-
vided in the previous field.
7. Master Password : when you click Generate Master Key, AutoPass will
generate a master password for you, which will be used to generate
passwords for individual websites. It is strongly recommended that
you keep a hard copy of the master password, because AutoPass is
not able to recover it if you forget your AutoPass login password. It
is stored encrypted using a key generated from the login password.
3
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8. Solve CAPTCHA: please tick the box next to I am not a robot, and
then solve the supplied CAPTCHA (if appropriate).
9. Registration: please press this button to complete the registration pro-
cess.
10. Print registration: please press this button to make a printed copy of
the registration credentials (including the master password).
5 Signing In
Once registration is complete, you will need to sign in to the extension
whenever you start Chrome. To sign in, please follow the steps listed below.
1. In Chrome, click on the AutoPass extension and then provide your
account name and the password, as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3: AutoPass login window
2. Account Name: provide the user name you registered with AutoPass.
3. Password : provide the login password you registered with AutoPass.
After signing in, AutoPass will be available to assist in providing passwords
for websites.
4
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6 Using AutoPass
6.1 First time use with a website
When you first navigate to a website (using Chrome), AutoPass will detect
the login page and display a pop-up to ask if you wish AutoPass to generate
a password for this website — for example as shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4: AutoPass pop-up for user consent
If you click on OK, AutoPass will display a pop-up window, as shown in
Figure 5. To use AutoPass with this website, please provide the User name
that you wish to use with this website. AutoPass will automatically fill in
the URL for the website.
5
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Figure 5: AutoPass password generation window
You now have two choices.
• If you leave the User your own password unchecked, when you click
on Generate Password AutoPass will generate a new password for this
site. This new password will displayed in the Password Generated
field. Clicking on the Copy Generated Password button will cause the
generated password to be copied to the clipboard, enabling you to
paste it in the appropriate place in the website account set up page.
• If you have already established a password with this website, and you
wish to keep using it, then select the Use your own password option.
Figure 6 shows the window that results if you select this option. In
this case please enter your chosen password in the Your Own Password
field, and click on Confirm.
6
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Figure 6: Use your own password window
Finally note that the Log Out button allows you to log out of AutoPass.
6.2 Everyday use
AutoPass will automatically fill in a previously established user name and
password if a login page detected and AutoPass has already been set up for
this website.
6.3 Notes on use
If you choose to use AutoPass to generate a new password for a site, and
you wish to keep using this site after you have stopped using AutoPass, then
you need to keep a record of the password AutoPass generates.
Some websites may give the error message No password policy is found
on domain: ***. In such a case AutoPass is unable to generate a password
for this site.
7 Contact details
If you have any questions about the operation and security properties of
AutoPass, please contact Fatma Al Maqbali at the following email address:
pbva132@live.rhul.ac.uk
7
XXXIII
A.6 AutoPass evaluation questionnaire
This survey is intended to evaluate the usability and deployability of AutoPass.
XXXIV
AutoPass evaluation questionnaire
This survey is intended to evaluate the usability and deployability of AutoPass.
About you
1. Gender:  Male  Female
2. Age:
 20-29  30-39  40-49  50-59  60-69
Your use of passwords
3. What difficulties do you face with using passwords? [Please select all that apply]
 Too many accounts with too many passwords.
 Different websites have different policies on what is permitted as a password e.g. upper case, lower
case.
 Some websites require frequent password changes.
 Other issues:
4. How do you currently generate your passwords? [Please select all that apply]
 Password generator.
 Password generator which is built into a password manager or browser.
 I use the same password for all accounts with minimal modification.
 I use familiar phrases or dates.
 I generate a random password from whatever comes to mind.
 Other methods:
5. Have you ever used a computer program to generate your passwords?
 Yes
 No
AutoPass Usability
6. Overall, how easy did you find it to use AutoPass?
 Very easy  Easy  Neutral  Difficult  Very difficult
7. How easy was it to create an account with AutoPass?
 Very easy  Easy  Neutral  Difficult  Very difficult
8. Knowing that AutoPass can generate the correct strong password on demand without the
need to store it made you feel:
 More secure
 Less secure
 No different
9. Level of satisfaction with passwords generated using AutoPass
 Satisfied
 Not at all satisfied XXXV
 Neither satisfied nor unsatisfied
10. Do you prefer AutoPass over your current password management method?
 Yes
 No
11. Overall, what additional features do you think might improve the functionality of AutoPass?
Answer:
XXXVI
A.7 AutoPass Survey Outcome
The complete set of questionnaire responses obtained from the user trial participants
is given below.
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AutoPass evaluation questionnaire
12 responses
Gender?
12 responses
Age?
12 responses
What di culties do you face with using passwords? [Please select all that
apply]
12 responses
Male
Female
75%
25%
18-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65+
8.3%
25%
58.3%
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How do you currently generate your passwords? [Please select all that apply]
12 responses
Have you ever used a computer program to generate your passwords?
12 responses
Overall, how easy did you find it to use AutoPass?
12 responses
Too many accounts with
too many passwor…
Different websites have
different polic…
Some websites require
frequent password…
Counterintuitive
7 (58.3%)
7 (58.3%)
6 (50%)
1 (8.3%)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Password generator.
Password generator
which is built into …
I use the same password
for all account…
I use familiar phrases or
dates.
I generate a random
password from whate…
1 (8.3%)
0 (0%)
5 (41.7%)
6 (50%)
5 (41.7%)
I generate a random password from whate…
Count: 5
Yes
No50%
50%
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How easy was it to create an account with AutoPass?
12 responses
Level of satisfaction with passwords generated using AutoPass
12 responses
Did you find the ability to use existing passwords useful?
Very Easy
Easy
Neutral
Difficult
Very Difficult
25%
50%
25%
Very Easy
Easy
Neutral
Difficult
Very Difficult8.3%
33.3%
50%
Satisfied
Not at all satisfied
Neither satisfied nor
unsatisfied16.7%
8.3%
75%
XL
12 responses
If you ever used a computer program to generate your passwords, how does
AutoPass compare with methods you have used previously?
12 responses
Do you prefer AutoPass over your current password management method?
12 responses
Yes
No
No opinion
8.3%
83.3%
Better
Worse
About the same
No opinion
16.7%
50%
33.3%
Yes
No41.7%
58.3%
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What additional features do you think might improve the functionality of
AutoPass?
6 responses
Change the random password
to auto  ll the username as well, not only the URL. Great work!
linking password creation with human memorization theories So the program doesn't generate password only but
helps user to remember it.
There should be speci cations regarding creating passwords in AutoPass in order for the password to be solid
length of the password should be limited
A timer to change your password, to improve security of my password maybe?
This content is neither created nor endorsed by Google. Report Abuse - Terms of Service
 Forms
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B Password Recovery Emails – Disclosure and Responses
As described in Chapter 9, details of the study of password recovery emails were sent
to all 50 of the websites included in the study. The email sent to the 50 websites is
given in B.1 and examples of the responses are provided in B.2-B.7.
B.1 Email Sent to the surveyed websites
Given below is the email sent to the surveyed websites.
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Subject: Your website was surveyed to evaluate the security of email based password recovery. 
 
Dear (webservice) team, 
 
I am currently a PhD student at Royal Holloway, University of London working 
under the supervision of Professor Chris Mitchell.  I am performing research 
on the security of password management. 
As part of my research, I have conducted a survey of 50 major websites to 
analyse and evaluate email-based password recovery, of which your website 
was one.  Every password recovery email we examined possessed at least two 
issues which could compromise the security of the password recovery process. 
I have also formulated a set of recommendations to mitigate the identified 
risks.  A paper describing the results of the study is attached for your reference. 
https://pure.royalholloway.ac.uk/portal/files/30955357/ebprro.pdf 
 
Regards, 
 
Fatma AL Maqbali 
Information Security Group 
Royal Holloway 
University of London 
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B.2 vimeo.com
Figure 1: Response from vimeo.com
B.3 wikipedia.org
Figure 2: Response from wikipedia.org
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B.4 Wix.com
Figure 3: Response from Wix.com
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B.5 cnet.com
Figure 4: Response from cnet.com
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B.6 dailymail.co.uk
Figure 5: Response from dailymail.co.uk
B.7 IMDb.com
Figure 6: Response from IMDb.com
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C Other Issues Identified in Email-based Password Re-
covery
Tables 1 and 2 below supplement Tables 9.2 and 9.3 of Chapter 9. They summarise
other issues identified in the 50 surveyed password recovery emails.
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1 google.com email /link ● ● ●   ● ● 
2 facebook.com email /link     ●     ● 
3 twitter.com email /link     ●     ● 
4 microsoft.com email/temporary code   ● ●       
5 linkedin.com email /link   ● ●     ● 
6 instagram.com email/link     ●     ● 
7 adobe.com email /link     ●   ● ● 
8 en.wikipedia.org email/temporary code     ● ● ●   
9 itunes.apple.com email/ link     ●     ● 
10 vimeo.com email/link ●   ●   ● ● 
11 pinterest.com email/link ●   ●     ● 
12 yahoo.com email/code   ●     ● ● 
13 amazon.com email/code ●   ●       
14 tumblr.com email/link ● ● ●   ● ● 
15 github.com email/link ● ● ●   ●   
16 mozilla.org email/link ●         ● 
17 sourceforge.net email/link ● ● ●   ●   
18 nytimes.com email/link ●   ●   ● ● 
19 soundcloud.com email/link     ●   ● ● 
20 bbc.co.uk email/link ●   ●     ● 
21 reddit.com email/link     ●   ●   
22 weebly.com email/link ● ● ●   ●   
23 dropbox.com email/link   ● ●   ●   
24 theguardian.com email/link     ●       
25 forbes.com email/link     ●   ● ● 
26 creativecommons.org email/link ●   ●   ●   
27 issuu.com email/link   ● ●   ● ● 
28 wix.com email/link ● ● ●   ● ● 
29 oracle.com email/link     ●     ● 
30 imdb.com email/link ● ● ●   ●   
31 slideshare.net email/link   ● ●   ● ● 
32 paypal.com email/code     ●     ● 
33 go.com email/link     ●     ● 
34 myspace.com email/link     ●   ●   
35 archive.org email/link   ● ●   ●   
Table 1: Other issues identified in email-based password recovery (Part 1)
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36 www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov email/link   ● ●   ●   
37 washingtonpost.com email/link ●   ●   ● ● 
38 cpanel.net email/link     ●   ●   
39 bloomberg.com email/link ● ● ●   ● ● 
40 ebay.com email/link or code     ●   ● ● 
41 telegraph.co.uk email/link ●   ●   ● ● 
42 ibm.com email/link ● ● ● ● ●   
43 hp.com email/link   ● ●   ●   
44 cnet.com email/link ● ●       ● 
45 dailymail.co.uk email/link ●   ●     ● 
46 opera.com email/link ● ● ●   ●   
47 imgur.com email/link ●   ●       
48 debian.org  email/link     ●   ●   
49 twitch.tv email/link   ● ●       
50 surveymonkey.com email/link     ●   ● ● 
 
Table 2: Other issues identified in email-based password recovery (Part 2)
